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Beginning with the colonial and imperial encounters that constitute the early, 
conflict-ridden moments of trans-territorial contact, this research is interested in the 
relationship between gender, race, and shifting transnational power relationships.  
Bringing together work from Sociology, Women’s Studies, and Postcolonial Studies, 
it is interested in the following questions.  How are modern constructions of gender 
and race forged in transnational—colonial as well as ‘postcolonial’—processes?  
How did they emerge in and contribute to such processes during the colonial era?  
Specifically, how did they shape colonialist constructions of space, identity and 
international community?  How has this relationship shifted with legal 
decolonization?  First, it offers a theory regarding these questions in the European 
colonial era, the theory of kinship.  This theory posits that the colonialist construction 
of space, identity and international community historically relied on a trope of 
kinship, which operated by constructing the colonies as ‘children’ and the metropoles 
as ‘parents.’  Even more, kinship actually helped to constitute colonial notions of race 
(i.e., ‘childlike natives’) and gender (i.e., ‘the lack of the nuclear household in 
African society as evidence of cultural immaturity’).  In this manner, kinship helped 
to define colonized others as children, thereby to deny the subjectivity of these others 
(particularly their spatial and identity claims), and thus to ultimately build 
hierarchical structures of international community.  
Combining discourse and comparative historical methods of analysis, this 
work explores how colonialists and anti-colonialists renegotiate transnational power 
relationships within the debates on decolonization in the United Nations from 1946-
1960.  It argues that while colonialists continued to use the trope of kinship to 
legitimate the status quo, anti-colonialists insisted that the colonies had ‘grown up’ 
and that continuing colonialism was a humiliation that emasculated fully adult men.  
Thus, anti-colonialists attempted to reorder global power relationships by 
renegotiating the kinship trope.  In other words, to the politics of paternalism, they 
responded with the politics of masculinity.  Ultimately, then, the complex, shifting, 
politics of race relied on a politics of gender/sexuality, both of which were central to 
the changing contours of international community in the mid-20th century.  
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Sociological work on difference and inequality has proceeded at multiple 
levels of analysis, each of which speaks to the others only rarely.  At the ‘macro’ 
level, for example, this work has been preoccupied with terms such as modernity, 
development and rationalization, and sociologists here have compared states at 
different stages of the so-called modernity-development-rationalization continuum, 
concerning themselves with delineating the factors that determine advancement or 
stagnation on this front.  At the ‘micro’ level, on the other hand, work on difference 
and inequality has examined experiences of racism, classicism, and sexism; and in 
recent years, intersectional work has also focused on how these different dimensions 
of inequality intersect and interact.  Additionally, some studies also exist at the 
‘meso’ level of institutions and organizations.  Yet, despite this plethora of work on 
difference and inequality, the attempt to bring together these multiple levels of 
analysis and indeed, to speak to these levels simultaneously, is rare.  From such a 
multi-level perspective, for example, what might a state’s comparative position on 
this modernity-development-rationalization continuum have to do with decidedly 
local but globalized constructions of racial or cultural or sexual inequality?  
Otherwise stated, how do we broaden our understanding of the intersections of racial, 
cultural and sexual hierarchy within the largely United States-focused literature to 
incorporate broader histories of globalization?  Moving one step back from 
experiences of racial, cultural or sexual inequality, as well as from determinants of 
modernity or development or rationalization, I am interested in the processes of 
racialization and sexualization—in the power-laden processes of differentiation—that 
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help constitute categories of difference and inequality across multiple levels of 
analysis in the first place.   
I am especially interested in exploring these multi-level processes of 
differentiation within the histories of Euro-American imperialism, colonialism and 
decolonization that have been so integral to the contemporary shape of the modern 
world—an analytical space that has rarely been examined by sociological work at any 
level.  For example, how have these histories of colonialism in Asia, Africa and the 
Americas, in their various manifestations, shaped not just modern notions of racial, or 
sexual or cultural difference, but also of the statuses of development and 
underdevelopment—all identity constructs through which colonialism denied the 
spatial and identity claims of its various others?  Regarding this denial of spatial and 
identity claims, according to Michael Shapiro, "to be an object of moral solicitude 
and a subject with eligibility to act within the domain of the political, one must 
occupy space and have an identity that commands a recognition of that occupation” 
(Shapiro 1999).  Thus, the identity/spatial order of the colonial era—a world map 
dotted by metropoles and their dependent territories—relied on granting ‘moral 
solicitude’ only to some while denying it to others.  In doing so, it relied on what I 
call a ‘differential personhood’ or ‘differential subjectivity,’ thereby helping to 
construct an international community based on affirming the personhood of some 
while denying personhood to others.  
Beyond these hierarchies of colonialism, I am also interested in how anti-
colonialists related to, negotiated with, and ultimately challenged these constructions 
of space, identity and international community in their efforts at decolonization.  
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Specifically, in this process, I am interested in how anti-colonialists addressed the 
colonialist construction of differential personhood, and the racial, cultural and sexual 
politics on which it relied.    
In this study, I address these questions in several parts.  First, I examine 
colonialist discourses prior to legal decolonization in order to develop a theory about 
space, identity and international community in the colonial era.  I start here with an 
examination of the development of the nation-state system as the advance of imperial 
models of space and identity over alternative, non-state models.  I argue that this 
process is driven in part by what I call a ‘politics of embodiment,’ or the deployment 
of the developing modernist hierarchy of rational/irrational.  Also manifesting as a 
gender (masculine/feminine) and an age (parent/child) hierarchy, the politics of 
embodiment ultimately becomes a key component in colonial theories of racial, 
cultural and gender inequality.  For example, colonialist discourse often constructed 
its others as insufficiently masculine men or as children, thereby denying them full 
personhood and providing a key step in the ultimate take-over of their lands.  But this 
differential personhood via embodiment politics is only one piece of a broader 
kinship politics, which, I argue, is the key to understanding international community, 
or relations of power across these (differentially ordered) territories and peoples, in 
the colonial era.  That is, a central way in which colonialist discourse imagined the 
nature of its authority in colonial relationships was on the model of authority within 
kinship relations, particularly the western European family.  Thus, this rule positioned 
itself as the rational/masculine/paternal, which possessed a natural and legitimate 
right to rule, much like the father within the family, in relation to a number of 
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irrational/feminine/childlike others.  I argue, moreover, that this kinship politics was a 
moving politics, providing a range of imagery for constructing naturalized, 
hierarchical association across peoples and territories, from the absolute authority of 
the father within classic patriarchy—concomitant with the ideology of absolute 
authority within colonial rule—to ‘softer’ notions of parenting for the benefit or 
‘development’ of children, which loosely correlates with notions of colonial rule for 
the beneficence and development of dependent peoples.  
How did anti-colonialists address this differential personhood—this 
irrationalization, effiminization, infantilization—which served to deny their spatial 
and identity claims?  How did they contend with the politics of embodiment and 
kinship?  How did they negotiate decolonization?  In the rest of this study, I explore 
these questions by examining a particular ‘macro-micro,’ local-global event: the 
discursive and institutional negotiation within the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA), between the years of 1946-1960, of the 1960 UN Declaration on Granting 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, a new legal instrument which would 
initiate the onset of legal decolonization.  The GA is the main deliberative organ of 
the UN, and each session is organized as a general debate in which Member States 
express their views on matters of international concern.  I argue that institutionally, 
the GA brings together more diverse, competing, and submerged voices than ever 
before (including European colonial interests, newly independent Asian and African 
anti-colonial interests, and colonial moderates).  Thus, the GA meetings are the ideal 
location in which to observe the poly-vocal, local- global negotiation of the movement 
away from the old geopolitical order to the new—from the old politics of differential 
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personhood and hierarchical international community to something new.  In the GA, 
then, I examine archival records to explore how the previous spatial/identity order is 
defended, challenged, and ultimately reworked via the renegotiation of the associated 
embodiment and kinship politics.  
In brief, I argue that the racialized, sexualized embodiment and kinship 
politics of the colonial era re-crystallize in the GA debates in a particular way.  For 
their part, colonialist powers and sympathizers largely resort to the kinship politics of 
paternal rule on the part of developed, rational, mature, and competent territories, the 
purpose of which is to teach and guide childlike, underdeveloped peoples so that they 
are prepared for (eventual) political independence.  Interestingly, for anti-colonialists 
in the GA, such infantilization amounts to an emasculation.  Thus, anti-colonialists 
argue, colonial rule is an illegitimate rule that serves to emasculate already grown 
men; and political independence is a prerequisite for the return of masculine dignity.  
Rather than international relations being modeled on the image of parents and 
children, thus, anti-colonialists argue that they should instead be modeled on the 
image of brotherhood.  
Ultimately, then, within this ‘macro-micro,’ local- global space of the UNGA 
debates, we see the utility of transnationalizing the current intersectional perspective 
within Sociology.  To the racialized, sexualized construction of space, identity and 
international community in the colonial era, anti-colonialists ask for a new, ‘more 
equitable’ masculine international community thereafter.  Thus, though they contest 
the racial and cultural hierarchies of the colonial era, in this moment, often 
represented as a ‘global advance of democracy,’ anti-colonialists reaffirm gender 
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hierarchy.  In doing so, they provide a window onto the emerging masculinization of 
‘postcolonial’ states as well as ‘postcolonial’ international community.
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Kinship Politics: Space, Identity and International Community 
Prior to Legal Decolonization
In this chapter, I first review the emergence of a particular geopolitical 
organization of space, the modern nation-state system.  I argue that in its 
confrontations with alternative models of space over time, this particular ordering 
denies the ontological validity of other organizations of space (for example, nomadic 
and other non-Westphalian models outside of the post-17th century European state-
system).  Next, I explore how the modern geopolitical order constructs identity as 
well as identity distinctions (including racial, sexual and cultural distinctions) through 
a process of what I term embodiment politics.  I argue that such politics becomes a 
central mechanism for the exercise of power, as it constructs some identities as 
subjects while simultaneously producing others as less than subjects.  Even more, I 
make the case that it is in this process of other-ization that emerge colonial 
constructions of race, gender and culture.  Next, I articulate how this racialized, 
sexualized embodiment politics becomes deployed as part of a larger kinship politics 
in the development of the modern state-system to construct hierarchical structures of 
trans-territorial community.  I end with a brief review of some historical connections 
between images of kinship and ideologies of colonial rule.
On Space and Territory
In this section, I discuss the ordering of space as a variable cultural and 
political construction.  More specifically, I focus on shifting constructions of territory, 
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which may be understood as bounded space associated with formal political 
structures (Cox 2002; Gottman 1975).  First, I outline a number of different 
organizations of space that have existed historically, each of which implies a 
particular construction of territory.  Second, I discuss modern forms of territory in 
particular, highlighting how, as these develop, meaning and identity themselves 
became 'territorialized' in some particular ways.  Finally, I explore how forms of 
territoriality that are considered modern confronted and contested alternative forms, 
often denying these others ontological validity in their advancement.  
To start, work on space and spatiality in general explores how the spatial is a 
thoroughly social, cultural and historical phenomenon, shifting in both form and 
meaning in different locations and indeed, even functioning as a medium through 
which the social is produced and reproduced (Soja 1989; Lefebvre 1991; Gottdiener 
1993; Abbott 1997; Gieryn 2000; Matias 1999; Gregory and Urry 1985; Cox 2002)
Considering political space, Agnew (1999) argues that political power has a different 
spatiality over time, and identifies four models of the "spatiality of power," which he 
associates with different historical epochs.  The first is the ensemble of worlds, which 
he argues was the most important until the 16th century.  In this model, human groups 
live in separate cultural areas with limited communication and interaction between 
them.  Each has a sense of profound difference beyond its own boundaries without 
any conception of the particular character of the others.  There are communal forms 
of social community within, as well as fuzzy external boundaries.  Time is cyclical or 
seasonal, and political power is largely internally oriented and directed toward 
dynastic maintenance and internal order.  Finally, there is also a strongly physical 
10
conception of space as distance to be overcome or circulation to be managed.  The 
second model is termed field of forces.  Most important from the 16th century through
1945, it is here that the state emerges as a rigidly defined territorial unit in which each 
state can gain power only at the expense of others and each has total control over its 
own territory.  All of the attributes of politics, such as rights, representation, 
legitimacy, and citizenship, are restricted to the territory of individual states.  Time is 
ordered on a rational global basis so the trains can run on time, military forces can 
coordinate their activities, and so on.  The dominant spatiality is that of state-territory, 
in which political boundaries provide the containers for the majority of social, 
economic, and political activities.  The third model, the hierarchical network model, 
has been most important since 1945.  Critical here is the spatial structure of the world 
economy, in which cores, peripheries, and semiperipheries are linked together by 
flows of goods, people and investment.  Time is organized by the geographical scope 
and temporal rhythm of financial and economic transactions.  The spatiality is that of 
spatial networks joining together a hierarchy of nodes and areas that are connected by 
flows of people, goods, capital and information.  Finally, the fourth model is that of 
the integrated world society, has been somewhat in ascendance in the last ten years.  
This model conforms to a humanistic ideal of the world in which cultural community, 
political identity and economic integration are all structured at a global scale.  Also, 
there is increased perception of common global problems and growth of an 
international 'public opinion'.  Time and space are both defined by the spontaneous 
and reciprocal timing and spacing of human activities.  Real and virtual spaces 
become indistinguishable.  Agnew (1999) argues that there is overlap between these 
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models, with the former two models somewhat in eclipse since 1945 and the latter 
two in ascendance.  Furthermore, these shifts are indicative of changes in the 
territorial nature of power relationships in that while the former two signify territorial 
spatialities of power, the latter two are network models that operate across territories 
(Agnew 1999).
Other authors generally agree with this periodization of shifting orders of 
political space.1  The medieval system of rule was legitimated by common bodies of 
law, religion, and custom that expressed inclusive natural rights.  These inclusive 
legitimations posed no threat to the integrity of the constituent political units because 
these units viewed themselves as municipal embodiments of a universal moral 
community.  Territorially, these political units were divided through 'frontiers' or 
large 'zones of transition' rather than by clearly demarcated boundaries.  There were 
also plural allegiances, asymmetrical suzerainties, and anomalous enclaves.  Hence 
the political map was an inextricably superimposed and tangled one, in which 
different juridical instances were geographically interwoven (Anderson 1974; Ruggie 
1993; Gottman 1975; Spruyt 1994).   Gottman (1975) argues that with the 14th
century there began to emerge an understanding of sovereignty over national territory
as an essential component of political power; from the 15th through the 17th centuries, 
the doctrine of space partitioning matured in Europe, with the Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648) a critical moment in this development.   All these changes prefigured what 
Ruggie (1993) calls "the central attribute of modernity in international politics…an 
1 A number of authors may not agree with the details of this periodization or that territorial forms of 
power are in descent in any significant sense.  For example, world-systems theorists argue for a much 
earlier dating of the development of the world economy, as well as the continuing relevance of 
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peculiar and historically unique configuration of territorial space” (144).  In the 
modern form, states are mutually exclusive and functionally similar.  The chief 
characteristic is the consolidation of all parcelized and personalized authority into one 
public realm, which entails two fundamental spatial demarcations: the first between 
the public and the private within the state and the second between the internal and the 
external to the state.  In terms of power, internally, legitimate power is fused with the 
provision of public order and externally, legitimate power is fused with statecraft.  
Reciprocal sovereignty becomes the basis of the new international order as well as the 
new principle of international legitimacy (Ruggie 1993).  Perhaps most significant in 
terms of the political dimension of modern notions of territory, however, is what 
Taylor (1994) calls "the state's capture of politics” (Taylor 1994: 151).  That is, he 
argues that, with the linkage of 'the political' to the state, anything that is perceived to 
be exterior to the state—whether the 'private' realm within states or that nebulous 
dimension 'above' states—is seen as somehow outside of politics.
With these shifting meanings of territory, a particularly interesting line of 
work has focused on how the meaning of territorial space within different kinds of 
political orders depends on particular kinds of bounding.  For example, as mentioned 
above, while political identity in medieval Europe may have crossed 'territorial 
boundaries' in numerous and complicated ways (Ruggie 1993; Anderson 1974; 
Gottman 1975), modern states territorialized meaning by manipulating languages, 
education systems, myths, symbols and narratives (Paasi 1999; Hobsbawn 1990; 
Anderson 1991).  The American and French Revolutions not only helped to construct 
territorial forms of political power.  See (Arrighi 1994).  Nevertheless, Agnew's work is useful in its 
overall historical approach. 
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a 'people,' but also established a direct relationship between people and territory 
(Gottman 1975).  An additional element was the imagination of horizontal as opposed 
to hierarchical relationships with members of one's particular territory (Cerwonka 
1999; Anderson 1991).  Such projects of the territorialization of meaning in turn 
changed the very meaning of territory.  Now, the community became indissolubly 
linked to the land.   No longer parcels of land transferable between states as the 
outcome of wars, all territory, including borderlands, became inviolate.  Hence, as 
migration from villages to towns increased, 'national culture' still gave people a 
continued identity with their land as the land became sacred (Taylor 1994).
Since 1945, several authors identify what they see as important shifts in the 
characteristics of political space and territory in the modern world.  According to 
Ruggie (1993), for certain kinds of issues, an "institutional negation of territoriality 
serves as a means of dealing with those dimensions of collective existence that 
territorial rulers recognize to be irreducibly trans-territorial in character...[and this is] 
where international society is anchored” (Ruggie 1993).   Matias (1999) argues that in 
some locations, we are seeing the emergence of a 'new medievalism,' or an 
overlapping of various authorities on the same territory, giving rise to 'empire-like' 
structures in some parts of the world (such as western Europe).
Political space and territory, then, are variable objects of historical and 
cultural construction.  Likewise, they have also historically been mechanisms for the 
exercise of power.  Indeed, Paasi (1999) uses a second noun form of the term 
territory, territoriality, to denote a spatial strategy which can be employed to affect, 
influence or control resources and people by controlling area.  What is interesting 
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about the emerging states of western Europe, from the perspective of power relations, 
is that modern, European statehood rendered to the political entities that could claim 
its mantle a particular form of territorial subjecthood, which, when confronted with 
alternative, particularly 'non-European,'2 'non-state,' territorial forms, tended to deny 
other possible territorial subjectivities, or at least their viability.  Delanty (1995: 6-10)
suggests that just the idea of Europe, grafted on as it was to notions of Christianity 
and civilization in opposition to others, itself served as a kind of legitimation for the 
politics of the secular and territorial state.  Certainly, Westphalia created a system of 
states that were to be equal to each other, but even a cursory consideration of imperial 
and colonial practices demonstrates that the status of legitimate territoriality and 
equality was not extended to all territories (Eva 1999; Theodoropoulos 1988).  
Moreover, celebrated as an evolutionary achievement, European state power, when 
confronted with other political entities and alternative forms of territoriality, did not 
hesitate to impose its preferred models of space (Shapiro 1999; Edney 2003; 
McClintock 1995).  
Discussing the spatial politics of the colonial project, McClintock (1995)
argues that during the colonial period, scientists invented two things: panoptical time 
and anachronistic space.  In terms of the first, as social evolutionists attempted to read 
from a discontinuous natural record a single pedigree of evolving world history, they 
collected, assembled and mapped not only natural space but also historical time.  
2 I am not using the term 'non-European' in any simple, given sense.  What counted as 'Europe' at any 
particular moment moved in tandem with countless other historical, cultural and political factors.  For 
more on this, see (Delanty 1995).  Given the complexities of what may have counted as Europe and 
non-Europe in a particular historical moment, I also assume such complexities when I use concepts 
such as 'west,' 'non-west,' and modernity.
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They sought to break the hold of Biblical chronology and to instead secularize time.  
Their solution, hence, was to spatialize time, where the axis of time was projected 
onto the axis of space.  Or to put it another way, perceived geographical difference 
across space was figured as historical difference across time.  Hence (European) 
travelers that sailed to distant lands actually traveled 'back in time.'  Particularly when 
applied to cultural history, then, time became a geography of social power, a map 
from which to read a global allegory of 'natural' social difference.  In terms of spatial 
politics, consequently, the agency of various 'others' was disavowed and projected 
onto anachronistic space.  These others were hence rendered somehow prehistoric, 
atavistic, irrational—inherently out-of-place in the historical time of modernity 
(McClintock 1995). 
Constructing Differential Personhood: The Role of Embodiment Politics
But what are the precise mechanisms of this removal of various 'others' onto 
anachronistic space and from the historical time of modernity?  How is geographical 
difference constructed as historical difference?  In this section, I explore how the 
modern geopolitical order constructs identity as well as identity distinctions through a 
process of what I term embodiment politics.  By the term embodiment politics, I mean 
to indicate a particular cultural and political construction of the body as a metaphor 
for disorder.3  That is, particularly in the 'west,' historically what we term the body or 
the bodily has alternatively signified the uncontrollable, the irrational, the emotional, 
3 Of course, such a construction of the body as a metaphor for disorder may not always be oppressive 
but also liberating, or something else, depending on the context.  In this work, however, I am focusing 
on conditions in which such a construction is positioned in opposition to and below the putative state 
of order.
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the uncivilized, the savage and the barbaric in some pervasive and systematic ways.  
Below, I explore this particular figuration of the body as well as its role in the modern 
exercise of power.  First, I examine how the object of 'the body' has been constructed 
through a number of western narratives.  Second, I use the work of Haraway, 
Bourdieu and a number of others on the politics of classification to explore the 
politics of what becomes classified as 'the body.'  That is, once the body is figured as 
that which requires control, how do different objects become embodied?  How do 
they become categorized as 'the body' or 'the bodily?'  How do they come to qualify 
as requiring control?  Finally, I argue that such processes of embodiment are 
mechanisms for the exercise of power, serving to simultaneously define the 
subjectivity and agency of those that are somehow 'disembodied' (dissociated from 
the bodily and thus disorder) while denying these to the 'embodied' (overly associated 
with the bodily and thus disorder).  This distinction between the 'disembodied' and the 
'embodied,' I argue, is central to understanding the colonial construction of space and 
identity within modernity.
To start, Donna Haraway (2000) begins from the notion that there is no place 
in the world outside of stories.  As objects are frozen stories, our own bodies become 
'objects' only through metaphor.  Embedded in "physical, semiotic, fleshy, bloody 
existence” (Haraway and Goodeve 2000), then, despite its 'physicality,' the body is a 
particular kind of physical, material object only from inside of stories.  Similarly, 
Turner (1997) writes that the body is plastic; instead of a closed, sealed entity, Harvey 
(2000) adds, rather a relational 'thing' that is created, bounded, sustained, and 
ultimately dissolved in a spatiotemporal flux of multiple processes.  As a relational 
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yet frozen object, then, the thing-i-fi-cation of the mutable body is accomplished 
through reification.  
A number of scholars have elaborated the scientific, religious, capitalist and 
other narratives in the west that have frozen 'the body' into an object of concern.  
Perhaps the most pervasive metaphor for the body has been that of the non-rational or 
the barbaric (Berman 1989; Patterson 2002; Turner 1992; Turner 1996; Elias 2000; 
Johnson 1987; Horkheimer and Adorno 1973), and multiple authors have traced the 
processes in modernity which have consequently sought to discipline or civilize the 
body (Foucault 1978; Elias 2000; Foucault 1988a; Foucault 1977).  Although the 
focus has typically been on the shift from the medieval to the modern and the sacred 
to the secular, writers have repeatedly pinpointed one critical historical moment in 
this construction of the body as disorder: the rise of mechanical philosophy (Berman 
1989; Holliday and Hassard 2001; Turner 1996).4  As Berman (1989) argues, in 
mechanical philosophy, everything in the world, from atoms to animals to galaxies, 
was thought to be comprised of material particles and to operate on the model of a 
machine.  With regard to the body, Descartes drew a distinction between the soul and 
the body as well, with the body also conceptualized as a machine that received its 
instructions from the soul (Turner 1996) .  Such reasoning clearly subordinated 'the 
body' or 'the bodily' to 'the soul' or 'the mind.'  Effectively, then, the ideology of 
4 I do not want to imply here that mechanical philosophy invented the rational/irrational hierarchy out 
of whole cloth.  This hierarchy actually has a long history in traditions claimed by contemporary 
western thought.  For example, in Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery, he argues that the distinction 
between a natural slave and a rational man (who may incidentally be enslaved) is based on a 
distinction between 'rational' and 'irrational' souls.  A rational man is a fully developed human male in 
whom the rational triumphs over the irrational, and so possesses the capacity for deliberation or moral 
choice.  According to Aristotle, natural slaves do not possess these qualities, and neither do women 
and children (Pagden 1995). 
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Cartesianism served to exclude the irrational and the magical, and to regulate 
emotions, sexuality and affective life through the regulated and disciplined body 
(Turner 1996).5  As a worldview, Turner argues that Cartesianism became a basic 
principle of Protestant individualism, scientific rationalism, and the Protestant spirit. 6
The principal features in all of these were thus the separation of mind and body, with 
the subordination of body to mind, and the associated dominance of cognitive 
rationalization.  In the following centuries, there was a further elaboration of this 
ascetic attitude towards the body.  The body was seen as a threatening, difficult and 
dangerous phenomenon—a conduit for unruly, ungovernable, irrational passions, 
emotions and desires.  As such, it had to be controlled and regulated by cultural 
processes.  While the flesh stood in the same sphere as sub-human animality, the soul 
became the carrier and symbol of all forms of spirituality and rationality.  Turner 
connects this will to control the body in Christianity, ultimately, with the ethic of 
world mastery which was central to the rationalization processes that Weber traces, as 
well as the new epistemological philosophies of empiricism, positivism, and 
Cartesian rationalism (Turner 1996; Turner 1992).  From the perspective of the body, 
then, Berman (1989) argues that the shift from the medieval to the modern was key; 
while oral cultures had strong somatic bases, with participation being highly sensuous 
5 I am fully aware of the problems of reading 'the past' in terms of our needs and investments of the 
present, as well as how this critique has been applied to the sort of reading of Descartes and of 
Cartesian philosophy being developed here (for example, see Newman 2002).  Following Newman's 
argument, I fully allow for the possibility of the complexity of the context in which Descartes wrote as 
well as multiple readings of Descartes (Newman 2002).  I further allow for historically variable 
realizations of the meaning of Cartesianism.  Nevertheless, this complexity does not negate the 
possibility of a particular kind of reading, as described in the section above, becoming available to the 
numerous political projects cited above.      
6 However, the sort of Weberian interpretation of Cartesianism that is provided here by Turner as 
largely associated with Protestanism, has been discredited as overly Anglo and Nordic-based, and as 
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in nature and its immediate, visceral quality valued as a mode of knowing, the 
emerging philosophy instead prioritized psychic distance.  Consequently, new 
formulations of 'objectivity' now required the removal of the body from analysis, the 
essential feature becoming "psychic distance, the existence of a rigid barrier between 
observer and observed” (Berman 1989; Elias 2000).  Likewise, the 'emotional,' 
associated as it was with the body, now became the 'unreliable (Berman 1989).'  
From the perspective of power, Donna Haraway makes a critical gesture here.  
She asks: what is at stake in boundary making?  What is at stake in maintaining the 
boundaries between what gets called nature and what gets called culture (Haraway 
and Goodeve 2000)?  Similarly, we may think of classification systems as "historical 
and political artifacts” (Bowker and Star 2000), ways of seeing the world or 
"principles of vision and division” (Bourdieu 1984), through the acquisition of which 
people learn the hierarchies embedded within the social system prior to and outside of 
any conscious intention.  Hence the consequent naturalization of hierarchy makes 
various forms of appropriation appear legitimate, even to those who stand to lose 
from these arrangements.  For the oppressed, consequently, this is a form of symbolic 
violence.  Misrecognized and naturalized, it is a "gentle, invisible form of violence” 
(Bourdieu 1977), and thus, what we learn to bound as the 'body' is a "technology of 
power…the effect and instrument of complex power relations” (Foucault 1977; 
1988b).  
A critical example of this 'gentle, invisible violence'—this 'technology of 
power'— is the notion of what Nancy Stephan terms the 'disembodied individual.'  
ignoring the earlier and perhaps more important influence of Cartesianism among Catholic as well as 
Jewish capitalists in places like France and the early German states (Moses 2003).  
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She writes that starting in 1600s, and culminating in writings of the new social 
contract philosophers of 1700s, there developed the concept of the political 
individual, an imagined, universal individual who was the bearer of equal political 
rights.  In the theoretical imagination, this person was to be someone who could be 
imagined stripped of individual substantiation and specification so that he could stand 
for everyman.  Unmarked by specificities such as wealth, rank, education, age, and 
sex, he expressed a common psyche and political humanity.  The contract 
philosophers used the notion of the universal individual to establish a theoretical 
ground for moral autonomy and democracy.  However, the historical counterpart to 
this 'disembodiment' of the universal individual of modernity was the ontologizing via 
embodiment of sexual and racial difference, a rendering of certain racialized and 
sexualized groups as somehow closer to their bodies than the disembodied individual. 
These groups were thus distinguished in their biology and differentiated from an 
implicit white (European), male norm.  By being embodied as qualitatively different 
in their substantial natures, communities of individuals were placed outside the liberal 
universe of freedom, equality and rights.  In effect, a theory of politics and rights was 
articulated as an argument about the nature of particular racial(ized) and sexual(ized) 
groups (Stephan 2000).  For Descartes, then, 'pure mind' meant the rational, sovereign 
individual (Holliday and Hassard 2001).  It follows that if the essence of humanity 
was defined as a set of qualities of 'the mind,' such as reason, intelligible language, 
religion, culture, or manners, anyone who was deemed to not fully possess those 
qualities was considered subhuman (Patterson 2002), outside of sociality (Witz 2000), 
with their subjectivity rendered a non-subjectivity (Holliday and Hassard 2001).  
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Thus, from the 1500s, non-Europeans were imagined in various ways as unnatural, 
savage, barbaric, cannibalistic, sexually aberrant, and lacking history (Patterson 2002; 
Augstein 1996).  For example, some groups of Africans were thought to be 
animalistic and brutish, with a beastlike, excessive sexuality, while particularly in the 
nineteenth century, Asians came to be seen as weak and lacking of virility (Patterson 
2002; Aldrich 1996).  Indeed, by the 1800s, European scientists were using the 
disembodiment-embodiment hierarchy in various ways to construct theories of racial, 
sexual, cultural and class inequality.  These emerging constructions of inequality set 
white, European males above non-Europeans, women, Jews, and Africans in multiple 
ways.  Women, non-whites, Jews, and the working-classes within 'superior' races 
were all considered to be lower forms of humans (Patterson 2002; Witz 2000; 
McClintock 1995; Roberts 1997; Dyer 1997; Turner 1996).  Such embodiment 
discourses, which constructed Jews as animalistic and insect-like, also informed the 
logic that sought to legitimate the Holocaust (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973; Perry 
1983).  
That it was the politics of embodiment that was an important, common 
mechanism of subordination in all these instances also becomes clear when we 
consider a number of things.  First, with regard to race and gender, there were 
important connections between the treatment of women and of non-Europeans in the 
language, experience, and imaginations of western men.  For both race and gender, 
existing philosophical and religious ideas combined with new natural and social 
science theories of classification, and there were a number of comparable ways in 
which difference was constructed and used to justify subordination for women and 
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ethnic others.  Differences between sexes as well as between races were seen as 
essential, or understood as inherent in their bodies.  For groups marked by gender 
(women) or race (non-whites or non-Europeans), both kinds of categories were 
inferior in relation to one category: European men.  (de Groot 2000).  
More important than mere similarities in mechanisms of subordination, 
however, is that despite the diversity of working-class groups, women, and non-
white, racial-ethnic groups, the embodiment of a particular group was nevertheless 
available as a resource in the cultural repertoire for the embodiment of another 
through analogy.  For example, because European women, as a sexually marked 
group, were embodied in relation to European men, the main symbols through which 
the feminine was constructed—lack of virility, lack of masculinity, irrationality, 
emotionality—could all be deployed as signifying mechanisms to embody different 
racial-ethnic groups. 7  In this way, for example, both the Orient and Africa were 
imagined as irrational and emotional—as feminine—and therefore in need of 
(masculine/European) control and authority (de Groot 2000; Staum 2003: 138-9).  
Ashis Nandy argues that from the early nineteenth century in India, British colonial 
culture marginalized local androgynous traditions, arguing that Indian men were 
insufficiently masculine and therefore in need of colonial rule (Nandy 1988).  
Similarly, in addition to these groups being ‘not masculine enough’ or ‘like women,’ 
women in turn were seen to be like them as well.  Thus, French scholars in the 
nineteenth century constructed European women as “like blacks, predominantly 
sensitive and affective, incapable of the highest exercise of reflective faculties” 
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(Staum 2003: 162).  In this vein, working-class European women who transgressed 
the norm of the housebound wife were particularly racialized, as they violated even 
the expectations of civilized, European womanhood (McClintock 1995).
Such processes of feminization and racialization intersected in various and 
complex ways.  For example, in the ‘global’ eighteenth century, the globe itself was 
imagined as four distinct quadrants, represented iconographically as female figures:  
America was represented as bare breasted, with a feathered headdress, 
carrying arrows and a boy; Asia bore incense and was veiled against a 
backdrop of desert and camel, or the harem; Africa, naked except for an 
elephant headdress, sat on a lion, and was flanked by a cornucopia signifying 
its natural riches; and Europe was represented as a muse surrounded by arts 
and letters as well as the signs of military victory (Nussbaum 2003: 2).  
In this representation, we see an example of the intersection of racialization and 
feminization processes in the imagination of different spaces across the globe.  This 
representation particularly demonstrates how the feminization of Asia, Africa and 
America was racialized in particular ways in opposition to the feminization of 
Europe.  Such contrasting feminizations played a key role in constructing distinctions 
between civilized and uncivilized peoples.  Indeed, comparative constructions of 
gender and sexuality in general were often central in creating such distinctions 
between peoples.  As demonstrated in the example of India above, colonialists 
deployed such comparative constructions of masculinity to build racial and/or cultural 
hierarchies, though comparative constructions of femininity seemed to be even more 
central in such classificatory schemes.  In nineteenth century French scholarly 
discourse, for example, the so-called 
7 Joan Scott discusses how, in this fashion, gender has historically been a metaphor for the articulation 
of power.  Likewise, she argues, other such marked groups (by race, or class or the like) may also 
signal power relationships (Scott 1988).   
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status of women often signaled the degree of civilization attributed to a 
people.  Heavy manual agricultural labor or brutal treatment of women was 
sufficient to label a group barbaric…there was also revulsion at the apparent 
absence in indigenous males of the stereotypical politeness and delicacy 
approved for European interaction with middle- and upper-class European 
women (Staum 2003: 102).  
Regarding British colonial discourse on India, there was similar concern regarding the 
practice of suttee as well as the issue of widow remarriage.  Cynthia Enloe points out, 
however, that such concern for ‘native’ women was ultimately hollow and 
hypocritical, for at the same time that British officials passed legislation to prohibit 
these ‘barbaric practices,’ they enacted laws which imposed prison sentences on 
wives who refused to fulfill sexual obligations to their husbands and imposed a 
system of prostitution that provided Indian women to sexually service British soldiers 
stationed in India (Enloe 1989: 49).  
Thus, the politics of embodiment is significant for building theories of human 
inequality on multiple levels.  Given its seeming omnipresence, particularly from the 
early modern period, how do we understand the relationship between this politics and 
the spatial project of European colonialism?   Bryan Turner (1996) writes of the 
complex relationship between developing ideas of rationality, difference, and colonial 
expansion:
The emergence of the ethic of world mastery corresponded with the 
philosophical project whereby the external world could be understood by 
rational inquiry.  The expansion of European colonialism created 
especially at the political level the origins of a global society within which 
philosophical universalism could flourish.  It was on the basis of the 
colonial world that the Enlightenment philosophers could, with a sense of 
security and confidence, philosophically speculate about the essential and 
fundamental questions about truth, irrationality and beauty.  Truth had 
come universal because the world had become a global environment.  
Societies which diverged from these central notions of truth, reason and 
beauty were understood as deviations from a rational culture, otherness 
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and difference.  There existed a complex relationship [therefore] between 
the notion of subordinate and free peoples on the one hand and the 
subordination of the body to the mind on the other (Turner 1996: 13).
Thus, the developing binary of rationality and irrationality, centered on a politics of 
embodiment, was critical to constructions of cultural, racial, and other kinds of 
difference within the colonial project.  Such distinctions helped to define European 
civilization itself: natural man, envisioned as the bestial Hottentot, the noble 
American native or even the wild and solitary European, figured centrally into 
Enlightenment classificatory schemes.  In France, exotics provided a measure of the 
heights of French civilization, and 'seductive' financiers, 'immodest' clerics, 'infamous 
courtesans,' 'vile prostitutes,' 'unnatural nuns,' and 'lusty 'negres' were the 
transgressive bodies against which (European, male) civilization gained its meaning 
(Colwill 1998).  Indeed, this concept of civilization "summed up everything in which 
Western society of the last two to three centuries believes itself superior…[it summed 
up] the self-consciousness of the West” (Elias 2000: 5).  As such, then, the politics of 
embodiment met the needs of the European colonial project precisely.  Thus, in the 
late seventeenth century, John Locke advanced his theory of property rights, in which 
he argued that while rational individuals can trust and enter into contracts to acquire 
property, non-rational people cannot trust or be trusted because they live outside of 
contracts in a state of nature, by anarchy, and by the rule of force (Grovogui 1988).  
The logic of embodiment, particularly as it relates to the spatial politics of 
colonialism, culminated in the nineteenth century in the argument of the liberal John 
Stuart Mill, who argued that because savages do not have society, actual societies do 
not have to recognize them as either a coherent collectivity or on basis of their land 
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use.  Because savages fail to exercise a notion of property in the European legalist 
sense, they have no basis for nationhood, and therefore no rights as a nation (Shapiro 
1999). 
It is critical to note here that while certain bodily codes also served to 
legitimate the position of those in power, such bodi-li-ness was of the disembodied 
and so was not recognized as such.  That is, the bodi-li-ness of the disembodied was 
somehow outside of the code of what counted as embodiment—what mattered for 
purposes of subordination.  Rather, the bodily codes of the disembodied could signify 
their superiority.  For example, when Bourbon absolutism painted the monarch as a 
strong, virile, self-sufficient father, it was certainly manipulating bodily codes, just 
not those that rendered him embodied.  Theorists of Bourbon absolutism linked 
personal order in the male self with public order in the state, comparing the king to a 
male head of household who ruled over a potentially unruly extended family.  That 
only certain bodily codes were deemed embodied is apparent in that while this 
patriarchal image was important to the king's legitimacy, it's lack could undermine 
authority.  If he failed to live up to his position, he was then vulnerable to charges of 
effeminacy, irrationality, and lust (Merrick 1998)—that is, embodiment.  It is of little 
surprise, then, that when Louis XIV took power, royal propagandists laid particular 
stress on the virile, masculine nature of his person.  Particularly when the young 
king's rule was unstable, between the years of 1658-1659, his propaganda apparatus 
strove to create images of virility (Zanger 1998).8
8 Interestingly, while not using the terminology above, Jeffery Alexander also speaks of the 
contemporary "binary discourse of civil society," in which oppositions such as rational-irrational, 
active-passive, and reasonable-unreasonable serve to distinguish bodies that belong in civil society 
from those that do not (1992).  
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Kinship Politics: Theorizing Hierarchical Constructions of Space, Identity and 
International Community before Legal Decolonization           
In the first section of this chapter, I argued that a particular politics of space 
becomes a critical mechanism of power relations in the modern world.  Such a spatial 
strategy privileges the modern, statist form of territoriality as opposed to alternative 
forms by granting ontological validity only to the former.  In the second section, I 
identified a central, recurring mechanism for denying the personhood of various 
groups, that of embodiment politics.  As a device of power relations, embodiment 
politics figures only some as the embodied, irrational objects of control while others 
become the disembodied, rational subjects of control.   In this manner, embodiment 
politics in the modern period have marked particular bodies as racial, sexual, and 
savage, culminating in colonialist projects that used these multiple dimensions of 
embodiment in conjunction.  Finally, in this section, I bring together both of the 
above in order to explore one question: how do colonialist discourses bring a 
particular kind of identity politics to their spatial politics, enabling colonialist rulers 
to justify their presence in and conquest over foreign peoples and lands in the 
legitimated language of natural hierarchy?  My answer here is what I term "kinship 
politics," a politics that brings together the notion of natural association across 
peoples and territories, with the notion of natural hierarchy within this association.  
As I will discuss below, particularly important in the ‘west’ for naturalizing not only 
association but also hierarchy-within-association in this way, have been the nature 
metaphors of the body and the family.  Thus, within colonialist discourse, I define 
kinship politics as a politics that uses these metaphors of the body and family in order 
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to construct such association as well as hierarchy-within-association.  That is, kinship 
politics uses the metaphors of the body and family in order to naturalize 1) trans-
territorial association across distinct lands and peoples and 2) a radically differential 
recognition of subjectivity, based on theories of racial, cultural and gender inequality, 
within this trans-territorial association.  
In the rest of this chapter, I develop this theory of kinship politics further.  
First, I discuss the metaphors of the body and family within kinship politics, and 
particularly how these metaphors work to naturalize differential personhood and 
hierarchy within political association.  Next, I move on to an exploration of the 
connection between kinship politics and such hierarchical association across peoples 
and territories within ideologies of colonial rule.  I also pay some attention to how 
this relationship is expressed within international law, enabling hierarchical, 
colonialist constructions of space, identity, and international community prior to legal 
decolonization. 
The Body and Family: Nature Metaphors, Hierarchical Metaphors
That the body and the family are metaphors of association is evident.  We may 
speak of the total "body of work" on anorexia to indicate psychological, biological 
and popular work on the condition.  Similarly, we may speak of the "family of 
Marxist theories" to indicate that dependency, world-systems, post-colonial and other 
theories are all thought to be influenced by the work of Karl Marx.  Regarding 
political association, Felstiner argues that political metaphors work by connecting 
something new with something already commonly accepted (Felstiner 1983).  In this 
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vein, Bryan Turner (1992) writes of the historical use of the image of the body 
specifically as a metaphor for political association (or political space).  Thus for 
Christian philosophers, according to Turner (1992), the balance of the human body 
provided a metaphor for the balance of political life, while disturbances in political 
life were thought to produce disease in the human body.  Similarly, as medicine was 
closely aligned with government, in medicine too, the doctrine of the four humors 
provided a rich source for political theorizing about the intimate connections between 
the dietary management of the body and the political regulation of the body politic.  It 
also provided a related set of theories about the necessity for personal government, if 
the government of the entire community were to be preserved.  In early Christianity, 
then, there was a close relationship between diet, sexual asceticism, and the social 
order.  The regulation of desire was seen as a precondition for orderly community, 
and this remained a fundamental feature of Christian teaching.  Turner (1992)
continues that the Christian concept of the body politic paved the way for the 
medieval idea of the king's two bodies, namely a division between the body natural 
and the body political...his earthly and corruptible body and his mystical and sacred, 
incorruptible body.  The notion that the king had a definite authority to rule, rather 
like the father in the household, was challenged by individualistic and utilitarian 
political theories.  Hence the struggle for representation in 18th century France was a 
struggle against the idea of the king's monopolistic embodiment of power.  Against 
this, Rousseau talked about a body of citizens living under a common law whose 
general will was the embodiment of collective power, such that the social contract 
produced a new type of political body.  
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With modernity, a number of parallel treatments of the 'modern state' and the 
body of the 'individual' are also especially compelling here.  Historically, for instance, 
there is the similar figuration of both in the narrative of modernity.  Hence one may 
note that the linear, modernist narrative of the 'emergence' of the body from kinship 
systems within lineage societies to 'autonomous' individuals bears strong resemblance 
to the 'emergence' of the modern state from overlapping, nonexclusive territories to 
'sovereign' nation-states.  What is important here is not the facticity of this so-called 
emergence, but its prominence in understandings of modernity.  Likewise in 
modernity, both 'the state' and 'the body' are imagined through container metaphors 
(Chilton and Ilyin 1993).  Such connections are evident even in the foundation of 
international law, such that Grotius based his writings on the idea that agreements 
between states were to be analogous to agreements in private law (Prott 1991).
Likewise, the metaphor of the family may also be deployed to invoke a sense 
of political space or association.  Thus, connections have been made between images 
of motherhood, fatherhood, and fraternity and the French Revolution (Hunt 1992), 
fraternity and (masculinized) national identity in the early American context (Nelson 
1998), family, motherhood, and the Fascist national project (Berezin 1999), and 
motherhood, fatherhood, and the Turkish national project (Delaney 1995).  Regarding 
independence movements in the Spanish and English colonies, too, which sought to 
dissociate any political association from the metropole and construct alternative 
political collectivities, these movements also used the language of family.  For 
example, in their bid for independence, Chilean nationalists spoke of Spain as a cruel 
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mother and Chile as a loving mother (1983).  Beyond such national projects, the 
‘family of nations’ also invokes global or international association (Grewal 1998).
But even more than providing a language for political association, the 
metaphors of the body and family are important for articulating power within this 
discourse.  This is the case, first, because both operate as what I call nature 
metaphors; that is, both are almost always invoked as emergent from nature.  Second, 
as such nature metaphors, both contain deeply rooted, naturalized notions of 
hierarchy.  Thus, feminist anthropologists write that particularly within ‘Euro-
American’ discourses, images of nature (alternatively, biology or god) function to 
naturalize power (Yanagisako and Delaney 2001).  For the body, specifically in 
modern, western narratives, this naturalization of power is evident within discourses 
that proceed from the notion that as a ‘natural’ state of affairs, the brain/head/mind 
must control or restrain the ‘rest of the body’ (Berman 1989; Turner 1992; Turner 
1996).  As discussed above, if the elite, European male is disembodied in modern 
narratives while bodies marked by race, gender, sexuality, and class become 
embodied, then the former become the 'mind' in Descartes' famous binary—rendering 
the elite, European male a modern, necessary, natural right to rule (Holliday and 
Hassard 2001; Patterson 2002; Witz 2000).  
Similarly, the image of the family, too, sanctions social hierarchy in this way 
(McClintock 1995; Collins 2000; de Groot 2000).  That is, the metaphor of the family 
in ‘Euro-American’ discourse constructs specifically gendered but potentially also 
other kinds of hierarchies, such as by age, as natural (Schneider 1980; Yanagisako 
and Delaney 2001; Franklin and McKinnon 2001; Nandy 1988; Nandy 1987).  
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However, although composed of different bodies, we should note that the image of 
the family itself incorporates the body as that which requires control.  Hence the 
'head' of the body becomes within the family the 'head' of the household (Turner 
1992; Felstiner 1983; McClintock 1995).  Embodied others, on the other hand, 
occupy different locations (on the body).  In the European colonial project, for 
example, Europeans imagined a physical geography of the body in which the brain 
was the European male, the heart was the European female and together, they were 
the forces of civilization which were to hold the (black) nether regions in check 
(Colwill 1998).
Kinship Politics and Colonial Rule: Naturalizing Hierarchical Association
Given this role of the metaphors of the body and family in theories of unequal 
political association, how has kinship politics historically informed colonial projects?  
As an image that alternatively naturalizes the hierarchy of the rational over the 
irrational, the masculine over the feminine, and parents over children, the metaphor of 
kinship has multiple points of entry.  It is a flexible politics, it bends, and it expands 
and contracts, enabling multiple logics and languages for colonial rule.  It may permit 
the harshest of legitimations, as in arguments that view colonialism as the natural 
extension of human supremacy over the 'animal kingdom' (Patterson 2002), or as the 
natural authority of masters over servants or of parents over children (de Groot 2000), 
or just the natural exercise of European or American masculinity and virility over 
insufficiently masculine groups (Doty 1996: 31; McClintock 1995).  Alternatively, 
kinship politics also offers ‘softer’ legitimations, such as the argument that those 
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possessing greater amounts of rationality or masculine competency or maturity have 
the obligation to offer guidance to irrational/insufficiently masculine/immature 
others, and that such tutelage is for the latter’s own benefit. 
In the necessarily exploratory discussion that follows, I suggest that one of the 
most important determining factors of ideologies of colonial rule historically has been 
the nature of family or kinship itself within the metropolitan or colonial culture in 
question.  I start with the periodization of European empires provided by Anthony 
Pagden (1995) in his comparative study of Spanish, British and French colonialist 
practices.  In this work, Pagden argues that there have been two distinctive phases in 
the history of modern, European empire-building, dating the first from the end of the 
fifteenth century through the early nineteenth, and the second from the early 
nineteenth.  Even more relevant for my purposes, Pagden makes some connections 
between notions of authority and rule within the family and ideologies of colonial 
rule, particularly for the first period of empire-building.  Nevertheless, his 
commentary on this question is brief and undertheorized.  Examining the historical 
record from the early modern period, I suggest that his two historical eras connect to 
changing ideas of kinship in Western Europe in some interesting ways.  In the former, 
I argue that harsher, ‘classical’ or ‘traditional’ patriarchal models of family offer 
‘hasher’ metaphors for imagining, theorizing and speaking about the nature of 
authority within colonial rule.  In the latter, ‘softer’ models of family emerge, which 
have important implications for changing ways of imagining and thinking and 
speaking about colonial rule.  Thus, in the first period, while images of absolute 
authority, honor, rights and rule offered by the classical patriarchal family are 
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available for legitimating colonial rule, in the second, these shift to images of the 
beneficence of colonial rule for the colonized.  
In the first period of empire offered by Pagden, the focus is on European 
empires in the Americas.  He argues that despite differences in Spanish, British and 
French ideologies and practices of colonial rule, there are important continuities, 
including a legacy of absolute authority, honor, and right to rule, which comes from 
the Roman Empire.  Moreover, he argues that the source of this model of authority 
and right comes from the model of the Roman family, which grants parents absolute 
power over children (he seems to ignore the gender dimension of the patriarchal 
Roman family) (Pagden 1995: 145).  In British political thinking in particular, a 
second important source of such ideologies of rule is also the seventeenth century 
work of Robert Filmer, who argued that the absolute rule of fathers within the 
patriarchal family should be the model for all authority relations in society.9  In the 
early modern period, this image of absolute authority and rule based on the metaphor 
of the traditional patriarchal family underpinned not only the ideology of colonial rule 
but also of absolute monarchies in Europe (Pateman 1988; Adams 2005; Pagden 
1995). 
Such notions of absolute authority and rule, and particularly their complete 
denial of the spatial and identity claims of various ‘others,’ are especially evident in 
the development of international law over this period.  For example, Grovogui (1996; 
1988) reviews the development of international law over a number of ‘regimes’ since 
the fifteenth century, and claims that from the beginning, the subjects of each of these 
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have been Europeans.  Theodoropoulos (1988: 6) writes furthermore that this law, 
because it excluded from its subjects colonized peoples, was not really an 
international law but rather, a ‘regional’ law of European or so-called civilized 
nations.  The first regime of this regional international law began with the papal bulls 
of Alexander VI, when the Pope ordered Spain and Portugal to conquer heathen lands 
for Christianity.  This period also saw the development of the foundation of modern 
international law, as the desire of industrializing Netherlands and Britain for colonies 
of their own posed a problem for Spain and Portugal: how would all these different 
parties justify their monopoly over their overseas ventures?  Hugo Grotius, whom we 
may perhaps consider 'the father' of international law, asked why only some Christian 
countries were allowed to be sovereigns over non-Christians.  Thus developed the Jus 
Gentilis, the body of law governing the relations between the separate political groups 
in Christendom.  This law made critical distinctions between different kinds of 
subjects.  Based on the premise that there were three distinct kinds of humanity, 
civilized, barbaric, and savage, the law gave a different kind of political recognition 
to each: plenary recognition for the first, partial for the second (which included 
Turkey, China, Siam and Japan)10, and mere human recognition to the rest.  It was up 
to civilized man to determine the conditions under which the non-civilized should be 
9 Though from the other side, Stephanie Coontz argues that the patriarchal family is itself based on the 
model of a ‘miniature monarchy’ in which the ‘husband king’ enjoys authority over his dependents 
(Coontz 2005). 
10 Regarding the differential recognition given by the Jus Gentilis to different categories of humanity, 
some authors emphasize that some Asian peoples were initially given a higher level of recognition than 
others.  For example, Watson argues that in addition to those Asian territories identified by Grovogui 
above, European commanders dealt with particularly Hindu authorities much as European rulers dealt 
with each other—at least until the nineteenth century, when relations deteriorated and these others 
began to be explicitly treated as inferior (1984). 
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recognized.  As concerns with property relationships started to dominate in legal 
theory, territories that belonged to the ‘other’ were treated as if vacant, without title or 
ownership, and ownership was defined as the retention of titles.  This regime was 
further biased towards ‘others’ in that not only did this law constitute rules of 
evidence 'others' were unfamiliar with to determine the status of property, but it also 
failed to recognize that most other signatory parties lacked the authority to enter the 
subject's legal agreements, if their own laws and customs are considered.  In the 
foundations of modern international law, ultimately, the property and sovereignty of 
Europeans was distinctly privileged over other kinds of concerns (Grovogui 1988; 
1996).  
Interestingly, an important component of such differential subjectivity within 
international law was the way in which sovereignty came to be defined. 
Theodoropoulos (1988) argues that while the basis of the relations of production was 
ownership of land and partial ownership of serf by landlord, as in feudalism, no 
distinction was made between imperium (rule over the territory) and dominium (land 
ownership).  Hence the landlord exercised both, and sovereignty was the landlord's 
absolute supremacy within the country (his feud).  As power began to concentrate in 
the hands of absolute monarch against landlords, however, kings and monarchs 
struggled for recognition against the emperors and popes.  With the success of the 
former, the principle of state sovereignty was recognized in the Westphalia Peace of 
1648, which consisted of the Treaties of Munster and Osnarbruck, and this event 
marked the birth of the feudal-absolutist state as the final stage of feudalism.  Here, 
the principle of sovereignty was transformed into a new weapon for the protection 
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and strengthening of the state, the rationale of which was also then revised.  Thus 
arose a new theory of the nature of states, the doctrine of sovereignty.  As capitalism 
continued to develop and the feudal-absolutist state came to be replaced with the 
capitalist state, the old concept of the sovereignty of the feudal monarch was replaced 
by the concept of the sovereignty of the people, as well as the recognition of the 
sovereign equality of all states and the prohibition of interference with their internal 
affairs.  Such agreements were codified in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Nations submitted to the Convention in Paris on the 23rd of April 1795.  Eventually, 
however, such a notion of sovereignty came to be equated with the power to exercise 
it, with the 'right to wage war' and the 'right of the victor.'  As European colonialism 
intensified, the major legal technique under international law used to do so was the 
denial of sovereignty to 'other' lands.  Similar to the mechanisms cited by Grovogui 
(1988; 1996) above, Theodoropoulos (1988) writes that colonialism also advanced 
through a series of unequal treaties in a number of ways 'forced' upon people.  All of 
these actions violated the principles of sovereignty, and hence while the system 
formally recognized the principle of the respect for sovereignty, it also regulated 
institutions such as vassalages, colonial protectorates, capitulation regimes, mandates, 
and the like. 
Given these harsh ideologies of colonial rule, as well as how they shape 
international law, how do these move to the softer conceptions of rule identified by 
Pagden?  I argue that from the early nineteenth century and on, a number of ongoing 
transformations contribute to shifts in traditional patriarchal conceptions of the 
family, which in turn then contribute to ‘softer’ ways for imagining, thinking about 
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and speaking about authority within colonial rule.  First, according to Philip Ariès’ 
study of France, there are central transformations in the idea of the family as well as 
of childhood from the medieval era to the modern.  In the former, he argues that “the 
idea of childhood did not exist” (Aries 1962).  Over the course of centuries, 
developing in particular ways in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and 
culminating in the nineteenth, however, he argues that not only does the notion of 
‘childhood’ emerge, but that the parent comes to develop an interest in the child and 
in childhood.  Thus, the parent now becomes concerned with every aspect of 
his child’s life, from ‘coddling’ to education; he watches closely over their 
health and even their hygiene.  [Now] everything to do with children and 
family life has become a matter worthy of attention.  Not only the child’s 
future but his presence and his very existence are of concern: the child has 
taken a central place in the family (Aries 1962: 133).  
Hence, from the medieval to the modern period, there is a shift from the notion that 
childhood is not a distinct state to the idea that not only is childhood a distinct state, 
but that it requires in a number of ways, active parenting.  Exploring this shift in 
Britain, one author terms this new call to parents ‘responsible parenthood’ (Johansson 
1991).  From the eighteenth century, this call to parenting is also accompanied by 
new ideas about privacy and domesticity, about intimacy between spouses and 
between parents and children, and about love and reason as the basis for relationships 
rather than absolute authority and right (Coontz 2004; Aries 1962; Johansson 1991; 
Coontz 2005: 148-49).  Thus, from the first period of empire to the second, there are 
ongoing transformations in the meaning of family and in the nature of relationships 
within the family.
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Interestingly, these changing notions of the family are concomitant with some 
parallel changes on other levels, as well.  From the period of the Enlightenment, for 
example, intellectuals and secularists develop unilinear theories of civilization as well 
as the notion that progress is the gradual triumph of human reason and freedom over 
unreason and necessity (Staum 2003; Todorov 1993).  It is important to note that 
these understandings incorporate the rational/irrational dichotomy of embodiment 
politics in particular ways.  For example in Hegel’s teleological view, something 
exists by virtue of its rationality and similarly ceases to exist by virtue of its 
irrationality.  As theories of human classification emerge, then, they seek to classify 
different lands and peoples according to their supposed ‘stages of development’ along 
this unilinear path to civilization (Wesseling 1997: 35). 
Thus, the modernizing notions of family and childhood, the new theory of 
progress, and this nascent conception of ‘stages of development’ intersect in 
emerging theories of colonial rule in the second period of empire-building.  
According to Ashis Nandy, 
colonialism dutifully picked up these [emerging ] ideas of growth and 
development and drew a new parallel between primitivism and childhood.  
Thus, the theory of social progress was telescoped not merely into the 
individual’s life cycle in Europe but also into the area of cultural differences 
in the colonies.  What was the childlikeness of the child and childishness of 
immature adults now also became the lovable and unlovable savagery of 
primitives and the primitivism of subject societies (Nandy 1988: 15-16).  
Thus, if Pagden is correct in his argument that the legitimating languages of empire 
shift in the second period from the absolute rule, rights and honor of colonialists to 
the welfare and benefits of the colonized, this shift may have a connection with the 
aforementioned transformations in family, childhood, and understandings of 
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patriarchal authority.  Hence, for example, in the eighteenth century, there developed 
the idea in French thought that certain peoples were ‘culturally retarded’ or in a 
childhood stage, and that Europeans could help mature them into a more adult stage, a 
perspective that loosely mapped onto the French colonial policy of assimilation 
prominent in the nineteenth century (Staum 2003).  Of course, colonial ideologies and 
their racial, cultural and sexual assumptions usually had competitors, and the French 
notion of childlike development over stages also competed with the idea that non-
Europeans were inherently and inevitably ‘stuck’ at a lower stage (ibid 2003: 188). 
Nevertheless, it appears that from the eighteenth century, colonial discourses 
began to move from absolute authority, rule, and rights to the softer language of the 
benefits and welfare provided by colonial rule and its Enlightenment science, 
commerce and agriculture (Pagden 1995: 63-69).  Concomitant were ideas about 
colonial duty and responsibility, and numerous versions of the civilizing mission: it 
was now the duty of the colonial power to bring western government, education, 
medicine and morals to the subject peoples (Aldrich 1996: 89-92; Wesseling 1997: 
32).  From the 1800s, then, French colonial discourse constructed Tahitians, 
Marquesans, and Equatorial Africans as ‘big children,’ and argued that evolution 
could be traced from lower to higher groups, as from Eskimos up to Polynesians all 
the way up to Europeans (Staum 2003: 91-180).  French colonial theorists envisioned 
the role of France as 
the mother country offering itself to these young peoples, these children in an 
act of ‘association, mutual comprehension, mutual respect, common labor 
among children of the same family’.  France was the country known 
universally as liberator; wherever France had passed, ‘the indigene found 
himself at peace, fed, reared, healed and multiplied by French 
presence’(Aldrich 1996: 4).  
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Regarding the British too, Nandy argues that particularly from the 1830s, the British 
linked the condition of colonization with the condition of childhood (Nandy 1988).  
For example, Nandy points to this connection in the colonialist writing of James Mill: 
The nineteenth-century liberal and Utilitarian thinker’s view of this private 
responsibility as a father meshed with his view of Britain’s responsibility to 
the societies under its patriarchal suzerainty.  Mill chose to provide, almost 
single-handed, an intellectual framework for civilizing India under British 
rule…he saw Britain as the elder society guiding the young, the immature, and 
hence, primitive Indian society towards adulthood or maturity, and he felt that 
Indian culture required more fundamental restructuring than that required by 
relatively advanced Western cultures (Nandy 1987: 57-8).  
Likewise, in their colonies, the Dutch also considered the ‘natives’ sweet, gentle, ‘big 
children’ which required their protection and care (Grimal 1978: 83).  Particularly 
after the publication of Kipling’s colorful acclamation of the civilizing mission in the 
“White Man’s Burden,”11 Queen Wilhelmina initiated the Dutch ‘moral’ or ‘ethical’ 
policy in this spirit (Wesseling 1997). 
An initial impact of this ‘softer’ conception of authority within colonial rule 
on international law is evident in Grovogui’s discussion of the Berlin Conference of 
1885.  She argues that in this conference, Africans were selectively granted limited 
juridical capacity.  Here, colonialist powers also decided to introduce commerce into 
these lands and claimed ‘spheres of influence’ and ‘spheres of interest’ within the 
lands, asserting a concern for bringing civilization and well being to these peoples.  
However, Africans’ subjectivity continued to be negated, as they were not consulted 
11 Recall that in this poem, Kipling encourages the civilized to take up the ‘white man’s burden’ or 
civilizing mission toward “Your new-caught, sullen peoples, Half-devil and Half-child (italics added).” 
The poem was written in 1899 in the context of the American take-over of the Philippines after the 
Spanish-American War.
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about these decisions.  Moreover, their newly granted juridical capacity served only 
to enable them to transfer their sovereign and territorial rights to European powers, so 
providing colonialists with legal documents with which to justify their presence in 
foreign territories, and to ward off rival claims (Grovogui 1988). 
After World War I, this new paternalistic language of colonial rule was 
institutionalized on a transnational basis.  Given the problem of what to do with the 
dependent territories of the enemy, the Allies institutionalized softer familial notions 
of the childlike incompetency of dependent territories and their own responsibility 
regarding these territories through the League of Nations Mandates System: 
[for] peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the 
well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of 
civilization… the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced 
nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their 
geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are 
willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as 
Mandatories on behalf of the League (Article 22, Covenant 
of League of Nations. 1919).
 While this obligation has of course often been critiqued as ethnocentric and racist 
(Grovogui 1988; Lauren 1998; Obadele 1996; Reus-Smit 2001; Rajagopal 2003), 
some have nevertheless also pointed out that the mandate  
introduced the novel concept of international responsibility regarding the 
peoples in non-autonomous countries…[and contributed to] a new type of 
relationship between nations which was markedly different from the idea of 
timeless domination which had characterized the previous period: the mandate 
was not a definitive but an evolutionary arrangement which one day would 
come to an end (Grimal 1978: 16-17).
In this vein, it also introduced a new actor into the relationship between European and 
non-European peoples: the international institution (Rajagopal 2003: 51).  
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note here that in accordance with the differential 
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recognition granted to different categories of humanity in earlier colonialist discourse 
and practice, the mandates system made a distinction between different kinds of 
territories according to ‘stages of development.’  According to these stages, the 
system created three different classes of mandates, classes A, B, and C (see Table 1).  
Within these, class A consisted of the former Turkish territories, while B and C were 
comprised of territories from Africa and the Pacific.  Moreover, though the mandates 
system may have contributed to a ‘new type of relationship between nations,’ only the 
first were to be brought to (eventual) independence, while the second two differed 
little from other colonies (Grimal 1978).  With the emergence of the United Nations 
after 1945, the League’s prior mandate system was transformed into the UN 
Trusteeship System, in which territories designated as Trusts were to be moved to 
(eventual) independence if so chosen, while those designated as Non Self-Governing 
Territories (NSGTs) were not.
In a sense, the shift from ‘harsher’ notions of colonial rule to ‘softer’ notions 
may imply a narrative of linear progress from the absolute authority and rule of 
colonialist powers to the welfare of dependent peoples.  Indeed, the shift has been 
enabled in part by an ongoing dialogue between colonial rule and anti-slavery and 
anti-colonial movements from the eighteenth century and on.  I have to emphasize, 
however, that even the softer imagery of welfare, beneficence and obligation is a 
controlling imagery that serves to maintain differential subjectivity and personhood.  
For example, in her research on counterinsurgency politics in the fifties, Doty 
discusses how the British seized on the imagery of Mau Mau rebels as insane, 
excessively passionate, children in order to legitimate their counterinsurgency 
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policies.  Likewise, in the newly sovereign Philippines, the United States dealt 
similarly with the Huk rebels, constructing them not only as excessively passionate
and childlike, but as ‘bad children’ as opposed to more cooperative Third World 
‘good children’ (Doty 1996).  
Conclusion
Regarding constructions of space, identity and international community within 
the colonial era, then, the argument here is that colonial discourses—despite variation 
over space and time—have over the centuries engaged in a kinship politics, which 
constructs proximity and indeed association, as well as hierarchy, between otherwise 
distinct or far-flung groups.  I want to emphasize that I am not making a universal 
argument here for either embodiment or kinship politics.  By no means am I arguing 
that these were the only mechanisms of the colonial construction of hierarchy, or 
always the central ones.  Nor am I denying that the hierarchical categories of 
embodiment and kinship politics could be turned on their head and used anti-
systemically.  Moreover, kinship politics in particular is a moving politics, shifting 
over time and space, and traversing between a softer imagery of benevolence and care 
to harsher notions of absolute authority.  Such contrasting images might exist in 
conjunction within a particular era or a particular set of practices of colonial rule as 
well.  Whatever the case, however, from a world-historical perspective, the politics of 
kinship draws from naturalized assumptions about hierarchical relations between 
different body parts and/or family members.  Moreover, inescapably related to 
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emerging values of order, reason, and rationality in modernity, kinship politics 
renders superior entities within the collectivity the right to rule by virtue of their 
greater ability to reason, while lesser entities are made incapable or less capable of 
reason.  In this manner, the discourses of embodiment—in variable, complex and 
intersecting processes—have targeted women, 'lower' classes, other races, and other 
cultures.  Even more, they have been critical to defining the very meaning of 
civilization, race, culture and gender in the colonial era, as they helped to construct 
notions of the west, whiteness, black, woman, and man (among others).  
Has all this been done away with legal decolonization?  Or do contemporary 
debates about immigration and the threat to American culture and identity hearken to 
geographies of identity further back?  In the rest of this work, I explore these 
questions by examining the politics of space, identity and international community in 
the negotiation of legal decolonization in the United Nations.
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Chapter 2
Research Questions and Strategy of Inquiry
My central question in this study concerns how the diverse, competing voices 
brought together in the UNGA negotiate the movement from the old geopolitical 
order to the new—from the older spatial/identity order with its attendant politics of 
differential personhood via embodiment and particular construction of international 
community to something new.12  Here, I outline my strategy for exploring these 
questions.  First, I discuss the source and nature of the materials used for analysis.  
Next, I situate my research design and strategy of inquiry within broader approaches 
to discourse and communication research.  Finally, I end with specific procedures for 
analysis.
Sources and Nature of Materials for Analysis
My main source of materials for analysis is the General Assembly Official 
Records for the years 1946-1960.  These records are public documents and are 
available at the United Nations Information Centre of Washington, DC (United 
Nations 2003).  The General Assembly is the main deliberative organ of the United 
Nations.  It meets annually for regular sessions, as well as for special and emergency 
special sessions.  Each session is organized as a general debate, in which Member 
States, represented by their diplomatic delegations, express their views on a wide 
range of matters of international concern.  Included are required reports submitted by 
the Secretary-General, as well as by a number of other bodies.  Because of the great 
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number of questions that the Assembly is called upon to consider, the Assembly 
allocates most questions to its six Main Committees.  Some questions are considered 
directly in plenary meetings, rather than in one of the Main Committees. All 
questions are voted on in plenary meetings, usually towards the end of the regular 
session, after the committees have completed their consideration of them and 
submitted draft resolutions to the plenary Assembly. 
The Official Records of the General Assembly consist, thus, of the meeting 
records, committee reports, and resolutions.  The records of specific interest to me are 
the Verbatim Records, or the meeting records of the statements/speeches made and 
actions taken during General Assembly meetings.  These include discussion of any 
submitted committee reports and draft resolutions, as well as votes on draft 
resolutions and explanations of particular votes.  The Verbatim Records, thus, provide 
a full, first-person account of the proceedings of a meeting, and are particularly useful 
for discourse analysis.
Finding Materials for Analysis
The Verbatim Records are published as bound volumes, one (or two) for each 
annual session.  The front matter of each volume includes a Table of Contents with a 
listing of the agenda for that session, as well as what was discussed.  I selected 
records for analysis by the subject headings that were listed on the agenda.  
Specifically, I chose anything that mentioned the terms: NSGT Territories, Trust 
12 Of course, I am not implying that there is necessarily a shift to something ‘new.’
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Territories, and colonialism.13   I fully recognize that such a strategy may leave out 
important debates on the problem of colonialism that are not captured by this 
terminology.  However, I adopted this strategy as a way of reducing and managing 
information.  Also, as the agenda terminology guides the topic of discussion, I believe 
my focus on NSGTs, Trusts and colonialism will sufficiently capture the material that 
I require for my purposes.  
Debates of interest on particular agenda items sometimes spanned several 
meetings.  One meeting could also contain several debates of interest.  Hence, there is 
no direct relationship between the number of debates examined and the number of 
meetings covered.  In total, I examined the speeches/statements that transpired in 
almost 100  debates on Trusts, NSGTs or colonialism, spanning 100 meetings over a 
15-year period.  
A Note on What These Records Do Not Tell
One important caveat that must be made is that although these records are one 
window onto the negotiation of legal decolonization in the UN, they of course do not 
and cannot represent a ‘pure’ or ‘authentic’ or ‘unmarked’ negotiation of legal 
decolonization or of any of the other issues that will be discussed.  The most basic 
reason for the unavoidable partiality is inherent in the nature of my sources.  That is, 
we must problematize the degree to which the delegates that officially represent their 
countries actually represent the multiple social groups differentially situated within a 
13 There were various indexes, which listed these records and what they contained, including an online 
index, a Journal of the General Assembly, an Index to Proceedings (formerly, Disposition of Agenda 
Items).  However, I found that such indexes often left out material I was interested in and the most 
reliable method was to actually go through the Table of Contents of the actual records themselves.
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particular delimitation of territorial borders.  The delegates examined here are 
overwhelmingly educated, male, and elite.  Their actions, discursive and otherwise, 
most directly represent the official policies of their governments and have little to say 
about the national populace in general, differentially situated social classes, women, 
and so forth.  This partiality, however, does not make my material less ‘legitimate’ 
for my purposes, but only highlights the relations of power which undergrid, shape 
and produce changing constructs of space, identity and international community.
Research Strategy
According to Guba and Lincoln (in Denzin and Lincoln 1998b: 195-219), both 
constructivism and critical theory14 are alternatives to positivist approaches to 
qualitative research, the key distinguishing factor of the first being its ontological 
relativism and the second being its stress on the always value-laden, always political 
nature of inquiry.  In this dissertation, I draw from the anti-essentialist insights of 
constructivism (Schwandt in Denzin and Lincoln 1998b: 221-259) but especially 
from the critical stress on power relationships, aiming to offer "simultaneously an 
account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims…and a no-
nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a 'real' world” (Haraway 1988: 579).15
Within these general approaches, my specific strategy of inquiry consists of a 
discourse analysis, broadly speaking, of the statements of different delegates to the 
General Assembly, where the notion of documents as cultural texts subject to 
14 Guba and Lincoln use critical theory as an umbrella term here, denotating neo-Marxism, feminism, 
and materialism, as well as poststructuralism and postmodernism (in Denzin and Lincoln 1998).
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discursive analysis (Tuchman in Denzin and Lincoln 1998c: 244-248) is key.  (I also 
pay some attention to their voting and other procedure-related practices that transpire 
in the context of these debates, but the bulk of the analysis focuses on the arguments 
exchanged).  The statements/speeches made by diplomats in the GA can be seen as 
constituting a particular genre of discourse, with its own distinctive features.  First, 
made in this international forum in the context of not just the delegates of other 
countries but also countless news media, the audience for this discourse goes beyond 
the immediate gathering and can be assumed to be ‘universal.’  Second, the 
statements made have a particular format, comprised of a series of monologues in 
which the head of each delegation takes a ‘tour d’horizon’ of the current state of the 
world’s problems as seen in light of the policy of her/his government.  Third, certain 
features are repeated in this discourse, including congratulation to the President of the 
GA, an affirmation of the importance and necessity of the UN, and the use of highly 
formal and polite language (Donahue and Prosser 1997: 65).  At the end of a 
monologue each speaker also takes a stance on a particular draft resolution that has 
been submitted for discussion and adoption (which ends with a yes, no or abstention 
vote on the draft resolution under consideration).  
First, then, I examine these debates as persuasive discourse, aimed at 
justifying a speaker’s own stance on a draft resolution and also of convincing others 
to take on a similar stance (and ultimately, to vote similarly).  Hence, I am 
particularly interested in each speaker’s story of the ‘state of the world’ and the 
appeals embedded within the story that seek to persuade the audience one way or 
15 Guba and Lincoln also agree that critical and constructivist approaches are commensurable (in 
Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 217).
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another.  Most important for my purposes, then, is Walter Fisher’s(1987) narrative 
approach to persuasive communication.  Extending Kenneth Burke’s argument that 
the individual is above all a symbol-user, Fisher argues that human beings are above 
all story-telling creatures.  Human communication, then, should be viewed as 
stories/accounts competing with other stories/accounts, purportedly constituted by 
‘good reasons,’ acceptable to an audience when they satisfy certain requirements of 
narrative probability and fidelity, with the central goal of identification with the 
audience and inevitably, functioning as moral inducements.  The term ‘good reasons’ 
here is central, as he considers these “the paradigmatic mode of human decision 
making and communication,” varying in form among situations, genres and media of 
communication and the production and practice of which is ruled by matters of 
history, biography, culture and character (Fisher 1987: 58-59).  In short, individuals 
are adequately persuaded by a story when they perceive it as offering ‘good reasons’ 
(also, ‘appeals’).16
The narrative approach is particularly appropriate for my analysis of GA 
statements because of how the approach situates itself in relation to issues of 
Cartesian conceptions of knowledge and rationality.  In his work, Fisher is explicitly 
in debate with the traditional rhetorical perspective on rhetorical argument, which 
assumes that such argument must “be marked by clearly identifiable modes of 
inference and implication, and that the norms of evaluation of rhetorical 
16 The term ‘good reasons’ is also akin to Kenneth Burke’s term ‘appeals.’  Beginning with the notion 
(that Fisher eventually adopts) that the central goal of communication is identification, Burke argues 
that human communication involves three elements: speaker, speech and appeal to the spoken-to 
person.  He sees the appeal, or the rhetorical use of language, as the essence of communication, where 
language functions as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to 
symbols (Donahue and Prosser 1997).
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communication must be rational standards taken exclusively from informal or formal 
logic” (Fisher 1987: 58-59).  With the narrative approach, he means to expand the 
meaning of rationality from the notion of formal and informal logic to narrative 
rationality, or rationality as constituted in narrative: 
rationality is determined by the nature of persons as narrative beings—
their inherent awareness of narrative probability, what constitutes a 
coherent story, and their constant habit of testing narrative fidelity…whether 
or not the stories they experience ring true with the stories they know to be 
true in their lives (Fisher 1987: 64-65).
This expanded conception of rationality is particularly appropriate because as 
discussed earlier, the crux of differential personhood in kinship politics is the 
construction of the embodied, irrational other in contrast to a disembodied, rational 
self; hence, the world of kinship politics systematically denies subjectivity to those 
considered incapable of rationality.  Narrative rationality, on the other hand, 
is inimical to the hierarchical idea that some people are qualified to be rational 
and others are not…[That is, it begins with the acknowledgement that] denials 
of fundamental rationality have appeared repeatedly—in slave states, in 
monarchic states, in fascist states, in communist states, and even in democratic 
states…[It seeks to move beyond] the dualisms of modernism: fact-value, 
intellect-imagination, reason-emotion…[and embrace] non-Cartesian concepts 
(Fisher 1987: 67-68).  
In addition to examining these debates as persuasive discourse, I also examine 
them as constitutive discourse.  Following Tischer, Meyer, Wodak and Vetter (2000), 
I see discourse as simultaneously constitutive of different social identities (or 
distinctions between different categories of identity), the relations between these 
categories of identity, and systems of knowledge and beliefs about these identities 
(Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, and Vetter 2000: 149).  From this perspective, the 
previously discussed discourses of 'the body' and 'the family' within kinship politics 
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can be seen in this way.  Regarding identity distinctions or categories of identities, for 
example, the kinship discourses of the body and the family are constitutive of the 
distinctions of the ‘rational’ versus the ‘irrational,’ the ‘paternal’ versus the 
‘childlike’, and the ‘masculine’ versus the ‘feminine.’  Additionally, these discourses
naturalize hierarchical relations within each binary, with the first term having the 
natural right to master, rule over, or guide the second.  Finally, certain knowledge is 
also created about these identities in the process of defining these identities and 
relating them to each other, for example, that the irrational, childlike or feminine 
require such tutelage or rule from the rational, paternal or masculine. 
For my purposes, the central question under investigation becomes, then, of 
understanding how different parties in the General Assembly attempt to use/advance 
different discourses to negotiate alternative visions of different categories of 
identities, the relationships between these identities, and knowledge about them.  
These (re)negotiations of identity are integrally part of the larger anti-colonialist 
project of the renegotiation of space.  
Outline of the Chapters
In general, I examine two sets of debates within the UNGA that are related to 
my questions about colonialism and decolonization.  One set consists of technical and 
other issues concerning NSGTs and Trusts within the UN system, and the second 
concerns the general problematic of colonialism within and beyond the UN system.  
The first occurs largely over the first fourteen years of interest, while the second 
occurs in the final year examined. 
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I begin by reducing the textual material for analysis.  Specifically, I read and 
re-read the verbatim records in order to identify specific patterns of ‘appeal’ or ‘good 
reasons’ given by different speakers on particular draft resolutions.  Thus, while a 
speaker could have spoken for what amounts to twelve pages in my records, I 
‘reduce’ this material by taking note 1) of their vote/stance on the matter under debate 
and 2) the central appeals or ‘good reasons’ they offer to justify this stance.  
In Chapter 3, in this way, I examine the first set of debates identified above, 
on the particular issues of Trusts and NSGTs, during the first fourteen years of 
debate.  I argue that to the colonialist appeal to the rational, anti-colonialists 
especially respond with an appeal to the moral.  In Chapters 4 and 5, I explore some 
of the ambiguities and complexities of these debates, particularly within the anti-
kinship arguments of anti-colonialists.  I argue that despite their dissensions, anti-
colonialists actually agree with key tenets of colonialist kinship politics.  In Chapter 
6, I examine the second set of debates identified above, on the general problematic of 
colonialism in the final year.  I argue that anti- colonialists’ ambiguities in relation to 
colonialist kinship politics results in a partial challenge to kinship politics that fails to 
challenge its major elements.  Additionally, I argue that this challenge is profoundly 
gendered, and has important implications for ‘postcolonial’ states as well as 
‘postcolonial’ international community.  In Chapter 7, I end with some concluding 
remarks on how colonialists and anti-colonialists renegotiate the kinship politics of 
the colonial era, with particular focus on three dimensions of this negotiation: its 





(Re)negotiating Kinship Politics, (Re)negotiating the 
‘Colonial’: The Rational versus the Moral in the Debates 
on Decolonization
Our political referents and priorities—the people, the community, class 
struggle, anti-racism, gender difference, the assertion of an anti-imperialist, 
black or third perspective—are not there in some primordial, naturalistic 
sense.  Nor do they reflect a unity or homogenous political object.  They make 
sense as they come to be constructed in the discourses of feminism or 
Marxism or the Third Cinema or whatever, whose objects of priority—class, 
or sexuality or ‘the new ethnicity’—are always in historical and philosophical 
tension, or cross-reference with other objectives.
-Homi Bhabha, 1994
This study concerns legal decolonization specifically, but also resistance more 
generally.  As argued in the above text, resistance is of course never in and of itself, 
never ‘pure,’ nor ‘authentic’ (Bhabha 1994a; See also Cooper 1996: 6-12).  Rather, 
resistance is inescapably shaped by the multiple, often heterogeneous conditions of its 
possibility, including circuits of capital, technology, and given institutional 
infrastructures.  In the world-historical space and time of the post-war UNGA, then, 
what are the conditions of possibility for anti-colonialist resistance?  In the nineteenth 
century, the politics of kinship imparted to the term ‘colonial’ a number of positive 
connotations, which in various ways became embedded in and disseminated through 
emerging fields such as the biological sciences and ethnology, specific institutions 
such as colonial medicine and colonial development projects, as well as elaborate 
colonial bureaucracies (see for example, Fako 1981; Peers 2005; Hannoum 2001; 
Andersson 2002).  As discussed in Chapter 1, this politics deployed especially the 
binary of the rational/irrational, which also manifested as the paternal/childlike and 
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the masculine/feminine, in order to construct transnational hierarchies of space, 
identity and international community.  In the twentieth century, however, two sets of 
developments served to disturb these conditions of possibility, helping to open up 
new space in which to (re)negotiate colonialist kinship and its hierarchies.  First, from 
the mid-1800s and on, anti-colonialists advanced new theories of democracy and self-
determination as part of a building global movement which sought to contend with 
older, colonialist meanings of the ‘colonial’, and by the mid-1900s, this movement 
had succeeded in de-legitimizing the ‘western imperial project’ (Parrott 1997; Winant 
2001).  Second, with the emergence of the purportedly universal UN after WWII, 
these anti-colonialist efforts were incorporated into the institutions of global 
knowledge production in a particular manner.  That is, the UN incorporated on a 
formally equal basis newly independent, ‘postcolonial,’ anti-colonialist states, with 
elite, mostly male leaders representing (elite blocks within) these states within its 
apparatus.  In the UNGA, then, these ‘postcolonial’ states provided the central locus 
of anti-colonialist resistance and social change, pushing for legal decolonization 
against the reactionary politics of colonialist sympathizers.  In this process, how did 
this anti-colonialist resistance challenge the politics of kinship, its construction of the 
‘colonial,’ and its rational/irrational and other hierarchies?  Critically, how did the 
conditions of possibility for this resistance, particularly its articulation by elite men 
representing ‘sovereign,’ if sui generis,17 nation-states determine its shape?  In this 
chapter, I argue that in the post-war moment in the UNGA, while colonialist speakers 
continued to legitimate their positions with the politics of kinship and particularly its 
17 I use the term sui generis here to distinguish nation-states in the non-European world from the 
European, for as Partha Chatterjee puts it, in the former, we see the historical fusion of the national 
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distinct deployment of the rational, anti- colonialist speakers responded with recourse 
to the moral.
In what follows, I explore this (re)negotiation of kinship politics and the 
colonialist bounding of the ‘colonial,’ as well as the contention between the rational 
versus the moral, under the rubric of the ‘(re)bounding of the colonial problematic.’  
By the term ‘colonial problematic,’ I intend to designate a particular apprehension of 
the colonial, including definition of its boundaries and parameters and assessment of 
its content.  In the UNGA, debate on legal decolonization falls into two broad
categories, a set of discussions on specific dependent territories under the purview of 
the UN as institutionalized in the Charter and a set of discussions on the general 
problematic of colonialism, beyond the particulars of the Charter.  The first takes 
place during the first fourteen years of debate, and is comprised primarily of 
colonialist and anti-colonialist attempts to negotiate the colonial as it is 
institutionalized within the Charter.  The second, which takes place in the fifteenth 
and final year of debate, moves beyond the particularities of the Charter to the general 
problem of colonialism, ultimately initiating the onset of legal decolonization.   I 
characterize this first category of discussions, thus, as fundamentally concerned with 
the (re)bounding of the colonial problematic, while the second is concerned more 
with the resolution of the colonial problematic.  In this chapter, then, I turn to this 
first set of discussions, treating the second in a separate chapter. 
Specifically, I examine three overlapping moments in this (re)bounding of the 
colonial problematic.   I begin with an initial moment of this bounding, largely from 
the perspective of colonialist powers, within the UN Charter in 1945.  Interestingly, 
question with the colonial question (Chatterjee 1986).
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we see in this bounding in the Charter the instantiation of a colonialist identity at the 
transnational level, one that collectively constructs itself as the 
rational/paternal/masculine in opposition to its colonial others.  While this is certainly 
not the first or only manifestation of such a transnational identity,18 it is significant in 
this instance in that it becomes incorporated into the institutional infrastructure of a 
new and enduring global organization.  Next, I move outside of the UN to examine 
the emergence of the central source of challenge to this bounding of the colonial 
problematic: the crystallization of the also transnational, anti-colonialist, counter-
identity of ‘Asia-Africa.’  This identity, in response to its designation as irrational, 
infantile and effeminate within the discourses of kinship politics, constructs itself 
instead in terms of masculine unity, or brotherhood, and morality.  How do these two 
identities (re)negotiate the colonial?  To explore this question, finally, I move to the 
UNGA debates.  Here, I argue that the central contention in these conversations is 
inextricably linked to these two transnational formations of colonialist and anti-
colonialist identity.  While colonialist speakers continue to legitimate hierarchical 
relations between territories and identities with the logic of kinship, particularly the 
rational/irrational binary within this logic, Asia-Africa responds to this insistence on 
the rational with an emphasis on the moral.  Indeed, with this focus on the moral, 
Asia-Africa especially seeks to disrupt the binary of the rational/irrational, also 
addressing the paternal/childlike binary to some extent.  On the binary of the 
masculine/feminine, however, it remains silent.  
18 For example, such a transnational colonialist identity was certain evident in the League of Nations 
Covenant.
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These anti-colonialist interventions do not necessarily displace or replace 
colonialist knowledge, its politics of kinship, or its production of the colonial.  
Rather, they introduce competing narratives of kinship and colonialism, rationality 
and irrationality, paternalism, race, culture and democracy.  Their challenge to 
especially the binary of the rational/irrational but also the paternal/childlike 
constitutes an important disruption of the colonialist politics of kinship.  Their silence 
on the masculine/feminine binary, however, foreshadows a profoundly gendered anti-
colonialist politics that will become more fully evident during the final year of debate 
and the ‘resolution’ of the colonial problematic.  
The Initial Moment of the Bounding the Colonial Problematic: The Institutional-
Discursive Structure of the Charter
How is the colonial problematic bound within the UN Charter?  How does the 
Charter betray a transnational colonialist identity constructed in opposition to a 
colonialist other?  As a document, the Charter symbolizes both the conflict and the 
cooperation of the post-World War II period, bringing together conflicting 
perspectives, values and agendas in unity and hierarchy.  This conflict is evident from 
the initial moment of the emergence of the UN, the signing of the Atlantic Charter 
(1941) and the Declaration of the United Nations (1942).  The Atlantic Charter, in 
particular, emphasized the principles of seeking “no aggrandizement, territorial or 
other…no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of 
the peoples concerned…the right of all peoples to choose the form of government 
under which they will live…sovereign rights and self government restored to those 
who have been forcibly deprived of them” (Atlantic Charter, 1941).  While these 
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principles may have been directed to the “Nazi tyranny” (Atlantic Charter, 1941), 
they nevertheless gave anti-colonialist groups hope that the Allies might support the 
cause of decolonization.  However, any such hopes were thwarted as the Allies 
insisted that their principles were merely declarations, not legal obligations.  
According to Lauren (1998), these disagreements persisted through the decision to 
erect a new international organization and over the series of meetings held on the 
design of this new organization.  While anti-colonialist groups (which by the last 
meeting in San Francisco included the Soviets, as opposed to the first meeting) 
wanted to address issues of race, sovereignty for all territories, an international 
standard of conduct, repudiation of territorial conquest, support for the principles of 
democracy, justice, and a number of rights, and a Trusteeship Committee to compel 
the process of decolonization,19 the western powers, above all, wanted to protect their 
sovereignty and state’s rights.
On one level, the Charter is of course a symbol of the cooperation of the post-
World War II period.  The final document includes a central identification of the 
exigencies of the moment as well as the 'solution' to these exigencies (incidentally, 
the features of a particular genre of political statements within movements for social 
change, the manifesto20).  We can see these features in just the Preamble (below), 
where the exigencies identified are given in the first two passages and the solution to 
them is given in the third passage:   
19 Not all anti-colonial groups supported this Trusteeship System.  Many thought it a patronizing 
suggestion, comparable to the League of Nations mandate system.
20 This feature was made evident to me in my conversations with Communications Professor Dr. Mari 
Tonn at the University of Maryland, May, 2003.  
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WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold 
sorrow to mankind, and 
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and 
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and 
other sources of international law can be maintained, and 
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, 
AND FOR THESE ENDS
to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and 
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and 
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be 
used, save in the common interest, and 
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all 
peoples, 
HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS
Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San 
Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the 
present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be 
known as the United Nations.
Hence, the Charter lays down a univocal series of justifications for the existence of 
the United Nations, supported by the central principle of peace and accompanied by 
the additional principles of human rights, international law and cooperation, and 
freedom.  
On another level, the Charter also inevitably encompasses the ongoing and 
unevenly matched tension between state sovereignty/rights and self-determination.  
Hence, though both principles are articulated within the document—and at fairly 
similar levels, with state sovereignty mentioned a total of three times and self-
determination mentioned a total of two times—by no means are both of equal 
importance.  That is, the relative importance of each within the text is highlighted by 
the uneven level of forcefulness in their respective articulations.  For example, while 
the first is mentioned only three times (in Article 2, Paragraph 1, in Article 2, 
Paragraph 7, and in Article 80), in each instance it appears as a master principle, 
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overriding all other principles within the text.  Thus Article 2, Paragraph 1 states: The 
Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members.  
Likewise, Article 2, Paragraph 7 states, “Nothing contained in the present Charter 
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”  Similarly, Article 80 states, “nothing in this 
Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever 
of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to 
which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.”  The purpose of 
Article 2 is to outline the principles upon which the new organization will be built.  
The placement of the issue of sovereignty in Article 2, then, does the work of limiting 
the scope of the new international organization (i.e., this 'international' organization 
may only intrude into the domain of sovereign states to a limited extent).  Similarly, 
Article 80 is located within the Chapter concerned with the International Trusteeship 
System (Chapter XII), the locus of UN provision for legal decolonization.  It is 
telling, then, that the second affirmation of the fundamental and prior principle of 
sovereignty is made in the context of the consideration of justice for dependent 
territories.  This second mention, hence, does the work of constructing state's rights 
(read: the rights of territories which are at present considered sovereign, which 
include colonial powers and exclude dependent territories) as prior to the rights of 
dependent territories.  
Consequently, despite the stated purpose in the Preamble of the maintenance 
of peace, human rights, international law and cooperation and freedom within the new 
organization of the United Nations, state sovereignty actually trumps all other 
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principles.  As such, this hierarchy of values within the Charter renders the UN 
provision for legal decolonization problematic and incomplete and is most evident in 
the Charter distinction between Non Self-Governing Territories (NSGTs) and Trust 
Territories (Trusts) and in the Trusteeship System.  First, the Charter makes a critical 
distinction between NSGTs and Trusts, where only Trusts are to be brought to 
independence, with definite obligations to be undertaken by administering powers in 
a framework of international accountability based on specific agreements, while the 
provisions for NSGTs consist of an unenforceable "Declaration” (El-Ayouty 1971).   
Moreover, only former League of Nations mandates and enemy territories are to be 
put into Trust status, while the dependent territories of Allies are to remain in the 
status quo of the ongoing dependence of NSGTs (Obadele 1996).  Needless to say, 
most dependent territories actually fall into the NSGT category (see Table 2); 
moreover, any territory that qualifies as a trust can nevertheless be designated as 
‘strategic’ and so retained, hence allowing colonialist countries to hold on to any
territories they wish. 
Beyond the distinction between NSGTs and Trusts, Lauren (1998) points out 
that the UN provision for decolonization via the Trust status is further handicapped 
by the watering down of the sole avenue that provided for (eventual) self-
determination.  Hence, only vague terms such as “human rights,” “fundamental 
freedoms,” and “just treatment” are used to describe the powers of the Trusteeship 
Council that is to oversee the progress of the Trusts, while more active works such as 
“facilitate,” “make recommendations,” and “initiate studies” are excluded.
Ultimately, the unevenly matched goals of the sovereign rights of (especially 
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western and colonialist powers) versus the self-determination of dependent peoples is 
evident in the way the process of legal decolonization is institutionally and 
discursively constructed within the Charter.  For example, Article 73, applying to 
NSGTs, states:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the 
administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full 
measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the 
inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the 
obligation to promote to the utmost…the well-being of the inhabitants of these 
territories, and, to this end…to ensure…their political, economic, social, and 
educational advancement…to develop self-government, to take due account of 
the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive 
development of their free political institutions, according to the particular 
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of 
advancement. 
Similarly, in relation to Trusts, Article 76 states: 
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system…shall be…to promote the 
political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of 
the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-
government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular 
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes 
of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each 
trusteeship agreement.
For both NSGTs and Trusts, then, the Charter constructs dependent territories as 
requiring guidance in “political, economic, social and educational advancement” and 
“progressive development.”  Trusts, to be brought to independence, are positioned as 
requiring such advancement and development before they can achieve independence, 
while the indefinitely dependent status of the NSGT is a “sacred trust.”  Such 
language continues themes from the Mandates system of the League of Nations, 
where any anti-colonialist voice was even more muted.  
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Thus, such logic betrays the reliance on a politics of kinship, embodiment and 
disembodiment, where more advanced, developed, rational and ultimately, 
disembodied administering authorities are to assist in the ‘development’ and 
‘advancement’ of less developed, advanced and rational, embodied dependent 
territories.  At the very least, such is the case for those territories that qualify as trusts 
and so are designated for eventual independence.  For NSGTs, however, defined 
outside of even this (eventual) possibility, the rights of the disembodied 
unconditionally trump the rights of the embodied.  
Ultimately, then, despite the greater emphasis on global cooperation in the 
immediate post-war era, the UN Charter nevertheless bounds the colonial problematic 
from the perspective of colonialist kinship politics.  Moreover, that this document 
with global reach relies on a politics of kinship to distinguish between transnational 
categories of subjects, most clearly ‘more advanced’ administering authorities versus 
‘less advanced’ dependent territories, demonstrates something else.  That is, kinship 
politics did more than just provide specific colonialist powers the logic for colonialist 
constructions of self and other; more importantly, it operated in this particular world-
historical moment at a critical transnational level, helping to construct distinct and 
hierarchically ordered—if unsettled—transnational collectivities, including a 
transnational colonialist identity in opposition to a putative underdeveloped other.   
The Emergence of Asia-Africa
If colonialist groups bound the colonial problematic in the Charter through the 
logic of kinship politics, the central challenge to this bounding emerged in the 
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subsequent years with the gradual crystallization of the collective identity of Asia-
Africa.21  Beginning with the idea that collective identity is an achievement, end-point 
or result of a process (Melucci 1995), in what follows I examine the process of the 
construction of Asia-Africa.  But first, I give a brief review of the larger global 
political context within which this identity negotiated its emergence.   
The recent encounters with the horrors of Nazism and Fascism, the 
development of the most destructive weapons technology to date, the accelerated 
decline of the older European colonial powers and growing challenges to the 
‘imperial idea,’ and finally, the seemingly sudden rise of the two new superpowers all 
pointed to the multiple possibilities, both hopeful and dangerous, for the post-war 
world.  As newly politicized22 Asian and African dependent territories became 
increasingly vocal and visible in their demands for democracy and political 
independence, European colonial powers like Britain and France sought to appear 
modern and liberal on the one hand, while devising new mechanisms with which to 
maintain their influence on the other.  For the British, a central way of maintaining 
power was to encourage lost colonies to become members of the Commonwealth and 
to remain in the sterling area.  For its part, France formed the French Union, 
eventually the French Community, to do the same and recast its language of 
‘colonies’ to that of ‘overseas départements.’  The Dutch also ‘incorporated’ their 
21 We must understand this coalition in the context of a centuries-long colonial history in which 
coalitions between African and Asian peoples were important tactics of resistance (Hall 1997b; 
Prashad 2001).
22 Scholars of anti-colonialist, nationalist movements often describe the period between World Wars I 
and II as a period of intensification in which these movements experienced a growing sense of ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ regarding the colonialist West.  This radicalism is argued to have intensified further with 
the war experiences of colonial subjects in WW II and especially with the ‘radical moment’ from 
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Caribbean territories into the Kingdom of the Netherlands.  Of course, not all 
European powers recognized or accepted the shifting ideological climate—Portugal, 
for example, refused to renegotiate the status of its possessions.
As Cold War tensions rose between the Soviet Union and the United States, 
various forms of overt and covert political pressure, economic aid, and military 
alliances divided Europe into two blocs.  Perhaps the struggle was felt most intensely 
in the Third World, however, for just as the territories of Asia and Africa launched 
their struggle for independence after centuries of dependence, the Soviet Union and 
the United States sought to draw them into their economic, political and military 
struggles.  Between the years of 1945-1990, the Third World was the theatre of over 
one hundred wars that had to do with the Cold War, and most of the crises that 
threatened to escalate into nuclear war also occurred in the Third World (Painter 
1999; Mortimer 1984; Bell 2001).  
Hence, the newly politicized subjects of Asian and African dependent 
territories struggled for independence over their own territories and identities in a 
climate where multiple groups sought power over them for a variety of reasons.  
Particularly with the emergence of the Cold War, former and contemporary 
dependent territories largely sought to shield themselves from the crossfire of battles
that, though would often entangle them, did not necessarily originate from them.  It is 
in this context, then, that we must examine the “awakening” of Asia-Africa.  In what 
follows, I examine a series of governmental and non-governmental conferences 
convened by this group that took place outside of the UN throughout the late forties 
1944-1952 in which they saw a weakening of imperial control, as well as a growing intellectual crisis 
of imperialism, among other developments (Furedi 1994).
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and fifties.  I begin with a formative period, which I identify from 1945 through 1950, 
examining the decade of the fifties as the heyday of Asia-Africa.  Regarding these 
conferences, I examine opening speeches, closing speeches, declarations and so on to 
explore the process of the building of Asia-Africa.  What was the language of this 
process?  How did it define a collective ‘we’?  How did it define Asia-Africa’s 
location in the world and its purpose?  Did it address the kinship politics of European 
colonialism that was institutionalized in the UN Charter?  I end with a consideration 
of the implications of this ‘we’ for the ongoing debates on the colonial problematic 
within the UN. 
In 1945, the governments of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Transjordan (Jordan, as of 1950), and Yemen formed the League of Arab States in 
order to “strengthen the ties between the participant States, to co-ordinate their 
political programmes in such a way as to effect real collaboration between them, to 
preserve their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in general the affairs 
and interests of the Arab countries” (Covenant of the League of Arab States, 1945).  
Two years later, the non-governmental Indian Council of World Affairs convened the 
first non-official Asian Conference in New Delhi in order to consider “the common 
problems which all Asian countries had to face in the post-war era” (Asian Relations 
Organization 1955).  This new “awakening of Asia” was institutionalized with the 
founding of the Asian Relations Organization.  In January 1949, when the Dutch took 
‘police action’ against Indonesia, the response of 15 Asian and African governments 
of meeting in New Delhi to publicly denounce this action (Asian Relations 
Organization 1955) signaled the awakening of not merely Asia, and not even Africa 
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in addition to Asia, but of a nascent entity that I term ‘Asia-Africa.’  According to 
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “that crucial demonstration of 
Asian-African solidarity helped ensure the survival of our young Republic.  Indonesia 
may therefore be regarded as the first child of Asian-African solidarity” (Presidential 
Speech delivered at 50th Anniversary Celebration, April, 2005). Indeed, this was a 
new moment in the building of a “deep sense of kinship among Asian and African 
nations” (ibid).  With the action of 1949, these countries began to consult each other 
and coordinate their actions in international forums, forming the basis of the 
emergence in the UN of what has been termed the ‘Afro-Asia bloc’ (Asian Relations 
Organization1955).  
Such a sense of connection was further developed and solidified in the fifties 
with the Baguio (1950), Colombo (1954), Bogor (1954), Bandung (1955), Cairo 
(1958), and Accra (1958) Conferences, among others.  Discussing the three most 
globally visible ones, Bandung, Cairo and Accra, one author argues that the 
conferences’ major accomplishment was in giving self-determination for all peoples a 
recognition, validity and respectability—at least to more liberal elements.  He argues 
that the pre-World War II question associated with decolonization, one of “whether,” 
had now become one of “when” (Lloyd 1959). 
But was a transnational, Asian-African identity really being built here?  Such 
a question is important as countries were divided by varying attitudes toward the 
‘West,’ on the particular issue of non-alignment, and by the myriad more local and 
complex identities they carried with them (i.e., Asia, Africa, the in-betweenness of 
‘Arabia’ in the middle of Asia and Africa, the distinguishing of ‘Asia’ from 
71
something called the Soviet Union, Animism, Christianity, and Buddhism, to name 
just a few).  And yet, especially from the Bandung Conference, there was an 
important sense that there was an entity termed Asia-Africa, which perhaps contained 
smaller identities such as Buddhists, Africans and even Communists, but which 
nevertheless was coming together in this particular historical moment to finally 
respond to their collective designation as the “Mysterious East” and the “Dark 
Continent.”23
In my examination, hence, I first begin with the Bandung Conference of 1955.  
This conference was organized by the governments of Indonesia, Ceylon, India and 
Pakistan, firstly, “as a result of their frustration with the political logjam surrounding 
new membership in the United Nations.  By 1953-54 no new members had been 
inducted into the organization since the acceptance of Indonesia in 1950” (Berger 
2004: 11-12).  Secondly, the conference was a reaction to the colonization of the UN 
arena by Cold War rivalries (Lyon 1984).  Beyond this immediate political context, 
however, the conference was notable for bringing together the first generation of 
‘postcolonial’ nationalist leaders.  As such, it was a central event in the emerging 
“political renaissance of Asia and Africa” (ibid) and helped to create an 
“unprecedented sentiment of Third World change and potential…[indeed, a new] 
Third World consciousness” (Mortimer 1984).  This new consciousness may be 
understood simultaneously as a transnational identity and movement—what some 
have termed “Third Worldism” (Malley 1996; Berger 2004).  In his study of the 
Algerian independence movement, for example, Robert Malley defines Third 
23 Abdulgani, Roeslan.  (1955).  “Foreword” in Asia-Africa Speaks from Bandung.  Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Republic of Indonesia.   
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Worldism as “an anti-imperialist ideology of national self-determination…[a call for] 
Third World solidarity” which was a curious and shifting crossbreed of three different 
philosophical stances, assimilationism (equality between colony and metropolis via 
cooptation), traditionalism (separation between colony and metropolis and 
affirmation of the former’s ‘tradition’), and socialism (transcending the dichotomy 
between colony and metropolis through a universal working class revolution) (Malley 
1996).  Furthermore, this nascent consciousness inspired the emergence of new actors 
on the international stage.  The radical African-Asian People’s Solidarity 
Organization (AAPSO), for example, was such a “Third Worldist” organization; and 
it convened the second conference I examine, the First Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity 
Conference in Cairo (December, 1957 - January, 1958) to reiterate the “solidarity” of 
Asia-Africa (Berger 2004).24  Finally, the third of these highly visible conferences, 
the Conference of Independent African States held in April 1958, focused especially 
on the unique issues of Africa but still within the larger collectivity of Asia-Africa.25
It is to the documents of these three conferences to which I now turn.   
In my examination of the conference documents, I found that participants 
constructed the ‘we’ of Asia-Africa in three ways.  First, they posited an essential 
similarity across these different territories, particularly the notion that what tied them 
24 Both members of this emerging entity of Asia-Africa and observers have alternatively termed it 
‘Asia-Africa,’ ‘Afro-Asia,’ and ‘Africa-Asia.’  For purposes of simplicity, I will use the first 
designation.  
25 The contexts for the three conferences of course had some important dissimilarities.  While Bandung 
was the first gathering of independent Asian and African states on such a global level, the radical Cairo 
Conference was somewhat marred by tensions such as western suspicions of excessive Soviet 
influence; and finally, Accra was convened to explore the particular situation of Africa within the 
larger collectivity of Asia-Africa.  Cairo was also the only conference where most of the delegates 
came from non-governmental organizations, as opposed to Bandung and Accra, where delegates 
represented independent governments (Legum 1958; Lloyd 1959).
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together was what they had suffered and continued to suffer at the hands of the 
‘imperialist west.’  Second, they largely seemed to work within the logic of kinship—
particularly the parent/child binary—deployed by colonialist powers, simultaneously 
invoking a sense of unity between themselves and distinction between themselves and 
‘the parents’ by using the masculinized language of brotherhood.  Finally, they 
crafted a unique set of qualities that were to distinguish Asia-Africa from the 
‘materialist’ and ‘aggressive’ west and indelibly bind them to each other: their 
‘common cultural, moral and spiritual heritage.’  
The similarity between the peoples of Asia and Africa was imagined, first, as 
the result of centuries of connection between different groups:
The contacts which we are seeking to revive and foster through this 
Conference among the nations of Asia and Africa are not at all new 
historically…The ties of history and geography, culture and religion, which 
bind together the countries represented there at this Conference, are very 
profound (Nepal, Text circulated during Opening Session, Bandung 
Conference, 1955).
A central element of this similarity was the common status of ‘underdevelopment,’ 
resultant of the unifying experience of colonialism: 
We, the nations of the new Asia and Africa, whatever our language, whatever 
our faiths, whatever our form of government, whatever the colour of our 
skins—black, brown or yellow—have one thing in common: we are all poor 
and underdeveloped.  Centuries of servitude and stagnation have left their 
mark, a dire heritage of poverty and ignorance, upon the masses of our 
peoples (Ceylon, Text circulated during Opening Session, Bandung 
Conference, 1955)
Within Asia-Africa, the Accra Conference constructed a unified Africa.  
Interestingly, it did so with a new distinction—the “African Personality”:
The former imperialist powers were fond of talking about ‘Arab Africa’ and 
‘Black Africa’; about ‘Islamic Africa and ‘Non-Islamic Africa; about 
‘Mediterranean Africa’ and ‘Tropical Africa’.  These were all artificial 
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descriptions which tended to divide us.  At this Accra Conference these 
tendentious and discriminating epithets are no longer valid.  Today, the 
Sahara is a bridge uniting us [italics in original].  We are one, an entity 
symbolized by our united African Personality (K. Nkrumah, Prime Minister of 
Ghana, Speech given at Closing Session, Accra Conference, 1958).    
Behind and beyond this notion of similarity was a powerful, naturalized sense 
of unity between the peoples of Asia and Africa.  The colonialist politics of kinship 
first invoked such a naturalized sense of connection, but fused with a naturalized 
sense of hierarchy in the relationships between colonialist powers and their dependent 
peoples.  Specifically, as metaphors for trans-territorial community, images of the 
body and the family brought together a naturalized sense of unity (i.e., we are all part 
of one body/family) with a naturalized sense of hierarchy (i.e., the head must rule the 
rest of the body/the family head must rule the rest of the family) in colonial 
relationships.  In these conferences, then, Asian and African speakers spoke of 
disordered kinship.  Hence, peoples continuing to suffer under colonial rule were 
“diseased organs in the body of Asia and Africa. [This disease required eradicating, 
as] a body cannot continue to exist with half of its structure safe and sound while the 
other half is diseased and decayed” (A. E. Sadat, President of Conference, Inaugural 
Address, Cairo Conference, 1958).  In this example, the body symbolized not the 
hierarchical colonialist community of metropole and dependent territory, but the 
entity of Asia-Africa.  Similarly, in the following description of the experience of 
dependent peoples is another image of disordered kinship: “they suffered many years 
of torture, isolation and deprivation.  They were surrounded by an atmosphere of 
injustice and treachery.  They felt like orphans in the midst of a malicious 
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community” (Permanent Secretariat, Organization for Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity, 
Cairo, 1958).  
This disordering of the kinship relations of the body and the family posited by 
a colonialist logic, moreover, could be followed by a refashioning of this kinship into 
something new: “Little by little these orphans began to realize that they were not 
alone in the world, that within the very same walls where they had been kept 
imprisoned, millions of other orphans were sharing their sorrows and fate” 
(Permanent Secretariat, Organization for Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity, Cairo, 1958).  
Such reordering gave rise to a new imagery, an imagery of birth and a new kind of 
kinship.  For example, at the Closing Session of the Bandung Conference, the 
following statement was made:
The Africa-Asian Conference is proud, after a week of hard labour, to have 
given birth to a most cherished child: a child of a future with no special name, 
no special colour, no special race but with certain specific features in which 
we all, more or less, recognize ourselves (Delegation of Iran, Speech given at 
Closing Session, Bandung Conference, 1955). 
Speakers insisted that “Asia and Africa have been reborn” (President Sukarno, 
Speech Given at Opening Ceremony, Bandung Conference, 1955), that “Africa is 
born” (Delegation of Morocco, Speech given at Closing Session, Accra Conference, 
1958), and that “we are all united here by the ties of this brotherhood” (Delegation of 
Lebanon, Bandung Conference, 1955).  Indeed, this reordering of paternalist kinship 
as rebirth and as fraternal kinship was to be the new kinship politics, the resistance 
politics, of Asia-Africa.  Hence, speakers addressed audiences as “Brothers,” 
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“Brethren,” and “Sons of Asia and Africa.”26   Most importantly, a sense of 
connection between these now formerly dependent territories and still dependent 
territories was forged through this new kinship:
For thirty-five years we have been appealing to the Great Powers to do us 
justice.  …It is for the Afro-Asiatic nations and States now to see that justice 
is done…For in North Africa we have dear brethren who suffer indescribable 
agonies and injustices…the existing reign of terror in that part of the world 
does not allow our brethren there to be represented at this Conference 
(Delegation of Jordan, Speech given at Opening Session, Bandung 
Conference, 1955).
Libya hopes that we shall not be only eight at future meetings, but we hope to 
see around the same table as ourselves, the representatives of our brothers 
from Algeria, Cameroons, Nigeria, Somalia, and other African territories 
(Delegation of Libya, Speech given at Closing Session, Accra Conference, 
1958).
Finally, in addition to similarity and (masculine) unity, Asia -Africa also 
sought to distinguish a particular kind of identity for itself as a whole and in 
distinction from the ‘west.’  Repeatedly, in every conference, this identity was 
articulated as a sense of cultural, moral, and spiritual heritage:  
The sense of moral and spiritual values in life is ingrained in our nature: it is 
part of ourselves, it is our essential way of life.  Even people of the West 
admit this, for do they not say Ex Oriente Lux, Ex Occidente Lex: Out of the 
East Light, Out of the West Law?  (Delegation of Thailand, Bandung 
Conference, 1955).  
Asia and Africa are the classic birthplaces of faiths and ideas, which have 
spread all over the world.  Therefore, it behooves us to take particular care to 
ensure that the principle which is usually called the ‘Live and let live’ 
principle—mark, I do not say the principle of ‘Laissez faire, laissez passer’ of 
Liberalism which is obsolete—is first of all applied by us most completely 
within our own Asian and African frontiers (Sukarno, President of Indonesia, 
Speech given at Opening Session, Bandung Conference, 1955).
26 Speakers also used the feminine noun ‘sisters,’ but this was rare.  Even Mrs. R. Nehru, a rare female 
delegate at the Cairo Conference, began her address during the Opening Session to “Brothers and 
Sisters” but soon settled on just “brothers.”
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It is not strange that such a loving, unbiased spirit should evolve out of Asia 
and Africa.  Our peoples never enjoyed at any time oppressing other peoples; 
on the contrary, they were oppressed themselves.  It is because of this that 
they are preaching now the message of love, justice and equality in this 
troubled world.  We do not excel others in force or in the ability to 
manufacture arms, but we do excel them in the ability to sense the horrors of 
injustice and in the ability to comprehend the dangers to which the world is 
exposed (A. E. Sadat, President of Conference, Speech given at Closing 
Session, Cairo Conference, 1958).
Some authors have argued that this notion of unique spiritual and moral qualities was 
an important element of the discourse of specific anti-colonial writers such as Ho Chi 
Minh, Nehru, Fanon, and Nkrumah, as well (Duara 2004; Chatterjee 1986; Sartori 
2005; Duara 2001).  In India, for example, “a nationalist political discourse that pitted 
a developmentalist national state grounded in the ethical and spiritual practices of 
Indian culture against the shallow materialism of Western civilization” (Sartori 2005)
flourished throughout the twentieth century.  In a study on Asia as a whole, one 
author argues that after World War I, new nations throughout Asia produced multiple 
articulations of such difference of Asian or Chinese or Japanese civilization from the 
‘imperial Civilization of the west.’  Though varying, each involved, in different ways, 
combining elements that are a) identical to and b) the binary opposite of the 
constituents of [imperial] Civilization.  [For example,] one strategy is to 
rediscover elements identical to Civilized society within the suppressed 
traditions of civilization: Confucian rationality, Buddhist humanism, Hindu 
logic, and so on.  Another strategy identifies the opposite of the West in Asian 
civilizations: “peaceful” as opposed to “warlike,” “spiritual” as opposed to 
“material,” “ethical” as opposed to “decadent,” “natural” as opposed to 
“rational,” “timeless” as opposed to “temporal,” and more.  Finally, the [new 
Asian] nation authorizes its opposition to imperialist Civilization by 
synthesizing or harmonizing the binaries after the equivalence has been 
established.  Thus Western materialism will be balanced by Eastern 
spirituality and modernity redeemed (Duara 2001).    
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Hence, such difference from the ‘west’ was expressed in complex and varying ways 
by intellectuals, nationalists, statesmen, and a variety of popular social movements in 
multiple governmental, academic and artistic spaces outside of the conferences of 
interest here.  What we see in these conferences, then, is a particular transnational 
elaboration of such uniqueness, in which, either due to their “spiritual values” or 
through their experience of the “horrors of injustice,” the collectivity of Asia-Africa 
distinguished itself from the putative “material west” as being able to offer a uniquely 
moral and spiritual perspective on the world.  
Differences between speakers did emerge from the conferences on issues such 
as non-alignment, how to define colonialism, the appropriate sort of attitude towards 
the ‘west,’ and to what extent Asia-Africa should cooperate with the west in its post-
independence efforts at development.  For example, a number of states at Bandung 
were allied in some sense with one superpower or the other.  Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and 
the Philippines all had relationships with the United States, while North Vietnam was 
linked to the USSR (Mortimer 1984).  At Bandung, the debate on how to define a 
colonialist aggressor also erupted, where some wanted to target Soviet aggression in 
addition to European colonialism.  In this vein, Ceylon, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Libya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan and Turkey submitted a draft 
resolution to condemn “all types of colonialism.”  However, China and India opposed 
this definition, and India’s Nehru argued that members of the UN could not be
colonies, thus excluding Eastern bloc countries that were members of the UN from 
being defined as such.  Eventually, the conference settled on condemning colonialism 
without actually defining it (Bell 2001).  On attitudes toward and cooperation with the 
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‘west,’ too, there were divisions between more pro-western countries such as 
Nkrumah’s Ghana and the radical United Arab Republic.         
Nevertheless, in these very visible, very public conferences, Asia-Africa 
endeavored to “speak with a concerted voice” and passed most of it resolutions with 
unanimity.  In the rest of this project, I discuss the first major impact in world politics 
of this new construction of Asian-African brotherhood, the moral argument for the 
political independence of still dependent “brothers” in the United Nations General 
Assembly.27  Over the years, this identity would also argue for peace and non-
alignment in the Cold War, materializing in the Non-Aligned Movement in the 
sixties.  It would call for more UN and World Bank assistance for Asian and African 
development and help to form what would become the Group of 77 (G-77).   It would 
form the foundation for the argument for international community itself, specifically 
calling for more cooperation in the economic, cultural, and technical fields between 
not just Asian and African “brothers” but also between “the human family.”  
It was French demographer and economic historian Alfred Sauvy who first 
used the term ‘Third World’ in his article "Three Worlds, One Planet" in the 
magazine “The Observer” on August 14, 1952.  The article drew on the discussion of 
the French writer Sieyes on the Third Estate during the French Revolution, where 
Sieyes spoke of the how against the First Estate (the clergy) and Second Estate (the 
nobility), the Third Estate (the ‘rest’ of society—the bourgeoisie, petit-bourgeoisie, 
artisans, peasants and workers), which was ignored and despised, sought to ‘become 
27 In the debates on NSGTs and Trusts, the Asia-Africa argument especially emphasizes this notion of 
the moral, while the focus on brotherhood emerges especially in the debates in the final year on the 
Declaration.  Since I examine the debates on the Declaration in a separate chapter, here I will focus on 
the argument for the moral and leave the discussion of brotherhood to the chapter on the Declaration.
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something.’  Sauvy wrote that like the Third Estate, the Third World also sought to 
become something.28  In the local-global space of politics in the United Nations 
General Assembly, this nascent Third World would make itself felt in particular 
ways.  And from the ‘other side,’ it would invoke a fairly concerted response as well.
(Re)Negotiating the Colonial Problematic: Debate on NSGTs and Trusts
 Having delineated the bounding of the colonial problematic in the Charter, as 
well as the emergence of Asia-Africa, the central source of challenge to this 
bounding, I now turn to the renegotiation of the colonial problematic in the debates 
on decolonization within the UN. Though one might expect certain patterns of 
discourse based on political perspective, particular groups were not identified a 
priori.  Rather, groupings of speakers (and the countries that they represented) that 
tended to make similar kinds of arguments, to base their arguments on similar kinds 
of appeals, and to support one another against others, were allowed to emerge from 
the data.  In this fashion, two fairly distinct, overarching groupings emerged: first, 
that of former and contemporary European colonialist powers, and second, that of 
former dependent, newly independent territories, what I term above as the entity of 
Asia-Africa.29  The United States and a number of former dependent territories in the 
28 The socialists of L’ Observateur (later Le Nouveau Observateur) had in mind parallels between their 
own search for a ‘Third Way’ between capitalism and Stalinism and the wave of national liberation 
movements.  (See Encyclopedia of Marxism, www.Marxists.org and www.homme-
moderne.org/societe/demo/sauvy/ 3mondes.html). 
29 I am speaking of groupings in regard to the issue of decolonization.  Groupings were of course 
situational, and shifted based on the issue under consideration.  Furthermore, regarding these particular 
groupings, and as delineated in the history of the formation of the United Nations (UN) provided 
earlier, this division already had a history.  Even before the formation of the UN, during WWII, while 
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Americas (such as Argentina, Peru, and Columbia) tended to side with the first group.  
The Soviet Union and its associated bloc of countries, along with a number of 
different former dependent territories in the Americas (such as Mexico and 
Guatemala), tended to side with the second.  As the first group tended to prioritize the 
perspective of the colonialist powers, I term this group the “colonialist” view.  As the 
second group did the same for former and contemporary dependent territories, I term 
this group the “anti-colonialist” view.30
Exploring the ‘bounding of the colonial problematic’ as discussed above, I 
specifically examine here a total of 54 debates, with 20 focused on NSGTs and 34 on 
Trusts.  The debates consisted of speakers supporting, opposing, or abstaining on a 
particular item under consideration with one or a series of appeals.  Focusing on the 
central appeals made to justify a position in a debate, eight appeals emerged as most 
prevalent in the period examined.  Speakers appealed to Peace, the master principle 
articulated in the Charter for the existence of the UN; International Cooperation 
(United Nations), the stated central avenue to Peace, with the UN, international 
the priority for anti-colonialist groups were issues of decolonization, racism and territorial conquest, 
the priority for the Allies was sovereignty.  This division lasted through numerous meetings regarding 
the structure of the United Nations and ultimately became an important organizing principle in the 
Charter, where the anti-colonialist interests of one group were supported to a limited extent through the 
Trust system but thwarted through the Non Self-Governing Territories (NSGTs) system (Lauren, 
1998).  With regard to the different discourses that are explored here, then, it must be remembered that 
the membership and goals of the two central groups within the debate had largely already solidified by 
1945.  As newly independent territories joined the UN, they tended to join the anti-colonialist group.
30 I do not intend to imply unproblematically with these terms that the United States was somehow a 
colonialist power or that the Soviet Union was not a colonialist power.  In what follows, I will argue 
that while both perpetuated hierarchical constructions of space and identity, as did the European 
colonialist powers, the particular discourse of colonialism produced within the United Nations did not 
allow for a ready recognition of these practices as colonialist practices.  Hence, although on occasion 
Soviet bloc countries especially targeted what they termed the colonialist practices of the United States 
and vice versa, both the United States and the Soviet Union were allowed to position themselves as 
‘outside’ of the history of colonialism.   While at times, it was recognized that the United States was 
indeed a colonialist power, it was nevertheless positioned as a ‘good’ power compared to other ‘bad’ 
powers.
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cooperation, the Charter, and international community often used interchangeably; 
Independence/Representation, a norm that increasingly began to be applied to 
dependent territories by anti-colonialists after World War I and especially World War 
II; Interests of Inhabitants, the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of dependent 
territories; Colonialism not negative, the basic logic of kinship politics that colonized 
peoples required and benefited from colonial rule; Sovereignty, the principle, as 
enshrined in the Charter, that state rights are paramount; Proceduralism/Practicalism, 
the argument that matters should proceed according to sound and agreed upon 
procedure or what was most commonsense or practical in a particular situation; and 
Legalism, the principle of adherence to the codes of national and international law. 
Debate on NSGTs
My examination of the debates on NSGTs in the General Assembly points to 
specific sets of concerns regarding NSGTs for speakers.  As mentioned earlier, the 
UN Charter made a central distinction between NSGTs and Trusts, requiring specific 
obligations from administering authorities for Trusts with the explicit goal of bringing 
these territories to political independence.  This was not the case for NSGTs.  The 
only significant obligation that the Charter placed on the administering authorities of 
NSGTs was to provide information regarding their territories to the UN on a regular 
basis.  Specifically, the Charter required them 
to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, 
subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may 
require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to 
economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they 
are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII 
and XIII apply (UN Charter, Chapter XI, Article 73).  
83
Significantly, this Article specifically excluded the provision of information of ‘a 
political nature.’  This relative lack of UN supervision regarding NSGTs compared to 
Trusts was also estimated to affect far more people than the Trust status.  For 
example, only a handful of territories were placed under trusteeship status in the first 
couple of years.  Indeed, between the years of 1945-1999, slightly over 100 
dependent territories came under the purview of the UN, and of these, only about one 
tenth were placed into trust status (see Table 2 for information on different dependent 
territories).  A major component of the anti-colonialist presence had thus always 
opposed the distinction between Trusts and NSGTs, and once established, anti-
colonialists consistently attempted to “read (the conservative provisions of) Article 73 
of Chapter XI, which were intended for the NSGTs, in light of (the more generous) 
Charter provisions, including those of Chapters XII and XIII, which were intended for 
the Trust Territories” (El-Ayouty 1971).  Specifically, my examination of the debates 
indicates that they sought to convene conferences where representatives from the 
NSGTs could air their aspirations and concerns—could in a sense, ‘represent 
themselves’; they developed a “list of factors” to determine precisely when a territory 
came under the purview of the United Nations and qualified as an NSGT, requiring 
the colonialist power it was associated with to comply with the obligations that 
resulted; and they proposed a resolution that NSGTs should be put into Trust status.  
By far the biggest move that this group made was to establish a Committee on 
Information, which would oversee the information that administering authorities were 
to provide to the Secretary-General on a regular basis.  Particularly after 1948 after 
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the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), anti-colonialists 
used the new rhetorical resources made available by the UDHR to press for the 
committee (El-Ayouty 1971).  The power, scope, membership, and permanent or 
temporary status of this committee comprised the bulk of the debates on NSGTs in 
the General Assembly.  While many of these proposals were rejected, many were also 
accepted, if in amended form.  The central contention was that under the legal 
machinery of the UN, the NSGTs were not to be brought to independence, and hence, 
as El-Ayouty (ibid) argues, the goal of anti-colonialist groups was to try to extend the 
UN's competence to include the supervision of the NSGTs toward self-rule.  
In my examination of these documents, I found that the most significant anti-
colonialist appeals for social change for NSGTs were Independence/ Representation 
and International Cooperation (United Nations).  Speakers argued that the ultimate 
goal for NSGTs, as for Trusts, should be independence:
There should be constant endeavor to liberalize the working of the Charter in 
order the millions of people outside of the direct supervision of the United 
Nations might achieve full self-government in the shortest possible period and 
qualify for direct membership.  [These are] the legitimate functions of the 
General Assembly which it [can] not afford to surrender (Mr. Rao, India, Sess 
4, 1949:  460).
Colonialist countries often claimed that the legal status of NSGTs was not 
problematic, that these territories did not lack political representation and indeed, the 
metropolitan authorities themselves provided such representation.  Anti-colonialist 
groups questioned the legitimacy of the notion that the administering authorities 
actually represented either dependent territories in general or NSGTs more 
specifically, and argued that only the people within the NSGTs themselves could 
represent their own concerns and interests: 
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However valuable the information provided by the metropolitan Powers may 
prove to be, the Philippine delegation believes it to be none the less essential 
that the Non-Self-Governing Peoples be given an opportunity to submit facts 
on their own lands as they know them, to voice their own aspirations…We are 
asking, for the Non-Self-Governing Peoples today, exactly the same 
opportunity for self-expression that we Filipinos enjoyed for forty years, in 
our relations with the United States of America (Mr. Romulo, Philippines, 
Sess 1, 1946: 1328-1329).  
The profound significance of international community and of the United Nations as 
an institutional framework for the establishment of a more democratic international 
community was also an important appeal, and argued as a precondition for the other 
appeals:  
Just as individuals should be prompted in their mutual relations by a sense of 
human solidarity, so nations must assist each other to advance …it 
is necessary to encourage the political education of the peoples… prepare the 
ground for them so that they might shape their own future and direct their own 
affairs.  All these things are impossible, except in an organization like the 
United Nations, in which the nations come together to study, considering the 
world as a whole—of which this institution is the true symbol—and examine 
common problems in a noble and generous spirit based on a community of 
ideas and ideals with the end of promoting the advancement and well-being of 
all peoples without exception...The United Nations is a democratic forum in 
which the peoples may come together and discuss matters freely not in order 
to widen the differences between them but in order to discover the common 
denominators that permit them to harmonize their efforts for the greater good 
of each of them and of all mankind (Mr. De Oliveira, Brazil, Sess 12, 1957: 
518).
Beyond these two appeals, anti-colonialists also appealed to Legalism and 
Proceduralism/Practicalism in the debates on NSGTs.  However, while the first two 
were central in explaining and justifying voting behavior, the latter two were most 
often in the form of rebuttal to legalist or proceduralist argument from colonialist 
speakers.  
In response to such arguments on NSGTs from anti-colonialist speakers, 
former and contemporary colonial powers also seemed to come together to form a 
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more or less cohesive response.  The most important appeals structuring this 
discourse were Legalism, International Cooperation (United Nations), Sovereignty, 
and Proceduralism/Practicalism.  Indeed, because NSGTs were legally outside of the 
purview of the UN for the most part, the colonialist appeal to Legalism, that the 
attempt to bring them more fully into the competence of the UN was legally 
problematic, was more significant for the NSGT discussion than for any other.  Thus, 
in response to an impassioned appeal from the representative of the Philippines 
regarding the need for people from within the NSGTs to be able to circumvent 
administering authorities and represent themselves, one speaker claimed:
I am wholly in accord with everything that has been said by the 
…representative of the Philippine Republic.  [But we oppose this resolution 
because it seems to] clearly violate the basic provisions of the Charter.  It 
ignores the basic distinction between the Trust Territories dealt with by 
Chapter XII and the non-trust territories that are dealt with by Chapter 
XI…the United Nations has no authority to intervene in such territories.  That 
authority remains with their own national government (Mr. Dulles, United 
States, Sess 1, 1946: 1331-34).  
Moreover, this appeal to Legalism was intimately tied to the appeal to 
Sovereignty/State’s Rights:
We are dealing with the fundamental issue of whether this organization can 
assert, within Member States, a political authority equal to that of the national 
governments themselves.  If it can do so once, it can do so again.  And no one 
can predict the consequences of the precedent we are here invited to set.  We 
can, however, assert with confidence that constitutional limitations are, in the 
long run, the only defense of a minority against the passions of a majority and 
the emotions of the moment (ibid: 1334).
Entangled in colonialist appeals to legalism and state sovereignty were also appeals to 
proper procedure (i.e., Proceduralism/Practicalism) and an insistence that while 
colonialist powers were not necessarily opposed to the ends of a particular resolution, 
that they were rather opposed to the means: 
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We therefore ask this Assembly to reject this resolution, not because we do 
not agree with its purpose, but because the means chosen violate the Charter 
and disrupt the basic tie which holds us together (ibid).
Finally, colonialist speakers also appealed to International Cooperation (United 
Nations), though their arguments here were not the same as the International 
Cooperation (United Nations) appeals of anti-colonialist speakers.  For example, in 
the following example, a colonialist speaker reacts to some resolutions asking for 
political information on NSGTs, information not directly authorized by the Charter:
The information demanded by the resolutions under question is very diff from 
that specified in the Charter, which in the case of NSGTs specifically excludes 
political information…When you interpret the Charter in a certain way, 
claiming to follow its spirit, you are violating it...it was a very careful 
compromise (Mr. Ryckmans, Belgium, Sess 2, 1947: 671-75).   
Here, Belgium appeals to International Cooperation (Untied Nations) by arguing that 
resolutions passed by the General Assembly must remain within the boundaries of the 
UN Charter.  Contrast this appeal to the anti-colonialist appeal to International 
Cooperation (United Nations) made by Brazil above.  While Brazil’s anti-colonialist 
appeal seeks to advance the cause of social justice and social change, Belgium’s 
colonialist appeal is a conservative appeal that in effect contains social change.
Beyond these four central appeals, colonialist speakers also appealed to 
Independence/Representation and Colonialism not Negative in their discussions on 
NSGTs.  Similar to the anti-colonialist deployment of Legalism and 
Proceduralism/Practicalism, however, Independence/Representation was not a key 
appeal in the explanation and justification of voting behavior for colonialist speakers 
and perhaps was only deployed to signify adherence to emerging global norms of 
democracy.  While the Colonialism not Negative appeal was an important appeal in 
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the explanation of voting behavior, its relative dearth can perhaps be explained by the 
shifting global climate as well, as it directly contradicted these emergent norms of 
democracy.  
Debate on Trusts
In comparison to the debate on NSGTs, many more debates, spanning many 
more meetings, were held regarding Trusts.  Since theoretically, Trusts were already 
to be brought to independence under the institutional purview of the United Nations, 
the issues of concern were not as exclusively about the legality of UN competence but 
rather, about procedure—how to implement trust agreements and how to develop 
machinery to implement trust agreements; how to induce the Union of South Africa 
to take up its ‘obligations’ as an administering authority and place South West Africa 
into trust status; how to address the particular issue of administrative unions, an 
institutional tactic configured by administering authorities to administer their trusts in 
union with other territories they were responsible for; and finally, such concerns with 
regard to specific trust territories.31
Regarding the distinct context of trust territories, institutionally, anti-
colonialists made several moves. First, they expanded the membership of the 
Trusteeship Council to include explicitly anti-colonial countries such as China, Iraq, 
Mexico, and the Soviet Union.  Second, over protests of violations of sovereignty, 
they passed two important resolutions as well.  The first of these sought to take the 
information and reports about conditions within trust territories as instituted in the 
31 In contrast to these specific territories, I have singled out the issues of South West Africa and the 
Union of South Africa as one of the big four issues for the sheer amount of time spent on the latter.
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Charter out of exclusive control of the Trusteeship Council and place it in the hands 
of the GA as a whole through the secretary-general and through a special ad hoc 
committee composed of anti- colonial countries like China, Cuba, Egypt, India, 
Philippines, Soviet Union, Uruguay.  The second of these resolutions called on those 
members who administered trust territories to convene a special conference of the 
representatives of the peoples living in these lands in order that they might articulate 
their wishes and aspirations for self-government (Lauren 1998: 215).
Despite these distinct maneuvers regarding Trusts as opposed to NSGTs, 
however, the patterns of appeal regarding Trusts for each group remained the same.  
For anti-colonialist countries, key appeals continued to be 
Independence/Representation and International Cooperation (United Nations).  
Regarding the issue of administrative unions and independence, for example, one 
anti-colonialist speaker argued:
[We have previously adopted resolutions that] an administrative union must 
remain strictly administrative in its nature and its scope, and that its operation 
must not have the effect of creating any conditions which will obstruct the 
separate development of the Trust Territory, in the fields of political, 
economic, social and educational advancement as a distinct entity…however, 
these General Assembly resolutions are being violated by the Administering 
Authorities…because their] policy…is designed to rob them of their special 
status and annex them by amalgamating them with the neighboring colonies 
under the cloak of so-called administrative unions.  The application of this 
policy by the Administering Authorities will clearly preclude any independent 
development of the Trust Territories as distinct entities, as required under the 
terms of the General Assembly resolution…It will thus prevent the 
development of the Trust Territories toward self-government or independence 
(Mr. Demchenko, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Sess 6, 1952: 351). 
Once again, anti-colonialist appeals for Independence/Representation were made 
together with appeals to International Cooperation (United Nations).  For example, in 
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response to a statement by the representative from Denmark that the Union of South 
Africa was legally not obligated to place South West Africa into trust status, one 
speaker argued that it was indeed the obligation of the General Assembly to ensure 
this was the case, as the General Assembly “represents the conscience of the world” 
(Mr. Chieh, China, 1947, Sess 2, p. 600).  
Similar to the discussion on NSGTs, anti-colonialists again appealed 
secondarily to Proceduralism/Practicalism and Legalism in the discussion on Trusts, 
though once again, these functioned more as rebuttals than key arguments justifying 
voting behavior.  
For colonialist speakers the most common appeals were again to Legalism and 
Proceduralism/Practicalism.  For example, regarding the anti-colonialist argument 
that South Africa was obligated to place South West Africa into trust status, one 
speaker replied: 
My delegation feels fairly certain that there is no legal obligation under the 
Charter to place a mandated territories under the Trusteeship System…There 
is sufficient prima facie proof, not only to us, but to a great number of States, 
of the non-existence of such an obligation.  There being, in our view, no legal 
obligation…we cannot go any further than invite the Union of South Africa to 
do what is asked for (Italics in original, Mr. Kerncamp, Netherlands, Sess 2, 
1947:  606).
The appeal to Proceduralism/Practicalism is demonstrated in the discussion of 
administrative unions below.  In this example, in response to a resolution that 
attempted to problematize these unions as compromising the territorial and political 
integrity of dependent territories, one speaker claimed:
What would happen if my Government were to attempt to implement a 
resolution such as this?  It would be required to disrupt the unified 
administration, which has existed in Togoland and the Cameroons for some 
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thirty years.  The new organs thus established would be in direct competition 
with the organs already in being, and would make it impossible for my 
Government to fulfill the injunctions of the Trusteeship Agreements (Lord 
Tweedsmuir, UK, Sess 6, 1952: 354).
Beyond these key appeals, colonialist speakers also again made secondary appeals to 
Independence/Representation and International Cooperation (United Nations).  
Finally, they also appealed once again to Sovereignty/State’s Rights and Colonialism 
not Negative.  
Understanding the Patterns: The Renegotiation of Kinship
For both anti- colonialists and colonialists, then, there were central patterns of 
appeal that shaped discussions on both NSGTs and Trusts.  For the first, these appeals 
centered on Independence/Representation and International Cooperation (United 
Nations), while for the second, they centered on Legalism and 
Proceduralism/Practicalism.  While each side also made some use of the central 
appeals identified with the other, these secondary appeals appeared more in the form 
of rebuttal to the other side than genuine explanations and justifications for voting 
behavior. Additionally, Colonialism not Negative and Sovereignty/State’s Rights were 
much more likely to be used by colonialist speakers than anti-colonialist speakers.  
How do we understand the distinction between the sorts of appeals made by 
anti-colonialist speakers and those made by colonialist speakers?  On the simplest 
level, one may argue that while the (anti-colonialist) appeals for 
Independence/Representation and International Cooperation (United Nations) 
advance the scope of globally expanding norms of democracy, representation and 
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cooperation, the (colonialist) appeals to Legalism, Proceduralism/Practicalism, 
Colonialism not negative and Sovereignty/State’s Rights serve the interests of 
imperial and colonial powers.  Alternatively, one may argue that both sides advance 
arguments that suit their interests.  Beyond both of these explanations, however, is the 
conversation that is occurring here between two crystallizations of transnational 
collective identity.  That is, the distinction between patterns of appeal in this 
conversation seems to go to the heart of the tension between the identity of European 
imperial/colonial rule and the identity that anti-colonialist Asia-Africa crafts in 
response.  Hence, if the kinship politics of European colonialism historically 
prioritizes the disembodied over the embodied, or the rational over the irrational, the 
colonialist appeals in these debates to Legalism, Proceduralism/Practicalism, 
Sovereignty/State’s Rights, and even Colonialism not negative, all perpetuate this 
argument for the rational and indeed, can be seen as constituting a meta-appeal to the 
rational.32
Meanwhile, for its part, the anti- colonialist contingent’s appeals to 
Independence/Representation and International Cooperation (United Nations)  can 
thus be understood as an attempt to reorder the logic of this kinship politics—of the 
meta-appeal to the rational —with a meta-appeal to the moral .  Such an interpretation 
particularly makes sense in the light of the way Asia-Africa distinguished itself from 
‘the west’ at Bandung, Cairo and Accra: as the unique voice of the moral, spiritual 
32 That these appeals should emerge in the arguments of colonialist speakers as they negotiate with 
Asia-Africa is not surprising.  The first two of these are fundamentally associated with the 
development of ‘the west’ in Weber’s Eurocentric argument (see Economy and Society, Vols 1 and 2
(1956), and General Economic History (1927)), for example, while the very development and meaning 
of the second two rely on the rational-irrational distinction between imperial/colonial western powers 
and their ‘others’ (Theodoropoulos 1988).
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and cultural, with its crucial part to play in contemporary politics of decolonization, 
war, and so forth.  For example, recall the statement of the Delegation of Thailand at 
Bandung (1955): “the sense of moral and spiritual values in life is ingrained in our 
nature: it is part of ourselves, it is our essential way of life.”  
Ultimately, these tensions manifest in each side’s approach to the Charter (and 
indeed, as was discussed above, to international community itself). 33   While for 
colonialists, they manifest in a “literal” interpretation of the Charter—in an appeal to 
remain in the limits of the “letter” of the Charter, for anti-colonialists, the goal is to 
move beyond legalized and institutionalized impediments and focus on the “spirit” of 
the Charter—for a liberal, interpretive approach rather than a “narrow, hair-splitting, 
legalistic attitude” (Mr. Menon, India, Sess 1, 1946: 1341).  Hence, colonialists 
insisted, “the Charter was a contract.  By definition, that contract could not express 
anything other than the common will of all the contracting parties” (Mr. Garreau, 
France, Sess 4, 1949:  457).  Indeed, the transgression of the letter of the Charter and 
the infringement upon the sovereignty of states was often posited as detrimental to the 
very foundation and purpose of the United Nations.  Colonialist meta-argument thus 
especially appealed to the images of order and controlled change inherent in the 
appeals of Legalism, Proceduralism/Practicalism, and Colonialism not negative.  
Speakers argued against what they saw as “revolutionary movements rather than a 
33In terms of this contention around the very meaning of the Charter itself, we may understand the UN 
Charter here as a boundary object.  Boundary objects arise “over time from durable cooperation among 
communities of practice…[and are]…both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the 
several parties employing them and robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites (Bowker 
and Star, 2000).  We may say thus that while the boundary object of the Charter allowed colonialist 
and anti-colonialist groups to come together, it also enabled very different constructions for each 
community of practice of the purpose and significance of that object.  Of course, the conflicts inherent 
in these different interpretations came to make themselves felt within the debates.  However, it is 
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balanced evolution towards self-government” (Mr. Riemens, Netherlands, Sess 7, 
1952: 348).  Others argued that the “liberal” attitude of anti-colonialist groups 
towards the Charter was “dangerous” and “extremist” rather than “undertaken in the 
spirit of realism and compromise,” that the actions and arguments of anti-colonialist 
groups in general were “too fast,” “hasty,” proceeding at “an unduly rapid pace,” 
suffering from “lack of wisdom,” “unwise,” “irresponsible,” “not practical,” 
“improper,” “inappropriate,” “inopportune,” “ill-considered…in the light of practical, 
commonsense considerations,” “insane,” “premature,” “immature,” and “in the 
emotion of the moment.” 
In contrast, anti-colonialists attempt to disrupt the disembodiment-
embodiment distinction by insisting on the moral over the rational.  In the following, 
for example, in response to the argument by the Union of South Africa that it has no 
legal or moral obligation to place South West Africa into Trust status, one speaker 
replied:
The Government of the Union of South Africa has argued that is under neither 
a legal nor a moral obligation to place South West Africa under the 
Trusteeship System.  I do not claim to be a lawyer, but speaking purely from 
the common sense point of view, and in view of the history of the last quarter 
of a century, it seems to me an astounding statement to make in this General 
Assembly before the nations of the world, that no moral obligation exists in 
this matter.  What would the Charter be but a medley of words, were it not 
sustained by the spirit which lies behind and which has inspired the peoples of 
the world to join together to solve their common problems?…We must not 
forget the fate of hundreds of thousands of Africans in South West Africa who 
will look to this Assembly for the safeguarding of their interests (Italics 
added, Mrs. Pandit, India, Sess 2, 1947: 598).
Regarding the reluctance of administering authorities to provide information on 
NSGTs, another speaker argued: 
perhaps the plasticity of the meaning of the Charter that enabled these radically different groups to 
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We do not see why a legalistic, narrow and limited interpretation of a 
paragraph e of Article 73 should be relied upon in order to frustrate or 
misinterpret the legitimate interests of this General Assembly—a 
representative body of the free peoples of the early, fully conscious of its 
duties and responsibilities towards mankind—in being fully informed of the 
progress of other peoples in the achievement [of] their ultimate independence 
and freedom (Italics added, Mr. Mendez, Panama, Sess 2, 1947: 708-709).
Hence, embedded in these patterns of appeal and evident particularly when we 
examine patterns of meta-appeal is that these debates are not merely negotiating the 
status of Trusts and NSGTs, or even simply legal decolonization.  They are 
fundamentally re-negotiating the logic of kinship politics.  That is, they are 
negotiating the legitimacy of the distinction between the disembodied and the 
embodied and the prioritizing of the disembodied over the embodied.  Whereas for 
colonialists, legal decolonization must be a process of controlled change organized by 
the logic and privileges of kinship politics, for the anti-colonialist contingent centered 
around Asia-Africa, legal decolonization involves fundamentally disrupting this logic 
as it applies to administering authorities, remaining dependent territories, and 
themselves.  
Conclusion: Negotiating the Colonial Problematic by Re-Negotiating Kinship
Historically, kinship politics provided a range of imagery, especially the 
binaries of parent/child, masculine/feminine, and rational/irrational, to naturalize 
association and hierarchy between distinct lands and peoples.  Those embodied by 
this logic—infantilized, feminized and/or made ‘irrational’—required the mastery, 
tutelage or guidance of those disembodied, or positioned as the parental, masculine 
come together to form an international community in the first place.  
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and/or rational.  In the Charter, this hierarchy of the disembodied over the embodied 
was institutionalized on one level through the relationship set up between colonialist 
powers (now administering authorities) and some of their dependent territories (now 
trusts) through the trusteeship system, where the latter were to be given political 
tutelage and guidance by the former in order to be ‘prepared’ for political 
independence.  Additionally, this hierarchy was also institutionalized through the 
relationship set up between administering authorities and the rest (bulk) of their 
dependent territories (now NSGTs), where these dependent territories were to remain 
in such dependency indefinitely, since the rights of the former unconditionally 
trumped the rights of the latter.  
Over the decade of the fifties, the emergence of the entity of Asia-Africa was 
the central locus of anti-colonial resistance to this bounding of the colonial 
problematic in the Charter.  This entity firstly constructed itself through the concept 
of similarity, or the notion that ‘we are similar in our experiences of oppression.’  A 
second important concept in this identity was the notion of masculine or brotherly 
unity, or that ‘we are one, we are brothers, we are the sons of Asia and Africa.’  The 
final component was a unique sense of moral and spiritual heritage: ‘we are distinct 
from the ‘west’ in our spiritual, cultural and moral heritage.’  In the debates in the 
GA, this identity was especially important in contesting the parent/child hierarchy, as 
former and contemporary dependent territories were constructed as ‘orphans without 
a home’ and the rational/irrational hierarchy, as the focus on the moral and spiritual 
disturbed its prioritizing of the rational over all else.  The consistent focus on brothers 
and sons, however, would do little to disturb the masculine/feminine hierarchy, and as 
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will be examined later, would have important implications for the anti-colonialist 
renegotiation of space, identity and international community.  
We can understand patterns of appeal in the debates in the GA, then, in the 
context of this larger negotiation of kinship politics.  The colonialist contingent 
especially appealed to images of order and controlled change or the rational, with its 
repeated arguments for Legalism, Proceduralism/Practicalism, Sovereignty/State’s 
Rights and Colonialism not negative.  Anti-colonialists centered on Asia-Africa, on 
the other hand, countering with arguments for Independence/Representation and 
International Cooperation (United Nations), sought to disturb this image of kinship 
and this prioritizing of the rational with an emphasis on the moral.    
While easily overmatched at the moment of the writing of the Charter, over 
the years examined here, this anti-colonialist contingent would continue to grow as 
more and more formerly dependent territories gained political independence and 
became members of the UN (see Table 1 for date of membership for every member; 
see Table 2 for information on Trusts and NSGTs in the UN since 1945).  In the latter 
half of the 20th century, the United Nations would emerge as a major institution of 
knowledge production with global reach.  With the incorporation of anti-colonialist 
voices centered on a specific construction of Asia-Africa into its machinery, the 
United Nations would help to shape and distribute new meanings of the ‘colonial’ 
crafted from the perspective of this location.  What would be the impact of this new 
constellation of social, political and institutional forces in negotiating the colonial 
problematic?  What difference would it make that growing post-war anti-colonial 
sentiment was primarily assimilated into the institutional logic of the UN via the entry 
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of newly independent nation-states—that a central condition of possibility for the 
articulation of anti-colonial resistance in the UNGA was the politico-cultural form of 
the nation-state?  And if this newly independent, ‘postcolonial,’ anti-colonialist 
nation-state made possible new negotiations of oppression, freedom and justice, 
would it close off others?
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Chapter 4
The Limits of the Anti-Colonial Critique: Anti-Colonialists’ 
Visions and Divisions
If in the UNGA, anti-colonialists’ anti-kinship critique was fashioned by elite 
representatives of ‘postcolonial’ nation-states, representing peoples indelibly marked 
by colonial-era administrative categories of space, time and the social (Anderson 
1991), how did these conditions of possibility impact the formation and deployment 
of the anti-colonialist exegesis?  Even more, how was the anti-colonialist critique 
shaped by Asia-Africa’s formation within a context of declining European power, 
various new and informal methods of colonial rule, and numerous struggles between 
the two rising superpowers?  Was the anti-kinship, anti-colonialist argument that 
eventually emerged in the UNGA consistent for every ‘perpetrator?’  For every 
dependent territory?  What was its scope?  How did it orient to dependent territories 
not under the purview of the UN, as in the case of the satellites of the USSR?  
Beyond the Communist bloc, how did it orient to territories for whom, though 
formally independent, autonomy, independence and self-representation were still 
compromised?  In this chapter, I argue that though launching an important 
intervention into colonialist kinship politics, the anti-kinship critique was uneven, 
partial, and at times thoroughly plastic, shaped by the particular priorities and 
limitations of newly independent, ‘postcolonial’ nation-states located within a broader 
constellation of identities and interests.  
In what follows, I delineate the variegated contours of this critique in several 
steps.  I begin by mapping the UN system’s bounding of the colonial problematic, or 
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the scope of what it institutionally included within the problem of colonialism via its 
NSGT and Trust statuses.  As discussed in the last chapter, in its debates on NSGTs 
and Trusts, the states of Asia-Africa especially sought to expand this bounding.  Next, 
I move on to complicate this analysis by exploring the limits of Asia-Africa’s anti-
kinship, anti-colonial argument in three distinct scenarios.  In the first, I examine 
several cases in which administering authorities sought to remove a dependent 
territory they were ‘responsible’ for—all NSGTs—from the purview of the UN and 
hence from its colonial problematic.  Specifically, I look at the cases of the 
Netherlands and its NSGTS, the Dutch West Indies and Dutch Guiana, the United 
States and its NSGT, Puerto Rico, and Denmark and its NSGT, Greenland. 34
Theoretically, from the perspective of Asia-Africa, the unsanctioned removal of an 
NSGT from its NSGT status and hence from UN supervision represents a thwarting 
of its goal of decolonization and thus is subject to its anti-colonial critique.  However, 
I argue that the three cases were politicized differentially, with the Netherlands and 
Dutch West Indies/Dutch Guiana case politicized the most thoroughly and the other 
two politicized relatively little.  Why is this the case?  I argue that within the 
immediate post-war, world-historical moment, there existed a complex set of 
transnational relationships in which the states of Asia-Africa stood in differing 
relation to declining European powers versus the superpower United States.  
Specifically, in contrast to the historical experience of colonial denial, the United 
States offered a model of economic and political possibility to newly independent 
states, leading to an uneven targeting that chose to ‘excuse’ the actions of the United 
34 Dutch Guiana is also known as Surinam and Dutch West Indies are also termed the Netherlands 
Antilles.
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States but not those of the Netherlands.  Regarding Denmark, the United States’ 
interests in Denmark also helped to deflect criticism of that colonialist power.  
Beyond such uneven targeting of problematic practices within the purview of 
the UN, how did Asia-Africa approach such cases outside of the UN?  In other words, 
how broad was Asia-Africa’s anti-colonial critique?  What was its scope?  To explore 
this question, I move on to examining the scenario of the republics and satellites of 
the USSR, which, while also theoretically representing a thwarting of the pro-
democratic impetus of Asia-Africa, were not included in the colonial problematic as 
defined by the UN.  Nevertheless, their case was brought to the attention of Asia-
Africa quite forcefully at the Bandung Conference.  Similar to their approach to the 
United States, however, anti-colonial states also neglected to politicize the practices 
of the USSR.  Why might this be the case?  I argue that similar to the US, the USSR 
also offered a model of economic and political possibilities after the historical 
experience of colonial dependence.  Thus, a set of forces parallel to those that served 
to insulate the United States from the anti-colonialist critique were also in operation 
here.  
The anti-colonial critique of colonialist practice, then, was shifting and 
contingent.  Beyond these approaches to dependency, how did anti-colonialist states 
orient to the complexities of ‘postcolonial’ independence—and particularly to the 
UN’s role regarding this independence?  To explore a small piece of this question, I 
turn to the third scenario, the conjoining of the dependent territories of the Gold Coast 
and British Togoland into the first state that would gain independence from within the 
UN system, the new state of Ghana.  A colony of the UK with a strong independence 
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movement, the Gold Coast had already negotiated its independence with the UK, with 
both agreeing that the territories of Gold Coast and British Togoland should be 
amalgamated into the new state.  Popular opinion in British Togoland, on the other 
hand, did not support this arrangement, and Togolander movements for independence 
lobbied for a separate state.  How did anti-colonialists in the UN negotiate these 
conflicting demands for democracy and self-representation?  I argue that these states 
adopted a statist politics that prioritized political independence via the nation-state 
form above all else—above their own anti-kinship critique and their own pro-
democracy/self-representation politics.  Indeed, in this first case of a territory 
emerging out of the UN system into ‘postcolonial’ independence, the states of Asia-
Africa abandoned their anti-kinship, anti-colonial critique, using the hierarchical 
discourse of kinship to simultaneously support the Gold Coast and deny British 
Togoland.  Thus, the anti-colonial critique in the UNGA for the period examined was 
not merely uneven or contingent—it was thoroughly plastic.  Over the years, then, 
though “Ghana” would come to be a symbol of the success of decolonization and the 
triumph of the anti-colonial movement, from the first two scenarios examined here, it 
differed little.  For quite like Greenland, Puerto Rico and the other aforementioned 
dependent territories, though officially outside of the colonial problematic as defined 
by the UN, British Togoland would continue in a non-democratic state thereafter.  As 
a distinct space and identity, however, unlike most of these territories, British 
Togoland would disappear from the global map.
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The System of NSGTs and Trusts: Defining the Colonial Problematic
In the last chapter, I described the institutional-discursive bounding of the 
colonial problematic within the UN Charter.  I discussed how the UN distinguished 
between two statuses of dependent territories (i.e., NSGTs and Trusts) and 
constructed a hierarchy between them, with the former designated to continue in its 
dependent status while the latter was to be prepared for eventual independence.  In 
this institutionalization of the colonial problem, then, the UN bound the colonial 
problematic in a particular way (see Figure 1).  Only those dependent territories that 
were voluntarily submitted to UN supervision by colonialist powers, or taken from 
those vanquished in the recent war, were visible as part of the colonial problematic 
from the perspective of the UN (in either NSGT or Trust status).  Beyond these, 
territories whose sovereignty was in some way compromised by another state were 
institutionally and discursively defined out of the colonial problematic—and hence 
were invisible to the UN.  For example, the dependent republics of the USSR, as well 
as Puerto Rico in its contemporary relationship with the United States and the Dutch 
West Indies in its contemporary relationship with the Netherlands would fall into the 
first column in Figure 1 and hence would be defined out of the colonial problematic.  
Similarly, nominally independent states such as the satellites of the USSR would fall 
into the third column in Figure 1 and hence would also be defined out of the colonial 
problematic.  Likewise, territories incorporated on an ‘equal’ basis but against local 
wishes, such as the Hawaiian Islands into the United States, would fall into the third 
column and also be defined out of the colonial problem.
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The UN bounding of the colonial problematic, then, was partial and 
contingent at best.  Moreover, for those not fully ready to cooperate with the 
impending ‘wave of democracy’35 or for those who wished to avoid it altogether, the 
bureaucratization of the colonial problematic offered another option.  As long as their 
dependent territories were kept out of the middle column identified in Figure 1, they 
were not colonialist powers and their territories were not dependent territories.  In the 
debates examined below, the Netherlands, US, Denmark, USSR, UK and Gold Coast 
would all take up this strategy.  How would the newly independent states of Asia-
Africa respond?  It is to this question that I now turn.
The (In)Consistency of the Anti-Colonial Critique: Comparing the Cases of the 
Netherlands, United States, and Denmark
That the Asia-Africa critique was uneven is clear when we examine how it 
dealt with the cases of the hierarchical relationships between the Netherlands and 
Dutch Guiana/Dutch West Indies, the United States and Puerto Rico, and Denmark 
and Greenland.  Each of these relationships could potentially come under the colonial 
problematic as envisioned by Asia-Africa, as each involved issues of compromised 
independence and representation. For example, regarding the Netherlands-Dutch 
Guiana/Dutch West Indies relationship, although there were slave revolts and 
resistance movements throughout the centuries, the Hague insisted that these 
populations had no desire for democracy and were ‘not yet ready’ for it (Goslinga 
1990).  Regarding the US-Puerto Rico relationship, democratic reforms over the 20th
35 This term has been used to describe a group of political changes concerning democracy occurring 
“close together in time in different countries.”  An important example is the post-war ‘wave of 
democracy.’  See  (Markoff 1996).  
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century                                                                                         did not, in the final 
analysis, alter the U.S. Congress’s authority over Puerto Rico nor the less-than-
independent political status of the island (Montalvo-Barbot 1997).  Similarly, though 
an Inuit-led politicization of dependency status after World War II resulted in some 
democratic reforms in 1953, Greenland nevertheless also continued in its unequal 
relationship with Denmark (Arter 1999; Janussen 1999).  
The dependent territories of the Netherlands, the United States and Denmark 
came under NSGT status in the UN, requiring each power to regularly supply 
information on these territories to the GA under Article 73 e of the Charter.  
However, in the early fifties, each informed the GA that it would stop sending 
information on these territories and incorporate them ‘on an equal constitutional 
basis.’  Their justification for these incorporations was based on the Legalism and 
Sovereignty/State’s Rights appeals identified in the last chapter (i.e., that the UN had 
no legal competence in considering the matter to any extent as this was a domestic 
matter) and the Independence/Representation (especially representation) appeal (i.e., 
such incorporation was justified because these territories had themselves chosen to 
become incorporated with them).  With this third appeal, colonialist speakers 
especially attempted to make the argument that democracy, freedom, and 
representation—some of the core values espoused within the Charter—could be 
achieved in multiple forms and even without full political independence.
Examining the response of the states of Asia-Africa to these requests is 
particularly instructive, as they unambiguously and forcefully problematized the case 
of the Netherlands, problematized but ultimately excused the case of the United 
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States, and more or less ignored the case of Denmark.  For example, regarding the 
case of the Netherlands and the Dutch West Indies/Dutch Guiana, the anti-colonialist 
contingent insisted that independence could take only one form, and that 
incorporation did not offer the territories another form of self-government but rather 
that it violated Independence/Representation because these territories were to be 
unequally incorporated: “we have studied the Charter for the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, and this instrument does not guarantee full equality to the three parts of 
the Kingdom” (Miss Brooks, Liberia, 1955, Sess 10, 460).  It also contested the 
Legalism and Sovereignty/State’s Rights argument that the General Assembly had no 
competence over NSGTs and only the administering authorities did, arguing that not 
only did the General Assembly have competence here, but that these questions 
required cooperation and compromise with the UN (i.e., the International 
Cooperation (United Nations) appeal).36
In contrast to Asia-Africa’s fairly united discourse against the incorporation 
attempts of the Netherlands, their stance in the comparable case of the United States 
and Puerto Rico was much more conflicted.  For example, colonialist speakers added 
the new argument in this case that the US could be trusted in its dealings with Puerto 
36 Nevertheless, the resolution on the cessation of information on these territories on the part of the 
Netherlands passed, and the Dutch West Indies and Dutch Guiana were represented as being granted 
‘self-rule’ within the Tripartite Kingdom of the Netherlands.   (Dutch Guiana gained political 
independence in 1975.  Hence, today, the Kingdom of the Netherlands consists of mainland European 
Netherlands, Aruba and the Dutch West Indies).  What self-rule meant was ‘control over internal 
affairs,’ while the Netherlands still controlled defense, foreign affairs, citizenship and extradition.  This 
shift has often been presented as ‘the end of the colonial relationship.’  And yet, the Netherlands still 
‘represents’ these other territories—for example, in the United Nations and in the European Union.  
The West Indies and Aruba are not considered part of the EU but rather, have the status of OCTs 
(overseas countries and territories).  Since citizenship is controlled by the Kingdom, however, citizens 
from all three are considered EU citizens.  
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Rico because it was a ‘good’ colonial power—and a number of anti-colonialist 
speakers agreed: 
When we speak of Puerto Rico today in my country, we think of it as an 
island where progress is in full swing, where freedom is fully enjoyed by all, 
and where a painstaking group of honest and very conscientious young men 
work ceaselessly to give their country an efficient government with far-
reaching powers, an island to which students from my country already go to 
seek knowledge and from which they return with what they sought…Puerto 
Rico today has the status of a free associated State, which its inhabitants 
accepted by a free plebiscite, and is not the colonial territory it was before, but 
one which possesses not only an independent but a good government…Puerto 
Rico is a beautiful and true example of a stable and democratic government 
(Mr. Canas, Costa Rica, Sess 8, 1953: 310-311).  
As a result of its constitutional status and its recent transformation into a free 
State associated with the United States, Puerto Rico has attained self-
government, and therefore the submission of information under Article 73 e of 
the Charter is no longer required of the late administering Power, the United 
States.  Moreover, the decisive factor for us has been the principle of the self-
determination of peoples, in which, as expressed through various electoral 
processes, we found an overriding argument in confirmation of Puerto Rico’s 
status in international law within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter 
(Mr. De Marchena, Dominican Republic, Sess 8, 1953: 320).
Interestingly, then, for some in this group, while Independence/Representation could 
only be obtained by complete political independence for Dutch territories, such was 
not the case for this U.S. territory.  However, others did counter that this change in 
Puerto Rico’s status did not constitute independence in the spirit of Charter or of 
Article 73:  
We are not called upon to decide whether the status which has been granted to 
the Puerto Rican people is good or bad, or whether or not it helps that people 
to realize fully its national aspirations.  It is not for us to grant or to deny 
liberty to the Puerto Rican people.  Our task is a different one: it is simply to 
determine whether or not the degree of self-government which the Puerto 
Rican people have reached corresponds to what the United Nations Charter 
calls ‘a full measure of self-government’…the present government of Puerto 
Rico is, in practice, subject to such limitations and depends so much on the 
United States that the country cannot be regarded as having reached the full 
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measure of self-government which the United Nations requires (Mr. Mendoza, 
Guatemala, Sess 8, 1953: 312).  
Still others added that this unequal status between Puerto Rico and the United States 
rendered problematic any ‘choices’ that the territory of Puerto Rico might make: 
The degree of self-government enjoyed by the Puerto Ricans under the new 
constitutional arrangement does not keep it outside the scope of Article 73 
e…while we do not deny Puerto Ricans the right to enter into any kind of 
arrangement with the United States or any other country, we hold that this can 
be done validly only after two conditions have been met: when Puerto Rico is 
fully independent of external pressures at the time of executing such a 
compact; and when the democratic processes claimed, such as a referendum or 
plebiscite, are conducted in an atmosphere of complete democratic 
freedom…My delegation is not convinced that Puerto Rico, under its present 
association with the United States, has become a self-governing territory…we 
believe that independence should precede any voluntary association (Mrs. 
Menon, India, Sess 8, 1953:  321).
But even detractors, those that thought the incorporation was problematic, agreed 
with the colonialist argument that the US was a trust-worthy, ‘good’ colonial power.  
For example, one speaker argued, “My delegation has always accorded its full 
measure of appreciation to the United States Government for the loyalty, sincerity 
and devotion with which it has always fulfilled its obligations under the Charter” 
(ibid).   Another added:
My delegation, which represents a country allied by tries of kinship to Puerto 
Rico, has for centuries followed the Puerto Rican people’s struggle for 
freedom and enthusiastically applauds its progress towards self-government.  
In doing so, we heartily congratulate both this sister nation and the US 
government, which has made such progress possible (Mr. Mendoza, 
Guatemala, Sess 8, 1953: 312).
One of the most interesting elements in the discussion on the United States and Puerto 
Rico, then, is the degree to which colonialist and anti-colonialist discourse actually 
overlapped.  
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One speaker resolved such contradictions within the anti-colonialist camp 
with a statement in which, noting a United States’ claim that its actions were 
supported by 80% of the people of Puerto Rico in a referendum, and then noting that 
various parties in Puerto Rico who contested this result were denied their requests for 
oral hearings before the UN, summed up the situation in this way:
I do not believe any representative will maintain that Puerto Rico is 
independent or that it has attained a full measure of self-government… but the 
traditional generosity and freedom-loving spirit of the people of the United 
States, which impelled them to spontaneously grant freedom and 
independence to the peoples of the Philippines and Cuba, and which today has 
made Puerto Rico among the most advanced of the Non-Self-Governing 
Territories, will, we believe, in due course bring to the people of Puerto Rico a 
full measure of self-government (Mr. Lawrence, Liberia, Sess 8, 1953: 309).
Ultimately, then, the matter was one of willingness to trust: these anti-colonialist 
speakers were willing to trust the United States in a way they would not trust the 
Netherlands.  While the GA had considered the Netherlands’ case for a total of three 
sessions, the debate on the US lasted for only one.  Ultimately, speakers accepted the 
United States’ request to cease sending information on Puerto Rico, and the draft 
resolution on this matter also passed.
In contrast to both of these debates is the case of Denmark, whose request to 
incorporate Greenland and stop sending information on Greenland was debated for 
less than one session and passed with almost unanimous support.  Again, the most 
common colonialist appeals in support here were Legalism and Sovereignty/State’s 
Rights  (i.e., the notion that the United Nations had no legal competence in interfering 
in the internal affairs of sovereign states and their NSGTs), 
Independence/Representation (i.e., that the people of Greenland chose this course of 
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action), as well as Colonialism not negative (i.e., “Congratulations to Denmark for its 
success in ‘civilizing’ the people of Greenland”).  To the representative from 
Australia (Sir Spender, Sess 9, 1954: 300-01) who commended Denmark’s “wise 
guidance,” for example, Denmark responded: 
We Danes have felt it a responsibility and a privilege to lead the people of 
Greenland to a richer life and to full equality and participation in the 
government of our country.  United we will work for the further advancement 
and development of the Greenland community...the new order will be a 
blessing and a benefit to the people of Greenland (Mr. Lannung, Denmark, 
Sess 9, 1954: 307).
In the anti-colonialist camp, speakers once again insisted that the United 
Nations did have the legal right to concern itself with NSGTs and several speakers 
also pointed out the need to confirm Denmark’s claim that Greenlanders indeed 
supported the move for incorporation.  Interspersed, however, were numerous 
‘congratulations’ to Denmark and Greenland on their happy news and the discourse 
of kinship (i.e., ‘the important work done by Denmark’).  Interestingly, speakers 
cautioned that this was a unique case:  
We support the draft resolution because we consider that in view of the
 geographical situation and the economic resources of Greenland, as well as 
the high education level attained there and the work done by Denmark, the 
United Nations could not find a more satisfactory procedure than that 
Greenland should so freely express its will to become a permanent part of 
what for so many years has, morally speaking, been its mother country.  I 
must state, however, that this…is in no way a precedent for the future.  On the 
contrary, in keeping with our position in this matter, we shall become 
increasingly cautious with regard to the rights of peoples still living under a 
colonial system (Mr. Vergara, Chile, Sess 9, 1954: 306). 
Although my delegation does not entirely approve of the procedure followed 
for the integration of Greenland within Denmark, it believes its attitude [of 
support for Denmark] to be justified by the special situation of Greenland, by 
the age-old ethnic bonds which tie that country to Denmark, by the fact that 
no objections have been raised against integration, which in many respects 
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appears to be the only possible solution in the present case, by the Danish 
Government’s close cooperation with the United Nations in the transmission 
of information—even political information—on Greenland, by the equality 
between Greenlanders and Danes resulting from the change in the political 
status of Greenland, and by a number of other factors (Mr. Itani, Lebanon, 
Sess 9, 1954: 304).  
These statements suggest that Greenland’s geographical location, economic 
resources, and “special situation” made this incorporation an acceptable option.  Both 
of these speakers also emphasized the idea that Denmark was a ‘good’ colonial 
power.  Additionally, Lebanon posited that there were ‘old ethnic bonds’ between the 
two territories that justified this incorporation, thus implying that the hierarchical 
territorial relationship between the two was not associated with a racial-ethnic 
dimension—despite the fact that over 80% of the population of Greenland is 
estimated to be Inuit (Arter 1999; Caulfield 1997).     
Thus in these debates, while the Netherlands, the United States and Denmark 
all sought to remove their dependent territories from the colonial problematic as 
defined by the United Nations, the states of Asia-Africa did not deploy their anti-
kinship critique against all three consistently.  How do we understand this selective 
politicization of these cases?  Some have discussed Asia-Africa as a strategic 
coalition of states pursuing their “interests” on the world stage.  For example, one 
author argues that because the General Assembly is based on a majority voting 
structure, individual states formed voting groups or ‘blocs’ with other states to aid 
passage of draft resolutions they cared about.  He argues that especially after the 
Bandung Conference, such a bloc was formed by a group of Asian and African 
countries (Hovet Jr 1960).  From this perspective, this grouping of Asian and African 
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countries was merely strategic; in this vein, perhaps Asia-Africa’s differential 
politicization of the colonialist practices of the Netherlands versus the United States 
and Denmark largely reflected shifting global power relationships, in which the 
Netherlands as representative of European colonial powers in general was on the 
decline and the United States was on the rise (more on Denmark later).  
While I do not deny the ‘strategic’ element of the politics of Asia-Africa, I 
argue that this perspective neglects one important dimension of Asia-Africa as a 
collectivity, particularly as demonstrated at the Bandung, Cairo and Accra 
conferences reviewed in the last chapter.  That is, beyond such ‘strategic interests,’ 
this grouping represents a racialized, anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist collective 
identity forged by formerly dependent territories from Asia and Africa.  To deny this 
element of the emergence of Asia-Africa is to deny the collective experiences—
however socially constructed—of racialized groups across Asia and Africa who had 
their territorial and cultural autonomy compromised by numerous colonialist projects 
since the 16th century.  From this perspective, then, the differential politicization of 
the problematic practices of the Netherlands versus the United States and Denmark, 
while certainly shaped by transforming global power relationships, was also affected 
by the particular angle of vision afforded to Asia-Africa by its collective history.  
Specifically, this ‘angle of vision’ was shaped by Asia-Africa’s own experiences of 
(western European) colonialism, how western European powers versus the US 
defined their political identities historically (and Asia-Africa’s acceptance of these 
identities, in a sense), and how Asia-Africa ultimately situated itself in relation to 
these identities.  
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From the perspective of Asia-Africa, for instance, the colonial experience was 
shaped within the structure of an overseas empire, where the rule between 
peoples/lands separated by vast amounts of territorial space was naturalized.  The 
traditional theatres of conflict regarding these empires were the territories of Asia and 
Africa, and the racialized objects of these empires were the peoples of Asia and 
Africa.  From the beginning, then, a traditional colonial power such as the 
Netherlands fit the colonialist profile from the perspective of Asia-Africa in a way 
that the U.S. did not.  Furthermore, western European colonialist powers produced a 
powerful narrative of self as colonial and imperial.  Indeed, their colonial and 
imperial identity was an integral part of their European-ness.  Delanty (1995) argues 
that it was just such a conception of self-as-Europe—a geopolitical name for 
civilization and indeed, a metaphor for ‘complex’ civilization—that served as a 
legitimation for the politics of the secular and territorial (colonialist) state.37  From 
this perspective, then, in its thorough politicization of the colonialist practices of the 
Netherlands as a part of ‘Europe,’ Asia-Africa simply accepted the 
colonialist/imperialist identity and narrative that Europe itself produced.   
One could argue that the United States had a similar history of colonialist 
practice, given its history of overseas dependent territories in the Western 
37 He argues that the idea of Europe first emerged in classical antiquity, transformed gradually in the 
Middle Ages from a geographical notion—originally linked to the idea of the Hellenic Occident—into 
a cultural idea subordinated to the idea of Christendom.  It consolidated in the 15th c and eventually 
became focused more on Europe instead of Christianity.  Then, it became enclosed in western Europe.  
Here, the division between Europe and the Orient was reflected in an internal division within Europe, 
and the eastern frontier was the determining factor in the shaping of the idea of Europe as the 'West.'  
With the opening of the western frontier following the re-conquest of Spain and the colonization of the 
Americas after 1492, there was a broader and more hegemonic notion of the 'West' which provided the 
basis for European identity.  Eventually, it came to rest on the universalistic notion of civilization, 
constructed in opposition to the Orient and the conquest of nature (Delanty 1995).
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hemisphere, the legacy of contiguous empire via Manifest Destiny38, its ongoing 
informal intervention in countries in Latin America, Asia and Europe, its continuous 
siding with the western European colonial powers on issues of decolonization in the 
GA, and contrary to its claims, its ongoing domestic problems with race, of which 
Asia-Africa was acutely aware.  Regarding this last element, a letter from the 
American white supremacist group, the Ku Klux Klan, was distributed to the 
delegations of the Asian and African states within the UN with the title “White 
America rejects a bastardized United Nations.”  The delegation of Nigeria actually 
introduced the document into the GA discussions during Session 15 in order to “put it 
on record” (Mr. Wachuku, Nigeria, Sess 15, 1960: 1236):
A foul stench spreads out from the East River and hangs over New York like a 
pall.  It is the smell of sweat, the greasiest sweat of the black races of Africa 
and the yellow races of Asia which have invaded the United Nations.  It is 
enough to make every white Protestant American vomit…(Letter by KKK 
introduced by Mr. Wachuku, Nigeria, Sess 15, 1960: 126). 
The letter went on to compare the ‘races’ of Asia and Africa to animals that whites 
were intended to rule over.  
However, in contrast to its politicization of the Netherlands, Asia-Africa 
seemed to ‘excuse’ the United States’ colonial practices.  Why is this the case?  One 
important factor is that unlike the European narrative of self as colonial and imperial, 
in contradiction to its actual colonialist practices, the United States historically 
produced a strong anti-colonial narrative of self, beginning with the original revolt 
38 Arrighi (1994), for example, points out that because the U.S. does not have a history of settler 
colonialism, its imperialist practices have sometimes been invisible.  He points out, however, that the 
absence of territorialism ‘abroad’ does not negate the remarkable ‘internal territorialism’ displayed by 
the U.S., in which Manifest Destiny incorporated huge tracts of contiguous land that decimated the 
local population and replaced it with a rapidly increasing immigrant population.
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against British colonial rule.  Moreover, the ideology of American exceptionalism, as 
espoused for example in the Gettysburg Address, associated the United States’ 
political identity intimately with democracy:  Four score and seven years ago our 
fathers brought forth, upon this continent, a new nation, conceived in liberty, and 
dedicated to the proposition that "all men are created equal" (Gettysburg Address, 
1863).  Moreover, regarding the case of Puerto Rico, the United States maintained 
this image by co-opting local demand, molding public opinion, and manipulating 
outward symbols of popular representation.  Grosfoguel (2003), for example, argues 
that the US response to local demands in Puerto Rico were always conditioned by its 
perceived needs within the international context.  For example, until the 40s and 
through WWII, this interest was primarily military, and wanting to avoid a local 
population hostile to its military use of the island during WWII, the US extended 
basic democratic rights in exchange for military exploitation.  Regarding resistance to 
the elected governor, Congress had a referendum on the bill for the elected governor 
so that it could demonstrate its commitment to the values of political representation 
and yet, despite local calls from separatists, statehood supporters and nationalists, the 
referendum—support for which was also built through widespread public relations 
campaigns—gave voters only one choice: that of an elected governor.  Later, in 1953, 
when the Eisenhower administration would inform the UN that it would no longer 
provide information on Puerto Rico, it added that this referendum demonstrated that 
Puerto Rico had ‘freely chosen’ this relationship with the United States (Montalvo-
Barbot 1997: 127-135).  
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But the value of Puerto Rico to the United States went far beyond its military 
use.  In the context of the international ‘independence boom’ but especially of the 
Cold War, the US wanted to make Puerto Rico a symbol of democracy and capitalism 
in the eyes of the international community.  Hence, it initiated during this time not 
only massive programs for industrialization but also Truman’s Point Four Program, 
where Third World elites were brought in to be trained in the techniques of 
‘development’ but even more, in the American model of development as opposed to 
the Soviet model (Grosfoguel 2003).  This symbolic role especially explains the 
massive US federal assistance in housing, health, and education that Puerto Rico 
received during this time (ibid).
Perhaps this manipulation of symbols of popular representation was 
efficacious, as anti-colonialist speakers in general, with the important exception of the 
USSR, seemed to largely accept the anti-colonial, democratic narrative of self 
advanced by the US.  This acceptance is evident in the repeated referral of these 
speakers in their Independence/Representation appeals to American texts and 
symbols:  
Although a man’s body might be conquered for a while, he had also been 
endowed with a soul which could not be crushed.  The cry of Patrick Henry, 
‘Give me liberty of give me death’ had been a cry from the soul, which still 
echoed from all parts of the earth (Mr. Cooper, Liberia, Sess 4, 1949: 532).
To paraphrase George Washington’s words, ‘it is folly in a colonial country to 
look for disinterested favors from the colonizers’ (Mr. Winiewicz, Poland, 
Sess 15, 1960: 1024).
In the words of Abraham Lincoln, ‘It is true that you may fool all the people 
some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all the time; but you 
can’t fool all of the people all the time (Mr. Aw, Mali, Sess 15, 1960: 1066).
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One of the great ironies of the present age is the curious inability of the 
colonial Powers to comprehend the fundamental urges of freedom and 
independence…Have they forgotten that a great American said: ‘that all men 
are created equal.  That they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
inalienable rights.  That among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness (Mr. Asha, United Arab Republic, Sess 15, 1960: 1047).
Perhaps the greatest blow it [colonialism] ever suffered was delivered here 
during the America Revolution… (Mr. Thors, Iceland, Sess 15, 1960: 1147).
Beyond the “strategic reasons” provided by Hovet Jr (1960) and the 
constructivist reasons outlined above, there is a third and final dimension to the 
uneven treatment of the Netherlands versus the United States by Asia-Africa.  That is, 
enabled fundamentally by the transformation in global power relationships between 
the declining European powers and the new superpowers, dependent territories on the 
cusp of independence and newly independent territories were finally to be ‘included’ 
in the world community.  Scholars of world culture argue that in the modern period, 
the only agent with legitimacy to act on the world stage is the bounded, purposive, 
responsible, rational nation-state (Meyer 1997; Meyer 1999; Boli and Thomas 1999; 
Finnemore 1996; Finnemore 1998).  It is precisely this agency that dependent 
territories had been historically denied and of which they were now on the threshold.  
Scholars of world culture also argue that while various ‘rationalized others’ in the 
world polity have always provided a set of prescriptions to the nation-state on how to 
conduct itself appropriately (i.e., provide security, individual citizenship, etc), after 
World War II, prescriptions for appropriate agency and behavior on the part of 
nation-state have especially intensified (Meyer 1999; Meyer 1997).  For example, the 
‘good,’ ‘rational’, ‘modern’ nation-state in the post-war period is especially expected 
to pursue economic development (Meyer 1997; Finnemore 1996; Chabbott 1999), 
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among other goals.  States that enjoy the most legitimation within the world polity 
and so are ‘successful states’ offer models for other states to follow (Finnemore 1998; 
Meyer 1999).  In the post-war period, the two superpowers each offered two 
alternative models of legitimate or ‘successful’ statehood and also of economic 
development.  I will discuss the Soviet Union more extensively in the next section.  
Regarding the United States, in addition to offering such a model for development 
and successful statehood for newly independent countries, it also, critically and in full 
cognizance of the alternatives offered by the USSR, offered development aid.  For 
example, as mentioned above, Puerto Rico was the international training ground for 
Truman’s Four Point Program, intended to demonstrate to Third World elites the 
efficacy of this American model of development as opposed to the Soviet model 
(Grosfoguel 2003: 57-58).  Hence, the states of Asia-Africa were located in a 
complex constellation of identities and interests in which they had every incentive to 
distinguish the United States from western European powers and turn a blind eye on 
the former’s colonialist practices.  
Beyond the U.S., while Denmark could certainly have been grouped with 
western European powers in its colonialist practices, it was also similarly ‘excused’ 
for a number of reasons.  First of all, it was a relatively small colonialist power, and 
neither the indigenous peoples of Greenland, nor peoples with a sense of ethnic 
connection to them, were anywhere visible within the collective identity of Asia-
Africa or in the General Assembly.  The racialized, anti-colonialist identity 
represented by Asia-Africa, thus, perhaps did not easily incorporate Danish rule over 
the indigenous peoples of Greenland as racialized rule—perhaps did not include these 
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indigenes as part of European colonialism’s racialized others.  This may be why one 
anti-colonialist speaker argued that Denmark’s incorporation of Greenland is 
acceptable partly because of the ethnic bonds between the two, indicating an 
assumption of ethnic overlap between the two territories that was in direct 
contradiction to their actual demographic makeup.  Beyond such de-racialization of 
Danish-Greenlandic relations, another possibility is that a number of the states of 
Asia-Africa, many of which were inheritors of the arbitrary territorial borders and 
identity categories of colonial administrators (Anderson 1991:165-69; Deng 1993; 
Nugent 2002b; Mengara 2001), did not orient to the one-to-one relationship between 
ethnicity or nation and state borders in the same way as did liberal theorists of the 
nation-state.  Particularly in Africa, colonial borders played havoc with long-standing 
affinities, deconstructing and reconstructing them according to extra-local priorities
(Nugent 2002b; Mengara 2001; Deng 1993).  As representatives of elites within these 
Asian and African states, then, perhaps these speakers viewed the state form not as 
problematic in its inability to align neatly with ethnic cleavages, but instead as 
offering a solution to these cleavages by transcending them.  
Moreover, in a strategic sense, Denmark was a relatively weak colonial 
power, and its relationship with Greenland was conditioned by the geographical 
position of Greenland close to the North American continent and thus the United 
State’s sphere of interest (and so, the Monroe Doctrine).  One example of the 
influence of this third party is that in 1941, Denmark entered into an agreement with 
the United States which allowed the latter to build military bases on the territory 
(Janussen 1999).  This influence especially made itself felt in the wake of an 
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emerging post-war Inuit-led politicization of dependency status (Arter 1999).  For 
example, a 1951 agreement gave the US permission to supplement its wartime bases 
with a larger military base at Thule.  In connection with the building of the Thule 
base, the local population was compulsorily and traumatically moved off the land 
(Janussen 1999).  In my examination of the debates in the General Assembly, in 
contrast to extensive politicization and discussion of the forced movement of a local 
population in one of the territories of the British Empire,39 this particular movement 
was not even mentioned.  Furthermore, the United States stored nuclear rockets on 
the Thule base despite official Danish promises to the locals to the contrary.  Janussen 
(1999) suggests that these favors to the United States were assets in connection with 
its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  Ultimately, there was an 
amendment to the Constitution in 1953, giving the territory limited representative 
institutions.  Even decades later, however, as indigenous movements within 
Greenland demand complete independence and a revision of the 1951 agreement 
between the United States and Greenland, and even in the wake of the development 
of a private association called Hingitaq 53 (Thrown out in 53) which has formed to 
take Denmark to court for the forced 1953 movement of the indigenous population 
connected to the Thule base, the fate of Greenland seems somewhat ambiguous.  For 
all of these issues “involve an allied great power with which Denmark under no 
circumstances wishes to seriously fall out” (ibid 1999).
39 Here, I refer to the forced removal from their lands of about 3000 Meru tribesmen by the 
administering authority, the UK, of the trust territory of Tanganika. The lands were awarded to 13 
white European settlers.
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The Scope of the Anti-Colonial Critique: The Case of the USSR
This uneven politicization of colonialist practices by different states on the 
part of Asia-Africa is underscored by its treatment of the case of the USSR.  The 
USSR’s hierarchical relationships with its numerous republics ‘within’ and satellites 
‘without’ were not officially recognized within the colonial problematic as defined by 
the UN (and hence can be placed in columns 1 and 3 of Figure 1 respectively).  Asia-
Africa, however, was decidedly aware of their situation.  Lloyd writes, thus, that 
Soviet imperialism was hotly debated behind closed doors at Bandung, but never 
openly acknowledged (Lloyd 1959).  Regarding the case of the republics, for 
example, before the Bandung Conference got underway, Said Schamyl, the Former 
Chief of National Defense of North-Caucasus and Isa Yusuf Alptekin, General 
Secretary of Eastern Turkestan State, submitted a memorandum entitled “Appeal to 
the Chairman of the Conference of Afro-Asiatic States in Bandung” to the organizers 
of the conference.  Calling themselves the “Moslem Nations under the URSS 
Imperialism,” and representing the National Centers of Azerbaijan, North-Caucasia, 
Idil-Ural, Crimea and Turkestan, they asked their “African and Asian brother states” 
for help against “oppression, torture, massacres and mass-deportations” 
(Memorandum, 1955).  The Memorandum included two annexes, which listed the 
various violations, including routine violence, the suppression of movements for self-
determination and nationalism, and Russification policies which sought to stamp out 
local languages, histories, cultures, and so on.  The issue, however, was not placed on 
the conference agenda.  In response to this lack of response, Said Schamyl wrote a 
second memorandum during the conference: THE HESITATION OF YOUR 
HONOURABLE CONGRESS TO TAKE A DIRECT STEP OF INTERVENTION 
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TO BETTER THE DESTINIES OF THESE FIFTY M ILLIONS OF 
UNFORTUNATE MUSLIM BROTHERS INSPITE OF THEIR SAD SITUATION 
WILL BE A CAUSE OF TOLERANCE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF SUCH 
TRAGEDIES…(Memorandum, Capitalized in original, 1955).  At the end of the 
conference, when the resolutions passed were widely distributed and it became 
apparent that they did not directly deal with these territories, this final letter from Said 
Schamyl stated: The Bandung conference dealt with the problems concerning East 
from one angle unfortunately, and they passed silently on the rightful question of the 
dependent peoples of the East in the Red Russian Imperialism…their brothers Behind 
the Iron Curtain…(Memorandum, 1955). 
 Regarding the case of Soviet satellites, too, as discussed in the last chapter, 
the decision was made to make a categorical distinction between UN membership and 
dependency status at the Bandung Conference.  That is, if a state was a member of the 
United Nations, by definition it could not be a dependent territory.  Ultimately then, 
whether regarding republics or satellites, the hierarchical territorial practices of the 
Soviet Union were not politicized and thus “went unremarked” (Bell 2001).  
And yet, the principles of the Bandung Conference continued to be an 
important referent for some of the independence and nationalist movements within 
the areas of Soviet influence.  Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy, for example, 
saw the principles of independence, sovereignty, equality and non-interference 
espoused by the Bandung Conference as ones that should be applied to the Soviet 
camp, where they were being opposed by the 'remnants of Stalinist autocratic rule.'  
His ‘uprising’ was of course brutally crushed (Brzezinksi 1967).  
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So, why were the colonialist practices of the USSR regarding its satellites and 
republics—practices of which Asia-Africa was decidedly aware—not politicized?  I 
argue that this is primarily because the same complex of identities and interests that 
served to mitigate the practices of the United States were also in operation here.  
First, like the United States, the Soviet Union was also a superpower and so 
strategically not as convenient a target as European colonial powers on the decline.  
Second, like the United States and in contrast to Western Europe, the USSR also 
produced a powerful anti-colonial narrative within its political identity.  For example, 
the USSR was officially anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist, as it associated these 
terms with capitalism and hence the capitalistic ‘west’.  Interestingly, however, if the 
ideological construction of ‘Europe’ was so intimately tied to colonialist practices 
(Delanty 1995), while there was an ambiguous relationship between Russian identity 
and this idea of Europe before the 1700s (Bassin 1991),40 this 
changed dramatically in the first quarter of the eighteenth century as Peter the 
Great undertook the far-reaching reform of the Russian state and 
Society [and so emerged a]...fundamentally new understanding of the 
distinction between Europe and Asia...[where now, there was an 
acknowledgement of] the singular importance of the European continent and 
the unconditional preeminence of European civilization...[and hence] the 
country was to be given a European appearance and to be thoroughly 
reorganized along European patterns...apparent at all levels, from the 
infamous ban on beards at court to the construction of the new and 
quintessentially European capital city (Bassin 1991).
Hence, as the colonial and imperial idea of Europe grew in the 18th century, it 
affected Russia as well and even after 1917, remained the dominant sense of self in 
40  No natural geographical borders distinguished Russia from Asia, rendering it European and again, 
no such borders distinguished it from Europe, rendering it Asian.   Hence, before the 18th c, its 
allegiance was not necessarily to either (Bassin 1991).
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the Soviet Union (Bassin 1991).41  The Soviet state even deployed hierarchical 
kinship language here, as it constructed itself as the ‘senior brother’ with the power to 
rule over and guide ‘junior brothers’ in its domain (Szporluk 1997; Shlapentokh 
2001).
Of course, an important way in which the Soviet empire distinguished itself 
from western European empires, however, was that it saw itself as providing an 
alternative model of modernity, superior to that represented by the ‘west’—a Soviet 
Utopia.  Based on the idea that the nation-state was the political form of capitalism, 
socialism was to be international and after World War II, was ‘extended’ to the 
formally independent states of Eastern and Central Europe (Szporluk 1997).  
Significantly, thus, whatever the complexities in terms of its relationship with 
‘Europe’ and whatever its territorial practices in contrast to western European 
colonialist powers, the Soviet Union did not publicly construct itself as a 
colonial/imperial power.  Moreover, its conquest of contiguous territories, like the 
ideology and practice of Manifest Destiny on the part of the United States, 
materialized in a contiguous empire and hence looked very different from traditional 
European overseas empires.  Ultimately, then, like its acceptance of the anti-colonial, 
democratic narrative of self crafted by the United States, Asia-Africa also seemed to 
accept the anti-colonial, anti-imperial narrative of self produced by the Soviet Union.  
41 Interestingly, while it continued to westernize and Europeanize itself, and as it extended its rule in 
European fashion over territories around it, the various Eastern Europeans Russia conquered were 
particularly difficult to dominate because they saw themselves as more European and thus more 
advanced than Russia (Spzorluk 1997).
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Beyond such strategic and constructivist reasons, the Soviet Union was 
similar to the United States in one final way: it offered a model of development and 
of successful statehood after independence.  This model had the added appeal for 
some newly independent states of not being associated with western capitalism—a 
point the Soviet Union sought to underscore with its active support, in important 
contrast to the United States, of Asia-Africa in both voting agenda and patterns of 
appeal in the General Assembly.  
The Plasticity of the Anti-Colonial Critique: The Case of Ghana
Against the hierarchical territorialist practices of the Netherlands, the United 
States and Denmark discussed above, I argued that Asia-Africa deployed its anti-
colonialist critique selectively.  Against parallel practices on the part of the USSR, I 
examined how Asia-Africa withheld its critique.  In this section, I argue that this 
critique was completely plastic, borrowing from colonialist kinship politics as 
required.  Specifically, I turn to the interesting case of the amalgamation of the 
dependent territories of the Gold Coast colony and the trust territory of British 
Togoland into the new independent state of Ghana.  Here, while the Gold Coast 
enthusiastically supported such a merger, British Togoland did not.  The plasticity of 
its anti-kinship critique is especially evident here, as Asia-Africa launched this 
critique in support of the Gold Coast, but fell back on crude kinship imagery to deny 
the wishes of British Togoland.  In what follows, I first examine the case of Ghana to 
introduce the complexity of the West African nationalist project of translating 
political identity into territorial borders.  I give a brief overview of the multiple 
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contingencies with differing agendas in this regard, and I end with how this all fared 
in the debates in the GA.  
Stories about Ghana and West African independence movements typically 
begin with the Gold Coast, and the review offered here is no different.  Hence, I start 
with Grimal, who argues that the territory of the Gold Coast was “confined within 
purely artificial borders” (Grimal 1978: 295), and was rife with ethnic, religious and 
economic class divisions, as well as divisions between nationalists and those who had 
a stake in the imperial order.  Korang (2004) writes that the nationalist effort to create 
the oneness of the territory began with the creation of a historical past for the Gold 
Coast.  A central piece of this project was the thesis of a genealogical connection 
between the Akan majority of the Gold Coast and the imperial kingdom of Ghana of 
the medieval western Sudan.  This thesis was especially taken up in the 1920s by the 
nationalist Danquah, who founded the United Gold Coast Convention in 1947 
(Grimal 1978; Korang 2004).  In 1948, Danquah publicly proposed that the name of 
the colony be changed from Gold Coast to Ghana, as the former was a colonial 
trademark to which ‘Ghana’ would be resistance.  Hence, Korang (2004) argues, 
Danquah invented, academized, popularized this essential ‘Ghana,’ and ‘Ghana’ 
became a successful symbol for the anticolonial struggle.  Additionally, his quest for 
national character and essence was also assisted by various imperialists, who aimed to 
create a “future filled with grateful ex-savages chanting to the Astraea Redux, 
metropolitan culture—at the service of imperial political economy” (Korang 
2004:164).  
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But the peoples of the territories that would be affected were still divided in 
various ways.  Multiple parties emerged, each of which claimed to represent different 
identities and sought a different materialization of these identities via different 
territorial borders.  For example, the All-Ewe Conference claimed to represent the 
Ewe tribe, which was split between the Gold Coast, French Togoland and British 
Togoland, and sought to unify these groups under British trusteeship (the British were 
somewhat more responsive to local demand for reform than were the French).  This 
movement faded after 1947, and was replaced in prominence by the Togoland Union, 
which wanted to reunite the British and French Togolands into a unified Togoland 
and ultimately exclude the Gold Coast.  (The two Togolands had previously been one 
territory, which became the German Protectorate of Togoland, and which was then 
split into British and French mandates after World War I).  This movement for 
Togoland unification began to gain mass support, formed the new unificationist party 
termed the Togoland Congress (TC) in 1950, and also gained increasing support for 
its case at the UN (Nugent 2002b:147-98). 
For their part, however, the British had long administered the Gold Coast 
colony with the trust territory of British Togoland, and preferred to grant 
independence to the two integrated together.  Hence, Nugent (2002b:147-98) argues 
that the ‘official strategy’ of the British became to stall the impetus to Togoland 
unification at the UN, while nurturing a local constituency that would favor the 
integration of British Togoland with the Gold Coast.  
Scholars disagree about the precise role of Kwame Nkrumah and his 
Convention People’s Party (CPP) in this scenario.  In Grimal’s (1978) victorious 
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account, Nkrumah chafed under the moderate politics of Danquah, and founded the 
CPP in 1949 as a base for more radical independence politics.  His ongoing 
contentions with the British government eventually resulted in more democratic 
reforms, then full internal autonomy, and eventually, independence within the 
Commonwealth in 1957.  Korang (2004) differs slightly in arguing that the significant 
contribution of Nkrumah was to advance the cause of independence by moving 
beyond Danquah’s pure ethnos, which actually failed to unite Gold Coast’s divided 
groups, and build a different kind of collectivity—a virtual nativity where if people 
were not united by descent, they could still be one by consent.  Specifically, the 
argument was the similarity argument of Bandung: if we are not all essentially alike, 
we are alike in our burdens at the hands of the colonial power.  We are the same in 
our common oppression, and in our common dream of freedom.  Perhaps then, as in 
the case of Denmark and Greenland, in this approach the state form was to be the 
solution to multiple cleavages within the Gold Coast.  
As Nugent (2002b:147-98) tells it, however, in contrast to such an image of 
the CPP, ‘as a black nationalist knight that slew the imperialist dragon,’ behind the 
doors, the CPP actually worked closely with the British.  While the British sought to 
‘buy time’ at the UN and not look too supportive of the CPP, the CPP assumed the 
task of building the constituency for integration of the Gold Coast with British 
Togoland.  The British even coached the CPP on how to present its case at the UN.  
Why such collaboration?  According to Nugent (2002), Nkrumah thought 
hydroelectric power was the key to modernization, but the viability of this depended 
on the new government having complete rights over the Volta River.  If British 
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Togoland was allowed to secede, however, the left bank would be touching foreign 
soil and thus, the status of British Togoland was of fundamental importance to the 
whole nationalist project of the Gold Coast.  Ultimately, in the battle between the TC 
and the CPP for British Togoland, the “annexationist agenda” (Nugent 2002b:147-98)
of the CPP won.  In 1956, the people of British Togoland were asked by the UN to 
vote in a plebiscite for either union with an independent Gold Coast or separation 
from the latter pending ultimate determination of the future of the territory.  Most 
(58%) voted for unification.  At the UN, the plebiscite results were decisive, and on 
March 1957, British Togoland was integrated with Gold Coast, emerging as the 
newly independent Ghana.  Across the border, French Togoland would gain separate 
independence as the Republic of Togo (ibid).
In this third version, the story of the role of Nkrumah, the CPP, and the 
process of gaining independence is very different from the first two versions.  
Interestingly, a central difference between the first two and the third versions is which 
part of Ghana the focus is on—the Gold Coast or British Togoland.  For the first two, 
stories of Ghana must begin with the Gold Coast and are more positive stories of the 
attainment of independence from colonial rule.  In the third, Nugent describes the 
independence of Ghana from the perspective of British Togoland, using the term 
“annexation”.  In what follows, I examine how the GA came to support this 
independence-annexation in its debates on British Togoland and in doing so, 
negotiated the graduation of the first trust territory from UN supervision to ‘political 
independence.’   
130
In the early fifties, the Togoland Congress appeared before the Fourth 
Committee and the General Assembly several times in order to plead the cause of 
Togoland unification, creating support within the anti-colonialist contingent in the 
UN for the unificationist case as early as 1953.  Anti-colonialists articulated this 
support in the GA debates with the usual appeal to Independence/Representation, and 
the GA passed a resolution instructing the British and French governments to convene 
a Joint Council for Togoland Affairs, which was to represent the populations of both 
French and British Togolands, to deliberate on the future of this ‘divided nation’ 
(Documents 1954).  The two administering authorities, however, never convened the 
Joint Council for Togoland Affairs.  In July 1953, the Acting Secretary of the All-
Ewe Conference wrote a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
enclosing a copy of a document entitled “Most Secret: The Future of Togoland Under 
United Kingdom Trusteeship” to share with all members of the GA.  In the letter, he 
wrote that it was important to forward this document to the UN, as its contents were 
“diametrically opposed to the aspiration of the Ewes and Togolanders to-day” 
(Atiogbe, I.K., Ag. General Secretary, Petition to UN Secretary General, 1953, 
Documents, 1954).  According to Mr. Atiogbe, the document itself laid out a joint 
strategy on the part of the British government and the CPP on how to outwardly 
satisfy the democratic prerequisites of anti-colonialists in the UN but still integrate 
the Gold Coast with British Togoland.  The document acknowledged that both the 
Togoland Congress and the Ewe-unificationists enjoyed support in different areas of 
the territories in question.  Hence, it proposed a two-step plan in which, first, the CPP 
was to go about building support for the integration of Gold Coast and British 
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Togoland among locals on the ground through whatever means necessary, including 
bribery of specific leaders and second, the UN was to be bombarded by petitions from 
locals demanding this integration.  Such locals were to be coached by the UK 
government and the CPP on how to do this.  Moreover, in order for the first step to 
succeed, this matter could not come before the UN until 1954—until the necessary 
local support could be obtained.  
Following the delivery of this document and Mr. Atiogbe’s letter to the UN in 
July 1953, Mr. Antor, the representative of the Joint Togoland Congress, addressed 
the Fourth Committee in November of 1953, arguing that its resolution that the 
British and French governments set up a Joint Council for Togoland Affairs to 
determine the future of the two Togolands still remained unheeded and that instead, 
the UK was going ahead with its plans as laid out in the “Most Secret” document.  In 
early December, the UK circulated a cablegram allegedly from locals supporting the 
case of integration of British Togoland with the Gold Coast in the GA.  Two days 
later, representatives of the All-Ewe Conference and the Togoland Congress wrote 
the Fourth Committee a letter in which they disputed this cablegram, arguing that its 
signatories were all members of the CPP and did not represent the Ewes or the 
Togolanders.  In this letter, they further asked the UN to itself take action to ascertain 
the wishes of the people.         
How did GA members react to this barrage of contradictory messages from 
the Gold Coast and Togoland territories?  In 1954, consistent with its alleged plan as 
laid out in the “Most Secret” document, the UK itself was ready for a plebiscite to 
‘determine what the people of British Togoland wanted’.  Some anti-colonialists 
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seemed sympathetic to the notion that the results might be manipulated, and they 
offered objections to the plebiscite.  Interestingly, these objections were a confused 
medley of the Colonialism not negative appeal and the Independence/Representation
appeal.  For example, the Philippines argued that this was an attempt on the part of 
the UK to “annex” British Togoland and that the UK was violating the sacred trust 
which had been entrusted to it.  It was supposed to develop the people of the territory; 
however, from the beginning, it had integrated British Togoland and Gold Coast and 
administered them together.  “We are now faced here with a situation where we are 
being asked to give the blessing of the United Nations to the annexation of a Trust 
Territory” (Mr. Carpio, Philippines, 1954, Sess 9, p. 500).  It argued further that the 
people had never been allowed to develop.  “Before we take a plebiscite…[we need 
to] determine first whether the people of the Trust Territory are or have been 
developed enough or are in such a condition that they can now be trusted to 
determine their own future” (italics added, ibid).  
Despite the above complications and the resultant misgivings on the part of 
some, however, most anti-colonialists ended up supporting the plebiscite.  India for 
example, offered the curious argument that: 
some apprehensions have been voiced…because the [British Togoland] 
Territory has been administered as part of the Gold Coast and because its 
future has sometimes been spoken of in terms of that situation.  The main 
element, however, is the independence of the people of the Trust Territory.  
[This is a] march forward to independence (Mr. Menon, India, Sess 10, 1955: 
456).  
This argument, in essence, encouraged detractors to focus less on the uncomfortable 
issue of ‘annexation’ and more on the positive element of progression toward formal 
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independence.  Indeed, other anti-colonialists that supported the plebiscite also 
supported their stances based on appeals to Independence/Representation, and in 
December 1955, the GA voted for of the plebiscite to take place.  
The difficulties of the situation, however, did not end there.  When the 
plebiscite was administered in May 1956, it offered the people of British Togoland 
only one of two options: union with an independent Gold Coast or continuation of 
existing trust status.  Alternative options, as preferred by the Ewes or the 
Togolanders, were not made available.  As mentioned earlier, the result was that 58% 
of the people chose the former, and so the GA voted for the integration of Gold Coast 
with British Togoland.     
In what follows, I examine the debates on this last draft resolution on the 
integration of Gold Coast and British Togoland.  I focus especially on the positions of 
different speakers—were they supportive of this integration of the Gold Coast with 
British Togoland?  What appeals did they use to make their cases?  I found that 
beyond the colonialist group who supported integration, anti-colonialists for the most 
part also supported integration, and they used their usual appeal (i.e., 
Independence/Representation) to do so: 
The Togoland people were offered free union with an independent Ghana, 
where all were to enjoy full freedom…the people…decided in favour of union 
with Ghana…[this supports] the will of the people…we in Ethiopia have 
followed with great interest the struggle of the people of the Gold Coast in 
their march towards independence…The emergence of Ghana and its 
subsequent admission to the United Nations will add one more voice to the 
voice of Africa (Mr. Yifru, Ethiopia, Sess 11, 1956: 691).   
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Only a few anti-colonialists, most of which were not part of Asia-Africa proper, 
(specifically Uruguay, Venezuela, Guatemala, the Philippines, Afghanistan and the
USSR) problematized this integration as violating Independence/Representation.    
Beyond these typically anti-colonialist appeals, however, these speakers also 
made use of typical colonialist appeals such as Colonialism not negative (i.e., ‘British 
Togoland has now been prepared for independence’).  For example, one speaker 
argued  “British Togoland was placed under trusteeship some time ago and now, as it 
reaches a level enabling it to exercise its right of self-determination freely, it has been 
given that chance” (Mr. Mahgoub, Sudan, Sess 11, 1956: 681).  Once again, these 
speakers from Asia-Africa who were in support of integration were opposed in this 
argument by anti-colonialist speakers who were not a part of Asia-Africa proper.  The 
oppositions of this second group to Asia-Africa’s kinship logic were incidentally also 
made with different kinship logic: 
the international trusteeship system, as set up, safeguards the advance of a 
group of underdeveloped territories to a stage at which their peoples are 
capable of self-determination, of deciding their own internal system of 
government and of acting independently in international affairs…It is the duty 
of countries which administer Trust Territories to promote the political, 
economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants 
...peoples'...inadequate development has caused them to be placed under 
trusteeship…We cannot believe that the mere incorporation of Togoland 
under British administration in Ghana is the appropriate step to take (Mr. 
Balay, Uruguay, Sess 11, 1956: 679).
There was a small intervention into this kinship-ridden discussion by one speaker, 
who argued that: “I believe all peoples are ready…it is not as though we today were 
conferring civilization upon them: they are re-emerging into their new youth” (Mr. 
Menon, India, Sess 11, 1956: 682).
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Ultimately, the central anti-colonialist arguments for unification made a case 
for the typically colonialist appeal of Proceduralism/Practicalism and to the 
historicity of ‘Ghana.’ Anti-colonialists actually made the appeal to 
Procedurlism/Practalism in this case more often than colonialist speakers did.  They 
argued that British Togoland was too small to be on its own, and that integration with 
the Gold Coast was efficacious since it had already been integrated with the Gold 
Coast by the administering authority for administration purposes for so long.  
Additionally, the Ewe tribe, parts of which were in Gold Coast, French Togoland and 
British Togoland, could not be practically united.  
But why the integration of British Togoland with Gold Coast instead of with 
French Togoland?  Here, the focus shifted to the history of ‘Ghana’ (i.e., Gold Coast) 
as opposed to the constructed nature of any connection between the two Togolands: 
‘Togoland’ was a name given by the Germans, and the Territory [of the two 
Togolands] has no national historical background…any feeling that any 
delegation may have that we are preventing the unity of a people 
is…erroneous.  [Moreover] this part of West Africa has a ancient history 
going as far back as the empires of the pre-Roman days, but even in more 
modern times, what is now to be called Ghana, which is the new name that the 
Gold Coast proposes to adopt, has a very glorious and a very honourable 
history [this history of the ancient kingdom of Ghana]…It is this history that 
the new nation will inherit (ibid:  685).    
Repeatedly, then, in the argument for integration, the focus shifted from 
British Togoland to Gold Coast, from the wishes of the Togoland Congress, who did 
manage to build a mass following, to a plebiscite that only offered Togolanders 
freedom via uniting with Gold Coast, and again from the wishes of the this Congress, 
to the mythical history of Gold Coast.  
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In this manner, British Togoland was the first trust territory to ‘graduate’ from 
the UN Trusteeship System—to move from the colonial problematic as defined by the 
UN (i.e., column 2 in Figure 1) to official statehood.  Hence, the emergence of 
‘Ghana’ can be seen as a metaphor for the complexities of postcolonial independence, 
accompanied by negotiations, compromises, and silences.  It was enabled by Asia-
Africa, who not only bound the colonial problematic unevenly with its differential 
politicization of different NSGT cases and the case of the USSR, but also with its 
willingness to ‘take what it could get’ when it came to freedom.  
Conclusion
Ultimately, then, anti-colonial states centered on Asia-Africa in the UNGA 
launched a multi-layered anti-colonialist critique that targeted particular colonialist 
practices based on their own positioning as newly independent states within shifting 
global power relationships.  Regarding the historic kinship politics of the colonial era, 
thus, Asia-Africa’s interventions were selective, limited and at times, non-existent.  
Was this fragmentary nature of its challenge to the kinship politics of the 
Charter merely a strategic sacrifice of principle?  Alternatively, considering 
especially the problem of Ghana, did the power of the kinship narrative affect the way 
anti-colonialists defined the colonial problematic as well?  In the next chapter, I 
explore such questions further by turning to the narratives invoked by different 
groups in understanding the nature of the colonial problematic, the role of colonialist 
powers, and the role of dependent territories.  
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Chapter 5
Contending with Kinship: Narratives and Counter-Narratives
Given the great overlap between the discursive appeals used by colonialist and 
anti-colonialist speakers examined in the previous chapter, and given the 
inconsistency of especially latter, in this chapter I seek to explore these discussions in 
greater depth.  In what follows, I examine the central narratives shaping the politics of 
different groups in their discussions of colonialism and decolonization; specifically, I 
examine these discursive exchanges as attempts to renegotiate space through the 
renegotiation of identity.  As mentioned in a previous chapter, I see these exchanges 
as both persuasive and constitutive.  They are persuasive in the sense that they are 
based on a set of appeals that aim to justify a speaker’s stance on a draft resolution 
under discussion and also to convince others to take on a similar stance (and so 
ultimately, vote similarly).  Additionally, following Tischer, Meyer, Wodak and 
Vetter, they are also constitutive.  They are “simultaneously constitutive of social 
identities, social relations, and systems of knowledge and beliefs” (Titscher, Meyer, 
Wodak, and Vetter 2000).  From this perspective, we may understand the historic, 
kinship politics previously identified to posit two overarching, distinct categories of 
social identity: the disembodied or rational/paternal/masculine on the one hand versus 
the embodied or irrational/childlike/feminine on the other; a hierarchical set of social 
relationships between the two, whereby the first category can and indeed must ‘rule 
over’ or ‘guide’ the second; and the system of knowledge inherent in these 
constructions, namely the notion that dependent states require rule/tutelage from 
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sovereign states.  From the eighteenth to especially the twentieth century, I argued in 
Chapter 1 that this politics moved away from ‘harsher’ notions of colonial rule to 
‘softer,’ paternalistic notions of guidance and tutelage.  In this chapter, I am interested 
in to what extent this politics—in either form—is evident in the GA debates in the 
fifteen years examined.  Moreover, given the great overlap in colonialist and anti-
colonialist argument identified thus far, how do anti-colonialists respond?
In what follows, I begin by identifying the different narratives colonialist and 
anti-colonialist speakers advanced within the United Nations General Assembly for 
the fifteen years leading up to the onset of legal decolonization, with a focus on how 
these different narratives constitute identities, relationships between these identities, 
and knowledge about them.  First, I argue that in this setting, colonialist speakers 
continued in their articulation of a softer kinship politics of colonial rule for the 
beneficence of dependent peoples, producing a colonialist narrative that worked to 
advance their own subjectivity while denying the subjectivity of dependent peoples.  
Specifically, this narrative made categorical distinctions between mature, wise, and 
rational administering authorities versus their young, immature charges, posited a set 
of paternalistic relationships between them, and so produced concomitant 
paternalistic and controlling knowledge about them.
Interestingly, while countries situated within the anti-colonialist perspective 
also prioritized the subjectivity of ‘their group’—former and contemporary dependent 
territories42—the anti-colonialist response here was quite different.  For in contrast to 
the relatively distinct and consistent character of the colonialist narrative, anti-
42 This distinction was consistent throughout the fifteen-year period, and I have used it as a central 
distinguishing feature between the colonialist and anti-colonialist camps.  
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colonialists produced three overlapping but conflicting narratives, distinguished 
primarily by the different stances each took on the colonialist narrative.  One 
narrative wholly accepted the central narrative produced by the colonialist 
perspective, including its paternalistic construction of identities, relationships 
between identities and knowledge about them.  Against this, a second rejected a 
number of the major premises of the colonialist narrative, while accepting others.  
The consequence for the resultant discursive production of identities, relationships 
and knowledge was ambiguous.  A wholesale rejection of the colonialist narrative and 
its implications for identity, power and knowledge was also evident, though this 
narrative was a minority perspective at best.  Overall, then, when it came to softer 
kinship images of the nature and rationale of colonial authority and rule, the bulk of 
anti-colonialists largely agreed.
A Note on Method
Michael Fry (1997) argues that in the post-war world, the new superpowers, 
the remaining imperial powers, the institution of the UN, ands its related international 
organizations all acknowledged the same norms as they adopted the vocabulary of 
self-determination, human rights, racial equality, modernization, and development.  
And yet, the documents on the debates between the years of 1946-1960 demonstrate 
that this common language was rife with the conflicting meanings and rhetorical 
functions of speakers with different histories, identities, positions and aims within 
complex webs of relationships.  As a first step, then, I began with the following 
questions: 1) Are there patterns in the use of any particular language (i.e., discourse, 
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imagery, symbols)?  By different political positions, for example?  2) What is the 
meaning of particular language for a particular speaker?  Might the same language 
have different meanings for different speakers?  3) What does a speaker’s use of 
particular language demonstrate about that speaker’s priorities, values, and 
worldview?  
In order to explore these questions, I chose to use the cluster-agon method, or 
cluster method, of analysis.  Cluster-agon analysis was initially formulated by 
Kenneth Burke (1973; 1984), who argues that every work produced by a rhetor 
contains a set of implicit equations, or ‘associational clusters.’ The meanings that key 
symbols or terms (also known as god terms) have for the rhetor can be discovered by 
charting the symbols that cluster around those key symbols in the rhetorical artifact.  
In cluster-agon analysis, key symbols or terms are first identified by their frequency 
or intensity within a text.  After the key terms/symbols have been identified, the 
words that cluster (i.e., appear in close proximity to the key term, or are joined by a 
conjunction to the key term, or are connected by a cause-and-effect relationship to the 
key term, and so on) around those key terms are charted.  Next, any patterns that 
might appear within the clusters are charted.  For example, is a particular word or 
symbol always associated with a key term?  Next, one may perform an agon analysis, 
where opposing terms (also known as devil terms) are examined.  Here, the goal is to 
discover what terms/symbols oppose or contradict the key terms/symbols.  The final 
step is to use the pattern that emerges in the analysis to identify the speaker’s motive 
(Burke 1973; Burke 1984; Foss 1989).  
141
Underlying the notion that the works of different rhetors contain ‘associational 
clusters’ as well as that symbols/terms may have different meanings for different 
rhetors is the idea that the meaning of language is not transparent or fixed but rather 
contextual, shifting and interpretive.  Speakers may employ the same terminology but 
with varying definitions of that terminology as well as with varying intent.  Cluster-
agon analysis, then, moves beyond more traditional methods—particularly more 
quantitative methods of discourse/textual analysis.   For example, the popular content 
analysis method may be defined as “a quantitatively oriented technique by which 
standardized measurements are applied to metrically defined units and these are used 
to characterize and compare documents” (Manning and Cullum-Swan in Denzin and 
Lincoln 1998a: 248).  While such a method may be useful in counting the frequency 
of particular symbols/terms within the debates, it nevertheless would have little utility 
in exploring two of the three questions listed above.  That is, it would offer little help 
on the question of the meaning of particular terms for particular speakers, as well as 
on the question of a speaker’s priorities, values or worldview.  
Additionally, cluster-agon analysis is particularly useful for comparing the 
rhetoric of several speakers (Berthold 1976).  Through the comparison of different 
speakers’ key term clusters and opposing term clusters, one may compare structures 
of binary logic that undergrid varying meaning systems.  In the case of this study, 
cluster-agon analysis is used to compare the meaning systems of not only different 
speakers but also different groups of speakers.
First, I perform a cluster-agon analysis of different speakers’ talk about 
dependency and sovereignty in order to tap into potentially varying meaning systems.  
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I especially compare the discourses of groups that emerged from the textual material, 
noting patterns by former and contemporary status in the European colonial system, 
position and allegiance in the Cold War, and other elements, in order to explore the 
competing meaning systems inherent in the ‘common language (Fry 1997)’ deployed.  
Next, I examine how in the use of this ‘common language,’ different 
discourses bring together different imagery in order to weave together contending 
narratives of the colonial experience and the meaning of political independence.  
The Colonialist Narrative: A Continuation of ‘Soft’ Kinship Politics
  Since the central interest here is the negotiation of dependency and 
sovereignty, I first performed a cluster analysis of the key terms/symbols political 
independence, freedom, autonomy, and sovereignty.  As language is necessarily
inexact, I examined any discussions of these terms/symbols without requiring this 
precise language (this is discussed in greater detail below).  The terms found to 
cluster around these key terms were: progress, advancement , development, evolution, 
higher civilization, and modernity (see Figure-1).  In the following statement on 
colonialism, for example, development and independence are placed in a cause-and-
effect relationship where (political) development is seen as a precondition for 
independence: 
We recognize that the colonial system is useful in a great many cases; we
recognize that the colonial system is the best way of slowly guiding, by 
gentle but ever-lengthening steps, peoples of little political education so that 
they can develop their political sense and become independent nations able to 
take their places with us here and thus constitute a truly universal assembly of 
nations.  We know that England, for instance, may be considered a great 
teacher of mankind…(Mr. Sourdis, Colombia, Sess 2, 1947: 689).
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Likewise, in the following statement made by a colonialist speaker on the exclusive 
rights of administering authorities to determine the status of their territories, the terms 
self-government and development are positioned within a cause-and-effect 
relationship where development is seen as a precondition for obtaining self -
government:
Only the administering Power is left in the position …to decide when a 
particular Territory under its administration has reached a stage of political 
development when it can be deemed to be self-governing. (Sir P. Spender, 
Australia, Sess 9, 1954: 301).
For my purposes, I interpreted this discussion of self-government as a discussion of 
political independence in the sense I am interested in, and I included this discussion 
within my cluster analysis.  
Moreover, all six of the terms that clustered around the key terms seemed to 
define each other, as they repeatedly appeared in close proximity to each other, 
appeared in conjunction with each other, appeared in cause-and-effect relationship 
with each other, and functioned interchangeably within statements.  In the following 
statement on the Danish administration of the dependent territory of Greenland, for 
example, the terms development and advancement are joined together by the 
conjunction and:  
United we will work for the further advancement and development of the 
Greenland community...the new order will be a blessing and a benefit to the 
people of Greenland (Mr. Lannung, Denmark, Sess 9, 1954: 307).
Similarly, in this next statement, the terms advancement and progress seem to be 
defined in terms of each other: 
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On principle, we sympathize with the advancement of the NSGTs and 
consider that their political, social, and economic progress should lead them to 
assume full responsibility for their own destinies, in accordance with the spirit 
and the letter of the Charter (Mr. P. Perez, Venezuela, Sess 10, 1955: 461).
After exploring this first cluster, I next performed a second cluster analysis 
concerning the key terms political dependence and lack of sovereignty.  The terms 
that repeatedly clustered around these key terms were: native, primitive, backward, 
underdeveloped, incompetent, uneducated, lack of civilization and simplistic 
civilization (See Figure-2).   The logic of this cluster seems inherent in the logic of 
the first cluster.  That is, if development, advancement, progress, modernity, and so 
forth are prerequisites for political independence, it follows that the lack of these 
qualifying conditions is a justification for political dependence.  Indeed, the most 
common argument made by colonialist powers and administering authorities to 
legitimate their rule over a dependent territory was the notion that they were in fact 
‘preparing’ and ‘training’ their dependent territories, by virtue of imparting 
modernity, progress and so forth, for independence at some future date.  In the 
following statement, for example, lack of education and preparation (which I 
interpret here as a synonym for competence) are associated wit h political dependence 
and so offered as the justification for political dependence by Brazil:  
We must encourage the political education of the peoples that were not yet 
ready for independence, and prepare the ground for them so that they might 
shape their own future and direct their own affairs (Mr. De Oliveira, Brazil, 
Sess 12, 1957: 518).
While this argument was usually used to legitimate continued conditions of 
dependency for dependent territories, there were also cases in which this logic could 
145
be turned on its head.  For example, in 1946 the Union of South Africa submitted a 
report (and request) to the General Assembly claiming that the people of their then 
mandate South West Africa had expressed the desire to become ‘incorporated’ into 
the Union of South Africa.  As such, the Union of South Africa appealed to the now 
commonly pledged norm of self-representation as it claimed it only sought to give the 
people what they wanted.  In this case, however, the alleged lack of the qualifying 
conditions (for independence) of development, advancement, modernity and so forth 
were used by opponents to argue that the international community need not recognize 
these expressed opinions here:  
African inhabitants of South West Africa have not yet secured political 
autonomy or reached a stage of political development enabling them to 
express a considered opinion, which the Assembly could recognize, on such 
an important question (Mr. Lannung, Denmark, Sess 1, 1946: 1324-25).  
Over the fifteen years examined, speakers who deployed these arguments more often 
articulated the conditions for independence (Figure 1) rather than the reasons why 
specific territories were in a dependent state (Figure 2).  Nevertheless, both clusters 
relied on each other for their meaning and significance within the debates (i.e., were 
defined in opposition to each other, see Table 1).  Considering the two in conjunction, 
then, colonialist discourse in these fifteen years conjoined the abstractions of 
progress, advancement, development, evolution, higher civilization and modernity 
into a singular narrative of linear progression.  Separately and together, these 
abstractions were quantified and placed on a linear scale, where countries that were 
‘higher’ or ‘more advanced,’ with a quantitatively greater amount of the qualities 
listed therein, were associated with political independence while countries situated as 
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‘lower’ on the scale, or ‘less advanced,’ and possessing quantitatively less of the 
qualities listed therein, were associated with political dependence.  
While differential placement of territories on this scale of linear progression 
helped to construct central identity distinctions such as independent territories versus 
dependent territories, an additional set of images and symbols helped to construct 
appropriate kinds of relationships between these categories of identity.  Thus, a 
second set of terms clustered around the key terms/symbols political independence, 
freedom, autonomy and sovereignty and its associated imagery of linear progression: 
growth, maturity, responsibility (including responsibility for self), autonomy, and the 
ability to make decisions for self (See Figure 3).  How did this imagery facilitate 
certain kinds of relationships between those ‘higher’ and those ‘lower’ on the scale of 
linear progression?  For starters, consider how the following speakers associate level 
of advancement on the scale of linear progression and responsibility: 
The struggle over backwards populations has passed from London to 
Washington, from Lisbon to Rio, Rome to Addis Ababa; but the situation 
always remains the same: a population of higher civilization, responsible for 
the well-being and advancement of peoples of another race (Mr. Ryckmans, 
Belgium, Sess 2, 1947: 672).
On principle, we sympathize with the advancement of the NSGTs and 
consider that their political, social and economic progress should lead them to 
assume full responsibility for their own destinies, in accordance with the spirit 
and the letter of the Charter. (Mr. P. Perez, Venezuela, Sess 10, 1955: 461).
Hence, a higher level of advancement on the scale of linear progression meant not 
just the ability to be responsible for self, but also responsible for others—for 
colonialist powers, anyway.  Meanwhile, a lower level on the scale implied an 
inability to be responsible for self.  Through such imagery, political independence for 
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dependent territories was envisioned as the end product of a naturalized, evolutionary 
process of tutelage under a ‘more responsible’ state until one was determined capable 
of ‘taking responsibility for self.’  This argument could of course also be used to 
justify the denial of political independence, as in the following case where the United 
Kingdom explained its views on political independence in a general sense: 
Democracy is a growth…In the case of all the territories coming under our 
jurisdiction, we have been attempting, will continue to attempt, to provide all 
the assistance we can towards this growth—and, as I have said, it is 
essentially a growth.  With all our cooperation and all the help we an offer, 
time is needed to build tradition and, to create political and public 
responsibility and to create the social services which we are the only sound 
foundation for political freedom (Mr. McNeil, United Kingdom, Sess 2, 1947: 
666).  
This imagery was also particularly useful for both sanctioning and disciplining 
the behaviors of those seeking political independence.  For example, the final 
negotiations for the territorial demarcations of Ghana occurred between the 
administering authority of the Gold Coast and British Togoland (Britain), the UN 
machinery, and a number of different and differentially interested groups (Nugent 
2002a), and it left numerous unificationist and nationalist groups within the affected 
territories unsatisfied. 43  In the following statement, consider how a great supporter of 
the final conditions for the independence of Ghana, the United States, associates 
independence with responsibility and maturity in order to legitimate one territorial 
and institutional arrangement and delegitimate others: 
A word about the opinion of my delegation concerning the magnificent 
accomplishments of the Administering Authority, the United Kingdom, with 
the supervision of the Trusteeship System…[for the UK] has not only brought 
knowledge of modern medicine, education and government administration to 
43 See the previous chapter.
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the people under its charge, but it has also instilled in them knowledge and 
experience in truly democratic government, honesty in administration, 
impartial judicial procedures…and many other principles and practices which 
form the basis for truly self-governing institutions…However, we would also 
like to utter a word of caution…there are still some West Africans who are 
somewhat dissatisfied with the decision of the General Assembly [regarding 
the boundaries of Ghana].  One of those dissident groups seeks a federal form 
of government in Ghana.  Another seeks a form of independence for both 
Territories of Togoland.  We would strongly urge those groups to accept the 
principle that political maturity seeks to achieve political change by peaceful 
means, and to operate on the democratic premise that minorities should yield 
to majorities...We are confident that the soon to be independent new peoples 
of the new State of Ghana…will prove themselves to be responsible, 
progressive and politically mature, and thus play a major role as 
a strong, free and democratic State which can be an example for the entire 
world (Mr. Nash, United States, Sess 11, 1957: 681-82).  
As in the two opposing clusters for linear progression, if this second set of 
terms of maturity, responsibility and so forth clustered around the key terms of 
political independence, autonomy, freedom and sovereignty (Figure 1), its binary 
opposites again seemed to cluster around the key terms political dependence and lack 
of sovereignty (See Figure 2 and Table 2).  Particularly evident were the 
terms/symbols immaturity, lack of responsibility (including responsibility for the 
self), dependency, wards, and children (See Figure 4).  In the following statement, for 
example, the speaker makes clear the connection between political dependence and 
immaturity: 
[The terms of the Charter apply to] countries, which, by reason for their social 
immaturity, have not yet reached the stage of full independence… (Mr. 
Sourdis, Columbia, Sess 2, 1947: 692)
Even beyond the justification of political dependence, such imagery could be 
used to deny even ‘lesser’ forms of self-representation.  For example, when the 
Fourth Committee submitted a draft resolution on allowing indigenous inhabitants of 
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NSGTs to participate in the Committee on Information from Non Self-Governing 
Territories (a committee formed to collect information on social, economic and 
educational progress in the NSGTs), the UK opposed this draft resolution with the 
following argument associating lack of responsibility with lack of sovereignty: 
We do not believe that direct participation of the Non-Self-Governing 
Territories in the work of the committee can in fact be of assistance in 
promoting the progress of those Territories and their peoples towards the goal 
set for the in Chapter XI of the Charter…we wish to remain the sole judges as 
to the composition of our delegations to international bodies, and we consider 
further that membership of the committees of the General Assembly must be 
confined to Members of the United Nations. These committees must remain 
associations of sovereign and responsible governments.  They cannot be 
converted into tribunals in which States of the United Nations can be 
confronted with the indigenous inhabitants of these Territories (Mr. Lloyd, 
United Kingdom, Sess 7, 1952:  344).
Hence, dependent territories, those on the right hand side of the binary in 
Table 1 and with quantitatively less ‘advancement,’ ‘development,’ ‘evolution,’ 
‘civilization’ and so on, were imaged here, above all, as children.44  The easy slippage 
between the naturalized condition of childhood and the status of political dependence, 
with no “autonomy” in the existing geopolitical system, is evident in the 
characterization of dependent territories throughout the fifteen years examined as 
“minors or incomplete states,” ”wards of the international community, ” “not yet able 
to stand alone in the modern world,” “unable to govern themselves,” and “not 
developed enough to have an opinion that counts.”  Lack of sovereignty was 
especially figured as a state of irresponsibility.  Against this, the state of 
independence was characterized as the ability to have “full responsibility for the self.” 
44 These territories were also periodically imaged as irrational or feminine, but the image of childhood 
was used most often.
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In contrast to this construction of dependent territories as children, 
administering authorities were “parents” given the “duty,” “the sacred duty,” and “the 
sacred trust” of “guiding dependent people,” providing “wise guidance,” “tutelage,” 
“political education,” and “teaching responsibility for self.”  Administering 
authorities added that the colonialist system existed merely to provide an important 
source of tutelage for dependent territories around the world.  Toward the close of the 
fifteenth year, when it became increasingly clear that legal decolonization was to 
become a reality, the notion that such tutelage should continue through the provision 
of United Nations programs for economic and technical assistance to newly 
independent states was also an important part of this discourse (this will be discussed 
in greater detail in the following chapter).
Hence, in the period examined, the colonialist construction of identities, 
relations between these identities, and knowledge about them, consisted of two 
primary sets of images.  First, the image of linear progression provided an entire 
lexicon of quantified and linearized abstractions, including progress, advancement, 
development, modernity, evolution, and higher civilization—all terminology that has 
been identified as constituting a post-Enlightenment metanarrative (Harding 2000; 
Wallerstein 1996; Lyotard 1984).  This metanarrative produced particular kinds of 
identities based on where territories were located within the scale of linear 
progression, including “backwards,” “primitive,” and “less evolved” dependent 
territories versus “advanced,” “modern,” and “civilized” countries.  Fundamentally, 
these identity distinctions posited an ontological difference45 between two different 
45 In philosophy, the term ontology may be used to indicate “that part of metaphysics that specifies the 
most fundamental categories of existence, the elementary substances or structures out of which the 
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categories of humanity.  For example, speaking of indigenous peoples within 
colonialist states as well as people in faraway dependent territories, one speaker 
argued:
They are so backward that, where they do not altogether escape the 
administration of the State to which they belong, they are placed under a 
special legal or administrative constitutional system…Furthermore, they are 
totally different, not only by reason for their primitive character, but also race, 
language and culture from the peoples from whom the government 
administering the State emanates (Mr. V. Langenhove, Belgium, Sess 8, 1953: 
310).
But location on the scale of linear progression does not necessarily explain the 
hierarchical sets of relationships between these identities that colonialist discourse 
legitimated.  To understand this, we must turn to a second set of images, that of 
kinship relations.  That is, this hierarchical metaphor of kinship, where more  
“childlike” and “incompetent” dependent territories were distinguished from “wiser” 
and “more competent” administering authorities, produced and indeed naturalized the 
paternalistic relationship of tutelage and guidance between them:  
We in the United Kingdom are proud of what we are doing in the colonial 
field.  It is with great pride that we have been able to bring various members 
of the British Commonwealth and Empire along the road to full self-
government.  We feel the same pride that a parent feels when he sees his 
children going out into the world and making their own way.  Sometimes the 
children, when they are given the key to the door, may kick over the traces a 
little bit but we do not mind that any more than the parent does.  More often 
we have seen growing affection between ourselves and our children and we 
look forward to an extension of that process.  We shall feel increasing pride as 
we see ourselves able to bring more and more of the dependent peoples who 
world is made. Ontology will thus analyze the most general and abstract concepts or distinctions that 
underlie every more specific description of any phenomenon in the world, e.g. time, space, matter, 
process, cause and effect, system  (Heylighen, 1995).”  I use the term “ontological difference” here to 
indicate deeply held assumptions of difference regarding these ‘most fundamental categories of 
existence, the elementary substances or structures’ between territories or peoples in different 
territories.
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look up to us, along this road to self-government and independence (Mr. 
Thomas, United Kingdom, Sess 1, 1946: 1271).
Ultimately, in constructing these identity distinctions and the relationships between 
them, these two sets of images simultaneously produced the knowledge that while the 
dependent territories were children “who were not developed enough to have an 
opinion that counts,” that the guidance of the more responsible administering 
authorities could bring them into “growth” and “maturity” (See Table 3).  In doing so, 
they continued the softer kinship politics of colonial rule, evident first in the 
eighteenth century, into the mid-twentieth. 
Conflicting Anti-Colonialist Narratives: Necessary Guidance or Imperialist 
Domination?
While this language of paternalistic rule for the beneficence of dependent 
peoples was certainly not new, then, what the fifteen-year period examined here 
reveals is that the anti-colonialist response was ambivalent at best.  It consisted of two 
primary responses, along with a minor third response.46  Of these, the first accepted 
the colonialist narrative wholesale, including its identity distinctions of ‘backwards, 
dependent territories’ versus ‘advanced, independent territories,’ the paternalistic 
kinship relationship between these identities, and (colonialist) knowledge about them.  
In contrast, the second anti-colonialist narrative also accepted the identity distinctions 
of ‘backwards, dependent territories’ versus ‘advanced, independent territories’ 
produced by the colonialist narrative.  However, not only did it reject the purported 
46 One could collapse all of these into more moderate and more extreme versions of the same response.  
However, following the Tischer, et al  (2000) approach to discourse as simultaneously constitutive of 
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relations of paternalistic kinship between these identities but also the (colonialist) 
knowledge produced about these identities.  The third anti-colonialist response 
rejected all three elements of the discourse under consideration: the colonialist 
production of dependent territories as ‘backwards’ and independent territories as 
‘advanced,’ the paternalistic kinship relationship between the two, as well as any 
(colonialist) knowledge about them (See Table-4).  
A key term within especially the first two of these anti-colonialist discourses 
was that of backwardness.  For these discourses, thus, I performed a cluster analysis 
of backwardness (see Figures 5 and 6), which reveals that each actually constructed 
the meaning of backwardness differently.  Given these different meanings, each then 
also proposed very different solutions to the task of eliminating this backwardness.  
For the first response, what I term the “colonialist” anti-colonialist narrative, 
backwardness was tantamount to lack of development, advancement, progress and 
evolution, or a lower status on the scale of linear progression.  In consequence, this 
approach argued that dependent territories must be prepared for independence, and so 
must be developed, advanced, must be helped to evolve.  This colonialist, anti-
colonialist narrative, thus, also appealed to both sets of images that the colonialist 
narrative deployed.  That is, it joined images of linear progression together with 
images of hierarchical kinship relations.  Describing the duties of the Trusteeship 
System, one speaker in the anti-colonialist camp proclaimed:
The trusteeship system must raise these at present backward territories to such 
level that they should be able to take their place in the family of nations as 
self-governing or independent peoples.  The peoples of these territories have 
an equal right to enjoy the benefits of contemporary civilization and to 
identities, relationships between them and knowledge about them, I have chosen to explore each 
particular response along these three dimensions, distinguishing between them accordingly.
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improve their welfare…our first concern for the backwards peoples of Trust 
territories is to ensure that these possibilities are realized…at which period 
these territories would be sufficiently mature enough to receive self-
government and independence (Mr. Novikov, USSR, Sess 2, 1947: 1278). 
Of course, the USSR did not really identify as a (former) dependent territory, and 
perhaps its own location as a global power conditioned its view.  However, even 
territories fully identified with the (former) dependent territory status responded 
similarly:
The Charter, with the object of leading the backward peoples step by step 
towards the light and towards an evolution which will enable them to take 
their responsibility for their social and political destinies upon their shoulders 
[and]…the Trusteeship System [are] more in keeping with our modern ideas, 
which require that the peoples of the world should rise from one stage of 
civilization to the next (Mr. Vieux, Haiti, Sess2, 1947: 611).
But if this anti-colonialist response to the colonialist narrative adopted this narrative 
wholesale, why is it a distinct discourse?  Why is it an anti-colonialist discourse?  As 
mentioned earlier, the two overarching perspectives, “colonialist” and “anti-
colonialist,” were determined in terms of the sorts of arguments they advanced, the 
sorts of appeals that arguments were based on, and who they supported in the debates.  
Perhaps the most decisive factor was that the first consistently prioritized the 
subjectivity and the rights of the colonialist countries, while the second did the same 
for dependent territories.  Hence, for the “colonialist,” anti-colonialist discourse, 
appeals to alleviate conditions of backwardness were always made from the 
perspective of the dependent territories and with an eye to advancing the cause of 
moving the independence process forward.  One of its most important maneuvers was 
to take the colonialist narrative’s discursive construction of ‘the duty of a higher 
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civilization towards a lower civilization’ and transform it into obligations that the 
administering authority had for increasing the material welfare of inhabitants in 
dependent territories and for advancing these territories towards political 
independence.  In contrast, colonialist discourse consistently prioritized the 
subjectivity and rights of the colonialist countries, or administering authorities. 
Typically hinging on the exclusive and sovereign right of these authorities to 
administer their territories and affairs as they sought fit, on a concrete level these 
tended to hinder the process towards independence.  The consequence was that while 
the colonialist countries advanced a conservative colonialist discourse aimed at 
preserving their rights and privileges, the first anti-colonialist approach advanced a 
colonialist discourse aimed at social change.
Furthermore, the peculiar position of an anti-colonialist subject advancing 
colonialist knowledge produced particular kinds of conflicts within this discourse.  
First, there was an ambiguous relationship to the cultural and racial hierarchy inherent 
in the colonialist images of linear progression and kinship.  The notions that 
“backward populations, most of whom had many centuries of their own type of 
civilization” after independence, may “return to [the] rich cultural heritage of these 
civilizations” and indeed, their civilizations “will enrich the whole world” were 
joined with the idea that “without imperialism, [these civilizations] would presumably 
have remained primitive.”   Second, although there was an overwhelming appeal that 
the “backward peoples must be lead, evolve, so that they can take responsibility for 
own social and political destinies,” or that they required “guidance, assistance to 
reach [the right] level for self-determination,” this was not the colonialist appeal of a 
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Belgium, a Union of South Africa or a France.  Hence, this discourse added: 
“countries need to develop themselves economically, politically, socially, and 
culturally to the most advanced conception of modern civilization…[as] this is the 
only guarantee of freedom.”  Thus the colonialist anti-colonialist appeal was not 
merely for linear progression, but for the conditions of freedom in a world of colonial 
realities.  Third, the UN Charter made certain obligations for progress in administered 
territories incumbent upon administering authorities.  While in the basic colonialist
narrative, these requirements were read as ‘assistance for progress’ that flowed from 
more advanced territories to less advanced territories, for the colonialist anti-colonial 
appeal, they were also read as conditions only enabled by, and hence stemming from, 
the international community:  “sovereignty is lying latent in the people, and [this 
territory] should come under the tutelage of the world community” (Mr. Menon, 
India, Sess 8, 1953: 324).  Similarly, in the following example, the system that 
matched a dependent territory with an administering authority was a global system: 
The essence of the mandate system was to place certain backwards peoples 
under the guardianship of the League of Nations and under the supervision of 
the conscience of the world…the responsibilities of the League of Nations in 
the wide field of moral authority have been assumed by the United Nations   
(Mrs. Pandit, India, Sess 2, 1947: 598).
Ultimately, such an interpretation of the UN trusteeship system muted (the 
significance of) the hierarchical relations inherent therein.
Finally, there was also an ambivalent analysis of the nature of post-
independence assistance.  Hence, the argument that after independence, domination 
would be “over” and that newly independent countries “will need 
help…aid…economic development” co-existed with the argument that beyond 
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political independence, the hierarchical relations of economic dependency would 
continue to be problematic.  
Ultimately, then, while the colonialist, anti-colonialist narrative certainly drew 
on the identity distinctions, hierarchical relations and knowledge inherent in the 
colonialist narrative, this discourse was much more cognizant of the power relations 
inherent therein.
While the colonialist, anti-colonialist narrative deployed the notion of 
backwardness—though from its unique location—in contrast, the second anti-
colonialist narrative defined backwardness very differently.  For this perspective, 
backwardness was indeed about lack of development (lower position on the scale of 
linear progression), which was also connected to a lack of political independence.  
However, the significant difference here was where this approach placed the cause of 
dependent territories’ lower placement on the evolutionary scale.  While the first anti-
colonialist narrative accepted that dependent territories were not advanced, were in 
fact dependent because they were not advanced, and required tutelage, the second 
argued that while dependent territories certainly lacked advancement, that this lack of
advancement was actually not an inherent condition but caused by the exogenous 
factor of European colonialism.  Hence, this approach argued, “colonialism is not 
civilization,” that “before colonialism, Africans were highly developed,” that 
“colonialism [itself] is bad for development,” is indeed “emasculating,” and that there 
is a “new kind of backwardness [that of] those who continue colonialism.”47  From 
this perspective, the “civilizing mission” or “white man’s burden” was seen as mere 
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“paternalism,” as a “guise” and an “excuse.”  One speaker argued: “you've been 
claiming to train us for 350 years, and haven't done so.”  Another claimed:
At this moment, over 100 million of our brothers and sisters are still 
experiencing the horrors of a system which has inflicted indescribable 
sufferings on the dependent peoples…[It was] brute force or force cleverly 
disguised in the best paternalistic traditions…a force designed primarily to 
hold back the development of the colonial peoples whenever development was 
not seen to be essential in one form or another, to the development of the 
colonial interests.  It was therefore basically a force opposed to the people’s 
development…[and it] did not allow people to develop except in so far as 
their development was essential to its own existence…so the colonial system, 
by the support it gave to the forces of social reaction in subject territories and 
to tribal classes and hierarchies which would otherwise have disappeared, 
distorted the dynamic working of the forces of change and froze political and 
social development at the primitive stage.  This is why colonialism must be 
held responsible for the considerable backwardness of the dependent countries 
in relation to the general progress throughout the world, and for the tragic gulf 
between these dependent countries and the industrialized countries (Mr. Vakil, 
Iran, Sess 15, 1960: 994-998).
Furthermore, because this discourse dissociated colonialism from ‘development,’ this 
approach could deconstruct the notion of advancement or progress on a linear scale as 
the precondition for independence.  This discourse thus inverted the relationship 
between progress on a linear scale and independence, arguing that progress did not so 
much lead to independence, but rather, that “independence would lead to progress” or 
“development.”  With regard to the image of kinship, it argued that  “independence 
would lead to maturity,” and that “independence is the best way to mature the 
people.”  
In this vein, this narrative was also much more critical of international 
relationships after legal decolonization than was the colonialist anti-colonialist 
narrative.  While the first made some note of the potentially problematic aspects of 
47 Similar to the historical significance of kinship politics for the colonial narrative produced within the 
arguments examined in the United Nations General Assembly, according to Mary Louise Pratt, these 
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continuing relationships of economic development after independence, this second 
anti-colonialist narrative was much more prolific on these dangers.  It repeatedly 
made reference to the “new colonialisms,” “neo-colonialism,” “new dangers,” “new 
forms of colonialism beyond political domination,” “the new type of colonialism 
under the guise of liberation,” and the “conquest of the mind.”  Specifically, it 
referred here to new kinds of economic relationships formed between older 
colonialist powers and newly independent territories, the ideological and other power 
relationships inherent in economic assistance to newly independent territories, the 
military alliances of various powers, the military bases that began to dot the world as 
a result of the Cold War, and the emerging ‘spheres of influence’ of various older and 
newer powers. 
Once the practices of colonialist countries, or administering authorities, were 
incorporated into the narrative in this way and once the image of linear progression 
was dismantled, colonialism could no longer be about ‘paternalistic guidance’ or 
‘tutelage.’  Hence the image of hierarchical kinship was also deconstructed.  One 
speaker argued, “We are of age from the moment when we have the full use of our 
freedom.  There are no countries which are under age when it comes to the exercise 
of freedom” (Mr. Kaka, Niger, Sess15, 1960: 1125).  Youth could even be a positive 
quality from within this perspective, about a closer association with a more authentic 
self, where political independence would lead to nations being “reborn.”  Now, this 
approach argued that “none of us are too immature for independence,” and that 
“notions of immaturity are about racism.”  Following the colonialist link between 
kinship status and political status, it argued that hence, “dependent territories do not 
counterarguments also have an important history in the tradition of anticolonial argument (Pratt 2004).
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need guidance, “ that “every territory is capable of governing itself” and “can develop 
itself,” that immaturity “should not be the pretext for delaying independence and that 
“'guidance' is just a justification of colonialism.”  
In sum, while this narrative accepted the identity distinctions of backwards 
versus advanced of the colonialist narrative, it rejected the purported relationship 
between these identities as well as the colonialist knowledge about them.  In the 
process, it redefined the significance of those identity distinctions themselves.
Against both of these perspectives, the third anti-colonialist narrative rejected 
the idea that the dependent territories were somehow backwards.  For example, 
The former colonial peoples and those who are still not independent have their 
own cultures, their own civilizations, their own traditions, their own languages 
and their own customs.  They are not only proud of their heritage but they 
want to maintain it.  They are determined to preserve it and to develop it in 
their own way…If some colonial Power would venture to say it…that some 
colonial territories are not prepared to assume independence, then we must 
treat with the greatest suspicion the assertion advance by that Power (Mr. 
Asha, United Arab Republic, Sess 15, 1960: 1049).
Hence, this narrative also rejected the notion that the territories required any sort of 
tutelage or that there was any relationship between ‘development’ and political 
independence:
Complete, unconditional and immediate liquidation of colonialism in all its 
manifestations must be our irreducible decision…Let the parties concerned 
begin immediate negotiations to transfer full sovereignty and authority to the 
rightful people without delay and let us welcome them in this world 
Organization (Mr. Asha, United Arab Republic, Sess 15, 1960: 1050).
It necessarily, then, also rejected colonialist knowledge about these entities and 
ultimately thus, this discourse rejected each element of the colonialist discourse.  
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Relative to the other two, however, this argument was quite rare in the fifteen-year 
period under discussion. 
Patterns of Argument
Attempting to ‘quantify’ or ‘compare’ discourse is a tricky business—
particularly when contending images develop in relation to each, have no definite 
boundaries, and notoriously defy quantification.  With these strong qualifications in 
mind, I attempted to gauge the relative strength of particular imagery by comparing 
the frequency of different associational clusters over time and by institutional-
discursive context.  Speakers engaged in discussions about colonialism and 
decolonization in three institutional-discursive contexts: through their discussions on 
Non Self-Governing Territories (NSGTs), through their discussions on Trust 
Territories (Trusts), and through their discussions on the Declaration on Granting 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Declaration).  The first two sets of 
discussions involved the two statuses allowed dependent territories in the machinery 
of the UN, with the Trust status incorporating territories into the Trusteeship System 
and explicitly seeking to ‘prepare’ dependent territories for political independence, 
and the NSGT status merely maintaining a status quo.  The third discussion regarded 
a draft resolution on the general problem of dependent territories, which sought to 
initiate the process of legal decolonization across both statuses of dependent 
territories.  While the first two sets of discussions took place largely during the first 
fourteen years of debate examined, the third took place in the final year.  
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Before comparing associational clusters over the fifteen years of debate, it 
must be reiterated that throughout the period, the colonialist discussions occurred 
from the perspective of the administering authorities, while the anti-colonialist 
discussions occurred from the perspective of dependent territories.  In terms of 
colonialist discourse, despite attacks from a growing anti-colonialist contingency, it 
remained remarkably consistent in its espousal of the colonialist narrative identified 
above, including its images of linear progression and hierarchical kinship relations.  
This included a discursive construction of dependent territories as having a lower 
status on the scale of linear progression and thus lacking in a number of linearized 
abstractions such as advancement and development, where such abstractions were 
general concepts incorporating political, social-cultural, and economic elements.  
Through this imagery, speakers engaged in a discursive construction of self as further
along this scale of linear progression, and possessing the ‘sacred duty’ or the ‘peculiar 
duty’ of helping dependent territories along as well.  
Anti-colonialist discourse largely accepted this notion of lack of progression 
or backwardness—or at least failed to challenge it.  This discourse alternated over the 
fifteen-year period between the arguments that dependent territories required help to 
progress from territories further along the scale of linear progression and that 
dependent territories were only lower on the scale of linear progression because of the 
experience of colonialism.  While the first was evident particularly in the case of 
NSGTs, in the case of Trusts, it was challenged largely by the argument that the 
administering authority, given its ‘sacred trust,’ was not doing a proper job, or that it 
was violating its sacred trust.  In these discussions on Trusts, then, speakers 
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introduced the crucial question of who should really have the task of generating 
progress for dependent territories: administering authorities or the UN?
These discussions became more complex in the last year of debate—which, 
not coincidentally—was also the year of the discussions on and passage of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the 
document which would initiate legal decolonization.   The anti-colonialist challenge 
to the colonialist narrative developed some new dimensions.  While it still articulated 
colonialist notions of backwardness, these articulations were overwhelmed by the 
argument that the backwards conditions of the dependent territories were due to 
colonialism, imperialism and exploitation and by the argument that the dependent 
territories actually were not backwards at all.  Instead, against the colonialist narrative 
of hierarchical kinship relations, anti-colonialist argument demanded non-hierarchical 
kinship relations between territories—relations between more or less equal brothers 48
rather than between parents and children.  They demanded cultural autonomy and a 
return of masculine dignity.  And, they insisted there was only one dimension in 
which they required assistance: the economic dimension.  Hence, they argued for 
economic development.  
48 The equation of ‘brotherhood’ with ‘equality’ in this context may seem somewhat problematic—
particularly as many of these anti-colonialist speakers represented cultures where the institution of 
brotherhood was hierarchical.  Nevertheless, the meaning of language is contextual and situational.  In 
this discursive space, in opposition to the paternalistic kinship politics of colonialist powers, anti-
colonialist speakers repeatedly and consistently equated brotherhood with equality and so advanced a 
preference for fraternal kinship relations.
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Conclusion
The narrative contentions explored in this chapter demonstrate that while 
colonialists generally continued to articulate the ‘soft’ kinship politics that emerged 
first in the eighteenth century, anti-colonialists, for the most part, failed to challenge 
this logic.  Regarding the colonialist perspective, a fairly consistent and distinct 
colonialist narrative brought together the images of linear progression and kinship to 
construct the ontologically distinct identity categories of ‘backwards’ versus 
‘advanced’ territories, paternalistic relationships between these identities, and 
colonialist knowledge about them.  In contrast, a much more conflicted anti-
colonialist discourse produced three narratives, two of which accepted major 
premises of the colonialist narrative.  While a third completely dismantled this 
narrative, it was rare.  
Given this great overlap in the understanding of the nature of dependent 
territories, as well as what advancement looked like, how did different speakers 
ultimately seek to resolve the colonial problematic?  How did they address issues of 
the colonialist construction of space, differential personhood and embodiment?  Of 
race, gender, culture, progress, freedom?  What would the new international 
community that resulted from these conversations look like?  It is to these questions 
that I now turn.
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Chapter 6
Masculinity, Time and Brotherhood: ‘Resolving’ the Colonial 
Problematic  
Nationalist texts were addressed both to ‘the people’ who were said to 
constitute the nation and to the colonial masters whose claim to rule 
nationalism questioned.  To both, nationalism sought to demonstrate the 
falsity of the colonial claim that the backward peoples were culturally 
incapable of ruling themselves in the conditions of the modern world.  
Nationalism denied the alleged inferiority of the colonized people; it also 
asserted that a backward nation could ‘modernize’ itself while retaining its 
cultural identity.  It thus produced a discourse in which, even as it challenged 
the colonial claim to political domination, it also accepted the very 
intellectual premises of ‘modernity’ on which colonial domination was based.  
-Partha Chatterjee, 1986
In the fall of 1960, anti-colonialists moved beyond the particulars of Trusts 
and NSGTs and introduced a debate on the general problematic of colonialism, 
initiating a set of conversations that would end with the passage of the 1960 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and 
the onset of legal decolonization.  In conventional understanding, this shift signaled a 
transition from the exclusions of the colonial era to a progressively more democratic 
era (Cassese 1995; Theodoropoulos 1988). If international law until now had been 
based on the systematic denial of the subjectivity of various ‘others’ (see Chapter 1), 
as one scholar put it, now, both individuals as well as liberation movements could 
claim subjectivity in some limited sense.  This transformation was especially signified 
by the decision of the international community, after 1960, to attribute a heightened 
status to a select group of principles considered more fundamental than other general 
principles of international law: those of jus cogens.  Theoretically, these meant that 
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now, no state, was to deviate from the right of self-determination, or of the values of 
peace and human rights—even if this was at the expense of competing national 
interests (Cassese 1995). 49
But did the 1960 Declaration really signal democratic progress in the sense 
indicated above?  How did it relate to colonialist constructions of space, identity and 
international community—particularly the racial, cultural and sexual dimensions of 
these constructions?  If, as I argued in Chapter 3, anti-colonialists disrupted the 
hierarchies of colonialist kinship politics especially with an appeal to the moral and to 
brotherhood, how did this discourse relate to the final ‘resolution’ of the colonial 
problematic?  Furthermore, what difference did it make that this resistance politics 
was conditioned on entering the nation-state system—that it could only be articulated 
by (representatives of) states (see Chapter 4)?  And perhaps most important of all, 
how did the fact that most anti-colonialists actually accepted some of the central 
premises of the colonialist narrative—specifically, colonialist understandings of 
progress, modernity and development (see Chapter 5)—figure into all of this?  In 
other words, what sort of a shift did the 1960 document really signify?  And for 
whom? 
In this final analysis chapter, I argue that the ambiguities and complexities of 
the anti-colonialist critique elaborated in the previous three chapters critically shaped 
the way the colonial problematic was finally resolved.  As the emerging identity of 
49 Specifically, it indicated an extension of a part of traditional international law governing modes of 
acquisition, transfer and loss of legal title over territory.  It implied the emergence of set of legal 
obligations for those countries still enjoying sovereignty over colonial territories, and these obligations 
made it incumbent on those states to enable people in the colonial territories freely to choose whether 
to opt for independent statehood or association or integration with an existing state (Cassese 1995).  
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Asia-Africa continued to develop as a masculinist, anti-colonialist, transnational 
entity united in its unique moral culture and its brotherhood (see Chapter 3), this 
identity made itself felt in the UNGA by 1960 in particular ways.  Specifically, anti-
colonialists offered a three-tiered argument that can be directly linked to the Asia-
Africa conferences examined in Chapter 3.  First, they argued that colonialism 
emasculates grown men and that decolonization is required to restore lost manhood.  
Second, they incorporated a critical temporal dimension: if colonialism was ever 
justified because the colonized were once ‘children,’ this is no longer the case.  Time 
has passed and the children have grown into adult men.  Third, they argued that thus, 
the appropriate relationship between territories must no longer be as between ‘parents 
and children,’ but rather, as between ‘brothers.’  To the colonialist construction of 
hierarchical space, identity and international community based on paternalistic 
kinship relations, then, anti-colonialists advanced the notion of a ‘more equitable,’ 
masculinist set of international relations based on fraternal kinship relations, or 
brotherhood.  
At the same time that they launched this challenge to legal colonialism, 
however, anti-colonialists’ acceptance of colonialist definitions of progress, 
modernity and development meant that they also accepted the designation of their 
peoples/states as somehow ‘behind’ on economic, scientific and technical, social, and 
other fronts.  Thus, while they fought to end formal political tutelage, they 
nevertheless would actively pursue such tutelage in the so-called, ‘non-political’ 
scientific and technical, economic, social, and even cultural arenas.  Indeed, as 
representatives of newly independent states, it seems they only asked for a shift in the 
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source of this tutelage (or in the era of the UN, of development assistance) from 
paternalistic colonialist powers to a ‘more equitable’ international community of 
brothers.  
In what follows, I discuss this contradictory resolution of the colonial 
problematic in three steps.  First, I relate patterns of appeal in this last year of 
argument, making the case that while colonialist speakers resorted still to the 
colonialist logic of kinship politics, anti-colonialists responded with an insistence on 
masculinity, time and brotherhood.  However, given their contradictions regarding 
‘political’ versus ‘non-political’ forms of tutelage, next, I more fully explore this 
ambiguous positioning.  Starting not in 1960 but from 1946, I examine anti-
colonialists’ efforts in this regard in different branches of the UN system, arguing that 
while seeking an end to political tutelage, they actually provided a key impetus for 
the elaboration of the UN’s machinery for ‘development assistance’ in economic, 
educational, social, cultural and other ‘dimensions of development.’  Indeed, such 
development assistance from the UN was a key ingredient in their nation- and state-
building efforts.  But how could anti-colonialists define freedom as the condition of 
sovereign statehood but then seek assistance on how to be proper states?  Finally, I 
explore this contradictory orientation to the politics of dependency and tutelage 
further from the perspective of the culture of the state-system.  Specifically, I argue 
that once freedom was defined in the GA as the attainment of statehood—as inclusion 
via the nation-state form into the system of nation-states—newly independent states 
were compelled to act ‘like states.’  Thus, they were obliged to perform and practice 
their statehood within certain culturally acceptable parameters, including the pursuit 
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of progress, modernity and development.  While there is certainly some room for 
negotiating precisely what constitutes these conditions of progress, modernity and 
development, anti- colonialist activity in the UN for the period examined demonstrates 
that they largely accepted the definitions provided by the colonialist narrative.  
Thus, the fifteen-year period examined here was not generally a transition to a 
‘more democratic’ era.  Rather, it signified a particular renegotiation of the racial, 
cultural and gender hierarchies of the colonialist narrative.  Specifically, to especially 
the racial and cultural hierarchies of this narrative, anti-colonialists responded with 
masculinity—with a retreat to gender.  This resort to masculinity illustrates that rather 
than launching a wholesale challenge to the multifaceted, paternalistic logic of 
kinship, anti-colonialists were willing to merely reconfigure this hierarchy so that 
‘postcolonial’ men—as brothers—could be included.  Ultimately, this masculinist 
politics of inclusion certainly provided access to the nation-state system.  However, it 
left the hierarchies of the colonialist narrative largely intact.  
‘Resolving the Colonial Problematic’: Debate in the Final Year
On September 23 1960, Nikita S. Khrushchev, then Chairman of the Council 
of the Ministers of the USSR, asked for the inclusion on the GA agenda of “the 
complete and final liquidation of peoples languishing in colonial bondage,” 
submitting to the GA for consideration the Draft Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Kruschev, United Nations, 1960).  
As discussed in Chapter 4, of course, this only meant European and United States’ 
colonialism.  Fearing a misappropriation of the decolonization issue in the Cold War 
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climate, on November 28th Asia-Africa advanced an alternative to the Soviet draft 
with the explicit aim of finding “formulae and solutions which would be acceptable to 
the greatest possible number of delegations” (United Nations 1960).  Initially 
sponsored by a group of 26 Asian and African countries, eventually the group of 
sponsors grew to 48 (United Nations 1960).  In addition, several amendments to the 
two drafts on decolonization also emerged.  The discussion on this series of items 
lasted for over two weeks, comprising debate on the general issue of decolonization 
within a field of possibilities.  During these conversations, over 70 delegations 
expounded on matters of colonialism and decolonization, oppression, gender, and the 
nature of racial and cultural difference.  Ultimately, these conversations ended with 
the adoption of the Asia-Africa version of the declaration on December 14 1960, thus 
formally ‘resolving’ the colonial problematic and initiating the process of legal 
decolonization.  
In these conversations, some speakers attempted to expand the definition of 
the colonial problematic, pointing to the narrative of the ‘white man’s burden,’ the 
role of capitalism, and the contemporary military and ideological struggle that was 
carving up the globe into ‘spheres of influence.’  There was also some discussion of 
the scope of this problematic, with speakers from different ideological locations 
pointing to not just ‘land-grabbing colonialism’ but also to ‘ideological colonialism’ 
and ‘neo-colonialism,’ as well as to the practices of particular states such as the 
United States, the USSR, China and Israel.  Despite such attempts to extend the 
parameters of the discussion, argument nevertheless tended to revert to the colonial 
problematic as constructed by Asia-Africa (see Chapter 4), with the targeted 
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European colonial powers reacting in defense.  In this last year, anti-colonialists 
especially made appeals to International Cooperation (United Nations), 
Independence/Representation, and Peace (see Chart 1 for a comparison of appeals for 
NSGTs, Trusts and the Declaration).  For their part, European colonialists and their 
allies appealed to the colonialist narrative (i.e., the appeal of Colonialism not 
negative) as never before:
When the Portuguese nation was set up and extended over other continents, 
usually on unoccupied or unused land, some very striking features became 
apparent: to those peoples which had not yet conceived the idea of a 
homeland, it offered one; it also offered a common language, the guarantee of 
peace and an organized economic and community life (Mr. Garin, Portugal, 
Sess 15, 1960: 1115).
The colonization process was the outcome of Europe’s tremendous impulse 
for expansion at the end of the Middle Ages.  There is no doubt that the ‘little 
peninsula backing on Asia’ as it was once described, comprised within its 
narrow confines a collection of peoples gifted with the most extraordinary 
qualities of intelligence, inventiveness, and enterprise that mankind has ever 
known…[who] soon found the territory assigned to them too small and went 
off to the four corners of the earth in search of new theatres for the expansion 
of their creative genius.  That was the beginning of the great colonial 
adventure…[Today, we hear critiques of this but in English and French.  To 
these critiques, then, we say that] when a people has received from another 
country such a valuable treasure as language, it cannot assert that it owes that 
country nothing…[moreover, there have been other benefits:] the victorious 
campaign against disease, the educational work of the missionaries and the 
constructive efforts of technicians (Mr. Amadeo, Argentina, Sess 15, 1960: 
1006).
This colonialist narrative, as discussed in Chapter 5, combined notions of 
linear progression and hierarchical kinship relations, where entities more advanced on 
the scale of linear progression were to teach, guide and ‘bring to maturation’ entities 
less advanced.  Michael Adas (2004) argues that the horrors of war during World War 
I especially catalyzed the critique of this discourse among many thinkers in Asia and 
Africa, undermining its moral authority and its ideals of racial superiority.  In its 
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challenge to this narrative in the GA, then, Asia-Africa reframed this tutelage as 
“paternalism,” a “pretext,” a “guise,” a “myth,” and even “neo-slavery.”  Speakers 
pointed to the problematic racial and cultural distinctions on which colonialist 
practices were based: 
It was in the nineteenth century that a very famous international lawyer, 
Professor Lorimer, Professor of International Law at Edinburgh, divided the 
world into three kinds of humanity.  There was civilized humanity, as 
represented by Europe; there was barbarous humanity, as represented by a few 
Powers like Turkey and Iraq…and there was savage humanity, which covered 
the rest of Africa and Asia (Mr. Perera, Ceylon, Sess 15, 1960: 1001).
Mr. Perera argued that these distinctions led to the different types of mandates within 
the League of Nations Mandates System as well as the different kinds of territories in 
the UN Trusteeship System.  Other speakers added that such practices, far from 
teaching or imparting civilization, violated the norms of civilization, imposing foreign 
practices on cultures that already had their own traditions50:
There is an infinite distance between colonization and civilization (Mr. Aw, 
Mali, Sess 15, 1960: 1965). 
The colonial powers have contended that the purpose of their remaining in 
other peoples’ lands is to spread their language and culture to the peoples of 
these colonies…to carry out a ‘civilizing mission’...the former colonial 
peoples and those who are still not independent have their own cultures, their 
own civilizations, their own traditions, their own languages (Mr. Asha, United 
Arab Republic, Sess 15, 1960: 1048).
Civilization is not a peculiar monopoly of any part of the world.  All we mean 
by making this distinction is that those of us who speak about it probably do 
50 However, as pointed out in Chapter 4, this critique was not consistent.  Rather, many anti-
colonialists distinguished between ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ colonialists in debates on NSGTs and Trusts, 
focusing on traditional European colonial powers and turning a blind eye to the practices of the USSR 
and the United States.  In this final year, newly independent countries as well as others that sought to 
curry the favor of particular powers engaged in a similar activity.  Ghana, for example, distinguished 
between ‘good’ colonialist powers such as France and UK versus ‘bad’ ones such as Portugal and 
Spain.  The United States itself pointed to the USSR as the ‘worst colonizer’ while the USSR returned 
the gesture.  
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not understand other peoples’ civilizations (Mr. Menon, India, Sess 15, 1960: 
1242).
As discussed in previous chapters, the colonialist narrative naturalized 
unequal relations between ‘more and less advanced’ entities with the hierarchical 
nature metaphors of the body and family.  In its challenge to this narrative, Asia-
Africa introduced three new elements into the discussion.  First, it invoked 
masculinity with the argument that hierarchical kinship relations were unjust because 
the recipients of this tutelage were not children but rather, fully growth men.  Hence, 
colonial rule did not derive from nature but rather, constituted a violation of nature.  
Using the same nature metaphors of the body and family as the colonialist narrative, 
moreover, this violation was depicted through the language of ‘unnatural’ family or 
bodily disease:
[At the eve of World War II, colonialism was so extensive that] contrary to 
the rules of creation, the child was manifoldly bigger than its parents, indeed 
all the parents put together (Mr. Shukairy, Saudi Arabia, Sess 15, 1960: 1013).  
The remnants of this [colonial] system in present-day society stand out like 
suspicious and unhealthy cancerous growths on a healthy human body (Mr. 
Djerdja, Yugoslavia, Sess 15, 1960: 1026). 
[The people still under colonial rule] form a cancer on the body politic of the 
world.  (Mr. Menon, India, Sess 15, 1960: 1244).
As a violation, this unnatural rule was a “moral prostitution” and a “rape” (Mr. 
Perera, Ceylon, Sess 15, 1960: 1001) that served to emasculate grown men:
[Colonialism] is a system that takes the manhood out of those exposed to it 
(Mr. Dosumu-Johnson, Liberia, Sess 15, 1960:1069).
[Colonialism has been] calculated to deprive the man living under colonialism 
of his identity and human dignity (Mr. Vakil, Iran, Sess 15, 1960: 990).
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Decolonization, from this perspective, would help to redress this emasculation.  One 
speaker described having freedom returned after being colonized, for instance, as 
once again being “master” in one’s “own house” (Mr. Thors, Iceland, Sess 15, 1960: 
1147).  Speaking of the decolonization process already underway, another argued that 
“nearly a thousand million men have recovered their outraged dignity and freedom” 
(Mr. Champassak, Laos, Sess 15, 1960:1108).  
On perhaps an even more fundamental level, the notion of differential position 
on a scale of linear progression, imparting greater and lesser quantities of 
advancement, as well as development, modernity and so forth, relied on a certain 
temporality, as discussed in Chapter 5.  Advanced, modern and developed peoples 
were the peoples of the present and future, while ‘backwards,’ ‘under-developed’ and 
‘traditional’ people belonged to the past (McClintock 1995).  This temporality is 
clearly demonstrated in the following statement by Australia on a territory it is 
‘responsible’ for, Eastern New Guinea:
Eastern New Guinea has long been isolated from the rest of the world.  Its 
people had no contacts with other peoples for hundreds of years…they have 
lived primitive lives…they were dominated by sorcery and witchcraft.  In 
many cases they practiced cannibalism.  These are not people who, until 
recent times, formed a nation with a highly sophisticated political or social 
structure.  I am not one of those who confuses civilization with Western ways 
of living, but [imagine] peoples living with primitive lives, with limited 
traditions, and with, up to the present, limited opportunities…this shows the 
immensity of the task.  It is a question of bringing men in a few years from the 
stone-age up to the modern complicated civilization…they have quite a way 
to go before they can take their place among us.  This view is not based on 
any feeling of racial superiority…Australia has had the task…of bringing 
these people into the twentieth century (Mr. Plimsoll, Australia, Sess 15, 
1960: 1091).
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Dependent territories like Eastern New Guinea, thus, were ‘behind’ and needed to be 
sufficiently advanced along the scale of linear progression to be able to have political 
independence and be ‘responsible for themselves.’  Moreover, this progression was to 
be guided by colonialist powers or administering authorities in a gradual, controlled 
manner.  A second key element in the anti-colonialist challenge, then, was a critique 
of this temporality.  Again and again, in this last year, anti-colonialists insisted that 
the time for decolonization could no longer be delayed with such gradualism—that 
the time for decolonization was now:
Here we are, the peoples of the United Nations, giving historic expression to 
this universal moment of truth.  It is a moment between a past of inequality 
and a glorious future…an irresistible and irreversible movement of peoples 
towards full emancipation (Mr. Vakil, Iran, Sess 15, 1960: 990).  
Speakers argued that this was a ‘historic moment,’ ‘ a great landmark in the history of 
the world,’ ‘the opening of a new and decisive era in universal evolution,’ ‘a new 
page in history of mankind,’ and ‘a new era in the history of human society.’
Finally, building on both masculinity and time, anti-colonialists argued that if 
the hierarchical international community of the colonial era relied on unnatural, 
paternal kinship relations between grown men, then the time had come for a transition 
to a more ‘natural and equitable international community’—made up of more equal, 
fraternal kinship relations between men—in effect, brotherhood.  In this regard, some 
speakers also mentioned the comparable image of sisterhood.  Nevertheless, there 
was an overwhelming focus on brotherhood as opposed to sisterhood, which should 
perhaps not be surprising considering the simultaneous attempt to recover ‘lost 
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masculinity.’  Indeed, both the elements of the recovery of lost masculinity and of 
brotherhood relied on each other:  
Men are born free, and no man should be allowed to enslave man.  This is not 
only right and just, but it is the dictate of human brotherhood under the 
fatherhood of God (Mr. Shukairy, Saudi Arabia, Sess 15, 1960: 1014).
Our age is one of co-operation among free and equal peoples and men.  More 
still, it is an age of human brotherhood, association and mutual assistance (Mr. 
Ammoun, Lebanon, Sess 15, 1960: 1162).
These statements on masculinity and brotherhood point to an important dimension of 
this renegotiation of the colonial problematic: in these conversations, both the 
colonial experience and the freedom and equality being fought for were masculinized.  
Even the mention of women did not negate this masculinization: 
Where the soldier stands in defense of the honor of his nation, from the exile 
where the patriot is deported from his fatherland, from the shabby place where 
the refugee is expelled from his home, from the prison where the hero 
languishes, and this cry for freedom comes from every man and every 
woman…fraternity…how pleasant life will be when nations live in real 
brotherhood (Mr. Rifa’I, Jordan, Sess 15, 1960: 1057).
In the GA, anti-colonialist and newly independent countries also used the notion of 
brotherhood to connote association with ongoing movements for independence.  With 
this language, then, speakers transformed the struggles of still dependent peoples into 
the masculine battles of ‘our brethren in Africa,’ ‘our Algerian brothers,’ and ‘our 
brothers in courage.’  
Hence, to the paternalism of the colonialist narrative, the anti-colonialist 
challenge consisted of masculinity, time, and brotherhood.  Interestingly, however, 
this challenge was somewhat ambiguous.  For while on the one hand, speakers 
critiqued the notion of political tutelage with the argument that ‘there was no country 
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in the world that had not always been capable of governing itself,’ on the other, they 
also argued that territories required ‘preparation’ and ‘political maturity’ before they 
could be granted political independence.  Likewise, while for some anti-colonialists 
every territory was ‘always already of age,’ for others, the once young territories had 
only now come ‘of age’ and so only now deserved freedom.  Describing his own 
country of India, one speaker transformed one of the oldest civilizations in existence 
into a ‘young country,’ and the representative from Ghana described his country as at 
once ‘ancient’ and ‘reborn.’  This ambiguous relationship of many anti-colonialists to 
the imagery of birth, youth, growth, tutelage and preparation, and adulthood, clearly 
emergent from the hierarchical kinship image, is especially evident in the following 
speech:
Every child, in his youth, inexperience and lack of initiative, lives under the 
wing of his parents.  When he grows up, he leaves his parents’ home, goes out 
into the world and makes a home for himself far from those who reared him, 
because he feels free in his person and personality.  Then should the
colonized, ever submissive, have his freedom rationed by his colonizer?…Not 
long ago we were being poisoned with the sugared venom of 
colonialism…but we have outgrown the stage of servitude, we are no longer 
credulous children who can be made to believe in Santa Claus forever.  Those 
days are over, and colonialism has been outstripped at every point (Mr. 
Lheyet-Gaboka, Congo (Brazzaville), Sess 15, 1960: 1178).
Here, the speaker moves between the image of a (male) child that grows up and 
obtains his freedom to the notion of a fleeting credulity or gullibility which is now 
decidedly gone.  
What are the implications of this ambiguity?  Did anti-colonialists fully 
challenge the paternalism of the colonialist narrative?  Or perhaps better stated, what 
really was the nature of their challenge?  Examining the debates on the draft 
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declaration on independence, it appears that while the anti-colonialist critique of 
paternalism was especially aimed at the notion of ‘political’ tutelage, this critique was 
not meant for other arenas deemed separate from the political arena. Hence, some 
newly independent countries insisted that though the time had come for an end to 
political tutelage, that they nevertheless continued to require economic or technical 
assistance:
Assistance and co-operation are indispensable for the progress of under-
developed countries, [as] the gap separating them from the technically 
advanced countries can only be bridged if loyal cooperation is established 
within the framework of national independence for all countries, for the task 
of transforming and industrializing the economic structures of backward 
countries (Mr. Ismaël, Guinea, Sess 15, 1960: 1083).
Moreover, this assistance had nothing to do with colonial domination, as the Soviets, 
for instance, insisted:
We badly need international technical assistance…as we listened to some 
representatives, however, we received the impression that these needs were 
sometimes overlooked, and that the provision of assistance to under-
developed countries like ours was sometimes regarded as a manifestation of 
neo-colonialism in that it crystallized the inequality between the country 
assisting and the country assisted.  I therefore wish to state, on my country’s 
behalf, that economic aid or technical assistance of any kind, rendered with no 
thought of domination, that is to say on an equitable basis and in respect for 
our freedom and independence, cannot be dubbed neo-colonialism (Mr. 
N’Goua, Gabon, Sess 15, 1960: 1181).
The challenging of hierarchical kinship relations whilst taking up of the language of 
linear progression—notions of development and under-development and 
backwardness, for example—was dangerous in that the two were intimately related.  
Ultimately, a failure to deconstruct the latter would only buoy the former—even after 
decolonization.  This problem is evident in the following statement from a colonialist 
sympathizer:
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The most important problem which the end of colonialism brings in its wake 
is the imbalance between the desire for independence of formerly subject 
peoples and their economic and technical possibilities for self-
development…this problem has already arisen and been solved in various 
ways.  In some cases the independent countries have retained close links with 
the former metropolitan country, which provides them with equipment, 
technicians and financial assistance.  It is precisely this type of co-operation 
which has been vilified as ‘neo-colonialism.’’  We should find it impossible to 
agree with this attitude because the cooperation and assistance of the former 
dominating Power to its newly emancipated colony do not seem to us to be 
intrinsically evil but appear rather to be in keeping with the natural order of 
things.  Who, after all, is more aware of the country’s problems, who has 
greater experience of its needs…[how else can] a country structurally in its 
infancy…alone, and without external aid, achieve the status of a mature nation 
(Mr. Amadeo, Argentina, Sess 15, 1960: 1007)?
In this statement, the colonialist speaker legitimates continuing relations of tutelage 
and guidance between newly independent countries and their former ‘dominating 
Power’ after decolonization as ‘the natural order of things’ in order to help a country 
in its ‘infancy’ to ‘achieve the status of a mature nation.’  From this perspective, 
despite legal decolonization, hierarchical kinship imagery is left intact.  Nevertheless, 
for their part, newly independent countries distinguished between the paternalism of 
the colonialist narrative and this sort of ‘economic and technical’ assistance between 
‘brothers’:  
Real brotherhood [means that] the strong supports the weak; the wealthy helps 
the needy; the developed assists the under-developed; and when all such aids 
are made without conditions or strings attached (Mr. Rifa’I, Jordan, Sess 15, 
1960:  1057).
Such assistance from their ‘already developed’ brothers suited them just fine.  Given 
their troubled history with the colonialist powers, what accounts for such an 
inconsistency in their critique?  Perhaps one explanation is that they sought such 
180
development assistance not necessarily from their former ‘dominating Power,’ but 
from their brothers in the United Nations:
The inadequate level of political, economic, social and educational 
advancement has in the past always been used by the administering powers as 
a reason for delaying the independence of the colonial countries…in fact, 
…they have delayed giving the peoples the necessary training for various 
aspects of their national life, while on the other hand they have argued that, 
since independence requires a certain minimum degree of training, it cannot 
be granted to them without this…Today, the difficulties which always spring 
from an inadequate level of development…do not frighten the colonial 
peoples unduly…if their economic, social and political backwardness 
necessarily imposes a state of relative dependence…there is no reason to think 
that such dependence should be imposed on them by the former 
Administering Power.  The international community and the United Nations, 
among others, can easily give them the necessary aid and 
assistance (Mr. Vakil, Iran, Sess 15, 1960: 994). 
In this last year, then, colonialist speakers reverted to the colonialist narrative 
to legitimate their practices.  Drawing on the growing identity of Asia- Africa (see 
Chapter 3), anti-colonialist speakers challenged this narrative by introducing three 
new elements into the discussion: masculinity, time, and brotherhood.  While calling 
for immediate political independence, this critique was partial and problematic in that 
it masculinized not only the colonial experience of domination but also the 
imagination of ‘postcolonial’ independence and freedom.  Moreover, the challenge 
was quite ambiguous in that while it focused on hierarchical kinship relations 
between colonialist powers and dependent territories, it continued to reinforce images 
of linear progression.  Hence, while anti-colonialists contested the notion that they 
were children, they nevertheless sought assistance for ‘development’ and ‘progress’ 
from the international community.  Perhaps the argument for masculinity, time, and 
brotherhood, then, was not really an attempt to dismantle hierarchical kinship, as 
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much as to reconfigure it so that excluded territories could be ‘included’ into the 
existing nation-state system.  What were the implications of these conversations?  
How would these particular negotiations manifest institutionally?  It is to these 
questions that I now turn.
Internationalizing Linear Progress and Kinship: The Institutionalization of 
Development in the UN System
The United Nations system consists of 6 main organs (see Table-1) and is also 
in relationship with a number of specialized agencies such as the International Trade 
Organization (ITO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the 
World Health Organization (WHO), to name a few.  In 1946, the colonialist narrative 
and its associated cluster of linearized abstractions (i.e., development-progress-
modernity-advancement-education), as well as its hierarchical kinship relations 
between territories, were institutionalized throughout this system on a number of 
levels.51  Most visible in this regard was the Trusteeship System, which oversaw the 
‘development’ of “peoples who are not yet ready to stand in the modern world” by 
specific administering authorities as discussed in Chapter 3.  Beyond such explicit 
development of dependent territories, moreover, this sort of ‘assistance’ was also 
available for formally independent territories.  The ITO, for example, was to provide 
such guidance to member states who sought it for the purposes of carrying out 
51 Rajagopal argues that even before the United Nations, with its notion of ‘sacred trust,’ the League of 
Nations provided the mediating role in the transition between colonialism and development.  In the 
process, the League helped to manage anti-colonial resistance (Rajagopal 2003).
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‘economic development’ while the FAO was also concerned with the ‘agricultural 
and industrial development’ of ‘less developed countries (United Nations 1946: 687-
822).’  Ultimately, through these organs, such assistance was institutionalized within 
discrete but overlapping fields of practice that the UN termed ‘economic,’ ‘political,’ 
‘cultural,’ ‘social,’ and ‘educational’ dimensions of development.  
How did anti-colonialists situate themselves in relation to these multiple 
instantiations of the colonialist narrative?  The response to this question may tell us 
something about how they envisioned freedom.  Through their initial participation in 
the Trusteeship System, they sought to take part in the oversight by the UN of the 
‘development’ practices of particular administering authorities; their part in this 
political tutelage ending only in 1960 with the demand for an immediate end to 
political dependency and equal access to the nation-state system.  But beyond this 
‘development’ of dependent territories, how did they understand the needs of newly 
independent territories?  An examination of anti-colonialists’ discourses and practices 
within the UN system regarding these territories—not just in 1960 but from 1946—
demonstrates that though they sought to bring political tutelage to an end, they 
pursued tutelage in every other arena.  Hence, they asked for ‘development 
assistance’ in the economic, technical, and educational fields.  Despite Asia-Africa’s 
aim of reclaiming oppressed ‘cultural personalities’ due to the colonial experience,
after decolonization (see Chapter 3) interestingly, they also sought such development 
assistance in the cultural and social fields.  In what follows, I first briefly describe 
anti-colonial participation in the Trusteeship System for the development of 
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dependent territories.  Next, I move on to their pursuit of development for newly 
independent states.  
Regarding the Trusteeship System, “peoples who are not yet ready to stand in 
the modern world” were to be developed in ‘economic,’ ‘social,’ ‘cultural,’ ‘political’ 
and ‘educational’ dimensions for Trusts, while with the exception of the ‘political’ 
field, the same was also true for NSGTs (United Nations 1951: 571).  Hence, 
administering authorities were to carry out a series of development projects within the 
aforementioned dimensions of development, with the Trusteeship Council overseeing 
these projects on a regular basis.  Specifically in regard to the ‘political development’ 
of Trusts, for example, the Council asked for increasing the numbers of indigenous 
people in local political institutions so that they could gain experience and ‘develop’ 
political skills.  On ‘educational development,’ the Council oversaw education 
facilities and expenditures, and on ‘economic development,’ training facilities for 
locals in areas such as ‘agricultural and industrial development’ were of interest.  The 
‘social’ arena was particularly interesting, as it was comprised of a broad array of 
activities including ‘demographic and sociological’ matters, medical and water 
facilities, women’s sexual autonomy, polygamy and women’s status, human rights, 
public welfare, and so on.  Finally, regarding the ‘cultural’ arena, there were some 
interesting contradictions in the UN institutionalization of progress and oversight.  
For example in the case of NSGTs, the Council asked administering authorities to 
engage in the ‘protection’ but also the ‘development’ of indigenous arts, literature and 
folklore.  Exacerbating this contradiction, progress on this matter was measured by 
the extent to which the administering authority contributed to the formation of various 
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cultural institutions such as the press, cinema, radio and museum within a territory 
(United Nations 1947: 722-723)—entities that were not always part of ‘indigenous 
arts, literature and folklore.’  Such complications notwithstanding, in each of these 
arenas the Trusteeship Council sought to guide the ‘development’ of indigenous 
populations within educational, political, cultural, economic, and social institutions 
that it associated with progress (see for example United Nations 1950; 1951; 1952).  
Given the construction of dependent territories as requiring assistance in the 
colonialist narrative, this institutionalization of the narrative within the Trusteeship 
System should not be surprising.  Beyond such guidance for dependent territories, 
however, such assistance was also available for formally independent member states 
if requested by these states.52  Initially, such assistance to member states did not 
necessarily fit the logic of the colonialist narrative, as it was primarily intended for 
the reconstruction of areas occupied during or devastated by the recent war.  Indeed, 
the GA adopted a resolution to encourage the speedy opening of the World Bank for 
just this purpose, which also then became one of the Bank’s main goals (United 
Nations 1946: 479-747).  Newly independent and anti-colonialist countries, however, 
sought to change the direction and tenor of this assistance for member states.  In 
contrast to the assumption that often seems to be made in critiques of the 
development project that development was somehow imposed upon the Third 
World,53 my examination of the UN records demonstrates that newly independent 
52 Organizations such as the FAO, WHO, and ILO, for example, all offered such assistance to member 
states in their various areas of expertise if requested by those states.
53 A more subtle and convincing version of this argument is that development emerged more out of a 
‘complex process of dealing with, suppressing, and co-opting Third World resistance that stretched out 
over decades (Rajagopal, 2003). Though in this study, I am more interested in focusing specifically on 
Asia-Africa’s negotiations with the ideology of development.  
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countries, often amidst some resistance from ‘more developed countries,’ more often 
than not pursued this goal themselves.  Indeed, though images of development may 
have originated in the space and time of an industrializing Europe, and some time 
before Truman flattened two thirds of the world into the undifferentiated condition of 
‘under-development,’ development became a universal goal (Escobar 1995).  Hence 
in 1946, Lebanon proposed a resolution for placement on the GA agenda that would 
provide member states “expert advice in connection with their own internal 
development” (United Nations 1946: 182), and after considering the resolution, with 
some amendments, the GA unanimously passed the following: 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
CONSIDERING that the Members of the United Nations are not yet all equally developed:
CONSIDERING that some Member Nations may need expert advice in the various fields of economic, 
social and cultural development;
RECOGNIZING the responsibility of the United Nations under the Charter for assisting in such 
development;
RECOGNIZING the importance of such development for the peace and prosperity of the
world;
RECOGNIZING the responsibility of the specialized agencies in their respective fields;
DECIDES to refer to the Economic and Social Council for study the question of providing
effective ways and means for furnishing, in cooperation with the specialized agencies, expert
advice in the economic, social and cultural fields to Member nations who desire this assistance.
Source: United Nations, 1946: 183.
Similar to the assistance provided to dependent territories in multiple arenas, 
this ‘expert advice’ to ‘not yet all equally developed’ member states was also to 
transpire in ‘economic,’ ‘social,’ ‘educational’ and ‘cultural’ fields—though, of 
course, not in the ‘political’ field since presumably, these territories were already 
sufficiently politically developed to be politically independent.  (Though it should not 
surprise anyone that some thought such development assistance would also advance 
progress in the theoretically already-achieved ‘political’ field).  In the ‘economic’ 
arena, while some countries like the United States argued outside of the European 
colonialist narrative that underdeveloped countries were primarily responsible for 
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their own economic welfare54, anti- colonialists such as China, Egypt, Haiti, India, 
Iraq, Mexico and the Philippines argued that the UN needed to do more to assist in 
the economic and technical development of “economically under-developed areas” 
and that the World Bank should shift its focus from reconstruction of war devastated 
areas to such development in under-developed areas.  In 1948, then, the GA adopted 
several resolutions to do just that (United Nations 1948: 432-438), and in the 
following year, the GA also unanimously voted for an expanded program of technical 
assistance, the “Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for Economic 
Development of Under-Developed Countries.”  The program was launched in 1950 
(United Nations 1949: 440; United Nations 1950: 3-12).
Beyond this technical assistance, newly independent and anti-colonialist 
countries also sought to increase financial assistance for economic development.  As 
the UN’s own documents note:     
The geographical distribution of the total disbursements made by the Bank up 
to 31 December 1950, in round numbers by areas of expenditures, was as 
follows: $471,000,000 in the United States; $56,500,000 in Latin America; 
$38,600,000 in Canada; $71,000,000 in Europe; $2,200,000 In Africa; 
$2,500,000 in the Near East; and $100,000 in the Far East (United Nations 
1950: 949).
 Hence, newly independent countries argued that this distribution of Bank loans 
needed to change (United Nations 1951: 377).  In 1953, to this end, the GA 
considered the recommendation for the Special United Nations Fund for Economic 
Development, or SUNFED, which would take voluntary contributions from ‘more 
developed countries’ and make these available specifically for the purpose of the 
54 According to Escobar (1995) for a number of years after WWII, the US’s primary concern was 
economic recovery in Europe, and it only turned its focus on the ‘Third World’ after 1949.
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economic development of ‘under-developed areas.’  These ‘more developed 
countries’ such as the United States and United Kingdom, however, argued that the 
monies for such assistance were unavailable (United Nations 1953: 292).  
These disagreements, in which anti-colonialists positioned themselves as 
lacking in development and requiring development assistance, occurred year after 
year, and by the end of the fifties, their efforts started to bear fruit.  For example, in 
1957, a compromise was reached on the matter of SUNFED, where SUNFED would 
especially provide technical assistance but also some financial assistance based on 
voluntary contributions (United Nations 1957: 142), and by January 1959, SUNFED 
launched 44 projects in ‘under-developed areas’ from Asia to Africa to Latin 
America.  Geographically now, in contrast to the distribution of World Bank loans in
1950, 80% of SUNFED’s assistance went to Africa, with the rest going to the 
Americas, Asia and the Far East, the Middle East, and then to Europe, in that order 
(United Nations 1959: 110).  Moreover in 1957, the World Bank itself expanded its 
lending in Asia (United Nations 1957: 422).  This success of anti- colonialists in 
bringing development assistance to their territories was underscored in 1960, when 
the GA decided to place special emphasis on the provision of development aid to 
newly independent countries during their “critical formative period” (United Nations 
1960: 269).  
Development is typically conceptualized as an economic project.  Beyond the 
‘economic’ arena, however, the UN system also offered such development assistance 
in ‘social,’ ‘cultural’ and ‘educational’ arenas.  For example, the purpose of the GA’s 
Third Committee, or Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee, was to focus on 
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“social, humanitarian, cultural, educational and health matters [for the sake of] social 
progress and development” (United Nations 1946: 54).  ECOSOC also focused on the 
issue of ‘social development’ for particular ‘socially under-developed populations’ 
such as the Aboriginal populations of the Americas (United Nations 1950: 610).  In 
the area of ‘cultural development,’ the central institution was UNESCO.  In 1946, 
UNESCO came into being with the explicit purpose of contributing to the cause of 
peace through the fostering of collaboration in culture, education and science (United 
Nations 1946: 704).  In this same year, at the behest of the GA, ECOSOC considered 
the matter of ‘cultural development’ and decided to assign to UNESCO the task of 
translating the world’s classics—which were to be drawn from multiple cultures—
into member country languages (United Nations 1946: 541).  For this, ECOSOC 
adopted the following resolution:
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
TAKING NOTE of the resolution No. 60 (1) of the General Assembly of 14 December 1946
whereby the question of the translation of the world's classics into the languages of the Members
of the United Nations was referred to the Economic and Social Council for reference to
the United Nations Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization, and of the principles
CONSIDERING
(a) That the translation of the classics is a project of international concern and of great
significance for the promotion of international cultural co-operation;
(b) That the successful implementation of this project is linked closely with all the activities of 
UNESCO which tend to raise the general level of culture among the people of the world;
(c) That certain nations do not have sufficient facilities and resources for the authentic translation of 
numerous classics into their languages;
(d) That such translation is greatly conducive to their cultural development;
and
DECIDE TO REQUEST UNESCO to submit by 1 June 1948, to the Economic and Social Council a 
report giving recommendations for needed action, and including particularly data on objective methods 
of selection of great books, the needs of various cultural regions, and suggestions for general assistance 
in translation, publication and distribution.
Source: United Nations, 1946: 541. 
Hence, UNESCO was assigned the task of raising ‘the general level of culture among 
the people of the world,’ of providing aid to nations with insufficient resources in this 
regard, and of generally promoting ‘cultural development,’ with the primary goal of 
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such a task being ‘international cultural cooperation.’  While conversations on such 
projects within the UN system were replete with commentary on the need to protect 
state sovereignty and respect cultural rights, similar to their stance on ‘economic 
development,’ newly independent and anti-colonialist countries did not exactly resist 
such efforts.  For example in 1949, the representative of Lebanon made the following 
statement to the GA:
While a series of general studies on the world economic situation had been 
initiated by the [Economic and Social] Council, no comparable action was 
contemplated in the social, humanitarian and cultural fields. However…in 
order to fulfill its double function, the Economic and Social Council would 
need a world survey of the social and cultural as well as of the economic 
situation (United Nations 1949: 619).  
Although initially floundering in the definition of its functions, by 1950, 
UNESCO’s purpose was fairly stabilized (United Nations 1950).  In 1950, it 
established the International Committee on Monuments, Artistic and Historical Sites, 
and Archeological Excavations (Sewell 1975: 180), and at the request of member 
states, it engaged in a series of activities in which development in the cultural arena 
was to be pursued through the attainment for example of skills in how to ‘restore,’ 
‘preserve,’ and ‘educate’ about ‘national culture.’  In this vein, UNESCO sent experts 
to advise member states on art education and restoration and on how to preserve and 
restore monuments and archaeological and historic sites and ‘national treasures.’  In 
1952, UNESCO held a seminar on how to use museums for the purpose of ‘education 
(United Nations 1952: 845),’ and from 1953, it advanced the notion of ‘cultural 
property’ with its International Study Centre for the Presentation and Restoration of 
Cultural Property (United Nations 1953: 746).  With its program ‘Direct Aid to 
Member States’ in 1955, it provided direct aid in the development of museums, 
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libraries and communications services (United Nations 1955: 393).’  In the mid-
fifties, at a meeting in New Delhi with ten Asian states and Egypt, then UNESCO 
Director-General Evans was told that their peoples were not being given adequate 
UNESCO assistance.  Specifically, representatives from these countries argued that 
"western advances in natural sciences and education would help them; in turn, the 
abiding values of Eastern culture or cultures might help others” (Sewell 1975: 167).  
In the same year, UNESCO began to engage in a significant way in a program for the 
‘mutual appreciation of Eastern and Western cultural values.’  UNESCO had already 
begun in this arena with activities such as determining ‘the characteristic features of 
each country’s culture and ideals’ and offering ‘help developing in each country 
sympathy and respect for other countries (Valderama 1995: 31).’  Now, this program 
included activities such as examining different teaching syllabi in the humanities for 
inclusion of the different civilizations of ‘East’ and ‘West,’ traveling exhibitions 
representing the art of different cultures, translating the representative literature of 
different cultures and so on.  Finally, beyond such efforts in the cultural arena, in the 
areas of ‘modern science and education,’ too, there was consistent demand for 
UNESCO training and expertise (United Nations 1952).  Pierre Auger, then 
UNESCO Secretariat, once said: 
Some people think you can attain peace by just crying 'Peace! Peace!'  but this 
leads to nothing...You must start obliquely—creating proper conditions, using 
civilizing influences.  A good starter is weaving scientists into the 
international pattern, since they already have a fund of ideas in common, 
speak the same language, and like being with each other (ibid: 174).
Thus, UNESCO also offered assistance in ‘modern science and education’ with 
numerous projects in the natural sciences and in childhood and adult education.
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The above is necessarily a brief and selective introduction to the emerging UN 
system in its first fifteen years.  For their part, while anti-colonialists sought to 
terminate political development, they nevertheless actively and persistently sought 
development in the economic, technical, social, cultural, educational and other arenas.  
Indeed, the UN machinery for development policies and programs was elaborated 
partly under pressure from anti-colonialist and newly independent countries (see also 
Rajagopal 2003: 27).  Yet, if development was an extension in a number of ways of 
the colonialist narrative into the ‘postcolonial’ era, why did anti-colonialists only 
challenge this narrative in the so-called political arena?  Why did they orient so 
differently to the economic and technical and even the cultural?
Nation-States in World Society
To understand the contradictory approach of anti-colonialists to 
decolonization and ‘postcolonial’ independence, as briefly touched on in Chapter 4, 
we have to examine the nation-state system they sought to be included in, not just as a 
geopolitical system or a politico-economic system but critically, as a cultural 
system—an arena of particular forms of subjectivity and practice.  From the 
perspective of the nation-state system as a cultural system, the nation-state is the one 
agent or agency that enjoys legitimacy on the world stage in the modern era (Meyer 
1997).  Moreover, it is decidedly an agency that dependent territories have 
historically been denied (Strang 1991; Theodoropoulos 1988).  The argument against 
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political tutelage, thus, is not merely an argument for decolonization, but a bid for 
access to a particular form of subjectivity hitherto unavailable.  
But with this argument for an end to political tutelage, why did anti-
colonialists actually pursue other kinds of tutelage?  Beyond mere inclusion into the 
system, this access to the mantle of the nation-state also brings with it particular kinds 
of performative requirements.  That is, in the modern era and particularly after World 
War II with the advent of the UN and other international bodies, the nation-state is 
accompanied by certain world cultural or world society models, constructs regarding 
their “true and responsible natures, purposes, technologies” (Meyer 1997), which 
impart normative symbols states must don and practices states must engage in, in 
order to maintain their status as legitimate states (Meyer 1997; Meyer 1999; 
Finnemore 1998; Meyer 1976; Thomas and Meyer 1984; Finnemore 1996; Boli and 
Thomas 1999; Korzeniewicz, Stach, Patil, and Moran 2004: 537-547).  Once 
‘included’ into the nation-state system, thus—and moreover, in a context in which 
independence has been denied on the basis of incompetence—newly independent 
states are compelled to demonstrate their legitimacy.  In this vein, especially after 
World War II, the legitimated goals of states became centered on what can broadly be 
called ‘modernization’ and consequently in the post-war period, world society 
scholars highlight the astonishing ‘diffusion of’ or ‘isomorphism in’ the 
modernization goals and practices of states across the globe (Boli and Thomas 1999; 
Finnemore 1996; Finnemore 1998; Meyer 1999; Korzeniewicz, et al 2004: 537-547).  
Of course, the colonialist narrative, particularly the hierarchical relations of power, 
knowledge and identity embedded within this narrative as well as anti-colonialists’ 
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partial adoption of this narrative (see Chapter 5), actually predict the ‘diffusion’ of 
particular models of modernization.  Beyond anti-colonialists’ goal of political 
independence for still dependent territories, hence, this adoption is evident for newly 
independent territories in their pursuit of one of the quintessential ‘modern’ state 
goals and practices in the post-war period: economic development (Meyer 1997).  
Thus, though they resist political tutelage, newly independent and anti-colonialist 
countries actively seek economic tutelage—as well as tutelage in any arena deemed 
connected to the economic (which over the years would decidedly breach the 
‘economic’/‘non-economic’ divide, however defined, as it moved from the technical 
and the scientific to the educational, the social, ‘women’s status,’ the cultural, the 
demographic, health and so on).  The possibilities and the fallacies of economic 
development and its associated scientific, technical and other arenas have, of course, 
been thoroughly expounded upon (Cooper and Packard 1997; for example, see 
Escobar 1995; McMichael 2000; Rist 2002), and so I will not remark on them further 
here.  
Finally, beyond the rejection of political tutelage and the embrace of 
economic tutelage, access to the nation-state system also has a third significant 
implication: the uptake of the legitimacy myth of the nation-state that a particular 
state somehow represents a particular ‘nation.’  Contrary to this myth, of course, 
states must actively engage in the power-laden process of the nationalization of 
particular local identities and their articulation with a given bounding of territorial 
space (Balibar 1991; Anderson 1991; Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983; Hobsbawn 1990).  
In this regard, within the UN system, the specialized agency of UNESCO ‘trained’ 
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newly independent states in such activities at their request.  Specifically through 
UNESCO, they learned the concept of ‘cultural property’ and how to ‘restore’ and 
‘preserve’ ‘national treasures, tradition, and history.’  They learned about how to use 
museums to ‘educate’ about the nation and its history.  They even learned how to 
educate the ‘west’ or the ‘Occident’ about their unique ‘eastern’ or ‘Oriental’ values 
and vice versa.  With this sort of assistance, then, beyond the pursuit of economic 
tutelage, anti-colonialist and newly independent countries also accepted, or rather 
pursued, cultural tutelage.
But how could newly independent countries simultaneously seek to ‘develop 
economically’ but ‘preserve authentic national cultures?’  Conforming with my 
findings on the construction of the collective identity of Asia-Africa that the cultures 
of Asia and Africa were distinguished from the ‘material west’ by their ‘unique 
spiritual and moral qualities’ (see Chapter 3), according to Partha Chatterjee (1993), a 
key feature of Asian and African ‘postcolonial’ nationalisms is that they also made a 
distinction between the ‘cultural’ and the ‘economic.’ He argues that this distinction 
was mapped onto a second distinction between an ‘inner’ spiritual dimension versus 
an ‘outer’ material dimension.  Hence, newly independent states could preserve their 
‘authentic inner selves’ while simultaneously pursuing ‘outward’ economic 
development. 
The pursuit of cultural preservation and nationalization via UNESCO were 
problematic for other reasons as well.  For example, according to Wells (1987: 43), 
there was a division of labor between the UN system proper and UNESCO in which 
while the work of the former was to delve into the ‘political,’ the work of the latter 
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was to remain ‘non-political’ and ‘technical.’  Of course, state- and nation-building 
through UNESCO is fundamentally political activity.  In the first instance, the borders 
of many of these new territories were the result of complicated histories of 
colonialism and decolonization (Anderson 1991).  With the sovereign state posited as 
the resolution to histories of colonial domination and suppression, however, this 
complexity was elided.  For example, the African freedom fighter and founder of the 
Party for the Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), Amílcar 
Cabral, made the argument that “if imperialist domination has the vital need to 
practice cultural oppression, national liberation is necessarily an act of culture” 
(italics in original, Cabral 1994).  Hence, the argument went, if colonialism 
suppressed distinct cultures, the political form of the nation-state would return not 
just political but also cultural freedom.  Never mind that this expression of ‘distinct 
cultural personalities,’ as one speaker in the GA put it, was to be enabled by 
remarkably similar museums, libraries, historical sites, and so forth.
Moreover, with the uptake of the myth that states represent ‘nations,’ and in 
interesting contradiction to the notion that national liberation meant reclaiming 
‘oppressed’ pre-colonial cultures, newly independent countries could use the 
resources of UNESCO to construct and indeed invent traditions, histories, and various 
objects of ‘cultural property’ (Bennett 1995; Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983; Korang 
2004; Lowenthal 1998; Hevia 2001).  According to Korang (2004: 272-73), speaking 
of ‘postcolonial’ states in Africa, thus, “appearing from above, it is the force of the 
State, it would seem, that ‘legitimates’ the nation, and not the force of the nation, 
from a popular below, that confers on the state its true legitimacy.”
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Despite these complications, nevertheless, newly independent countries 
engaged in ‘restoring’ and ‘preserving’ their national cultures.  In the process, they 
helped to universalize and naturalize the nation-state as a particular organization of 
territorial space and identity across the globe.  According to Lentin (2005), this push 
for ‘culture’ was made on the part of a strong anti-racist current in UNESCO.  
However, this discourse of discrete cultures merely replaced the discourse of discrete 
races to explain human variation.  Emanating from UNESCO, ‘discrete culture,’ too, 
was internationalized across the globe.  
Conclusion
Ultimately, I argue that legal decolonization signified not merely a shift from 
the colonial to a new more generally democratic era—but to something much more 
particular.  For legal decolonization was less about dismantling the power-laden 
constructions of power, identity and knowledge of the colonialist narrative and more 
about inclusion—about having ‘access’ to the prevailing system of power.  In other 
words, this decolonization was less about doing away with the racialized, sexualized 
construction of transnational hierarchy and more about reconfiguring this hierarchy so 
that ‘postcolonial men’ could be included.  Thus, while the anti-colonialist argument 
of masculinity, time and brotherhood certainly challenged some of the exclusions of 
the colonialist narrative, it also universalized and naturalized the construction of 
space, identity, power, knowledge and agency inherent in the nation-state system.  At 
the very minimum, then, while it intervened to a limited extent in the racial and 
cultural hierarchies of the colonial era, it also invented and solidified a new gender 
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hierarchy—masculinizing ‘postcolonial’ nations-states as well as ‘postcolonial’ 
international community in the new democratic era.  
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: Twentieth Century Transformations of Space, 
Identity and International Community
Every modern nation is a product of colonization: it has always been to some 
degree colonized or colonizing, and sometimes both at the same time.
-Etienne Balibar, 1996
Decolonizing nationalism did not envision a mere return to traditional 
patriarchy…the new patriarchy…was not a traditional patriarchy, but a 
nationalist patriarchy.
-Prasenjit Duara, 2004
In the Introduction to this study, I began with a discussion of the largely 
United States-based literature on intersections of racial, gender and other inequalities, 
and I posed a question regarding the utility of globalizing this perspective—of 
attempting to observe such intersectional dynamics of hierarchy on a transnational 
level.  The findings of this research, I argue, move beyond mere utility and 
demonstrate the great significance of this perspective, which enables an 
understanding of the contradictory, gendered process of the ‘global advance of 
democracy’ known as legal decolonization.  Even more, it illuminates the 
significance of work on gender, sexuality, bodies, and the family—often ghettoized as 
somehow particular or local, separate and distinct from more ‘macro’ and 
generalizable work on states, democracy, development, modernization, and 
globalization.  Thus, as explored in Chapter 1, there are important historical 
connections between notions of authority within the family and ways of imagining, 
thinking about and speaking about authority within imperial rule.  In the first period 
of empire, notions of absolute authority within the patriarchal family are connected to 
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‘harsher’ ideologies of imperial rule.  From the 17th century and on, a series of 
transformations in the nature of authority and relationships within the ‘western’ 
family are connected to new ways of imagining, thinking about and speaking about 
authority within ‘softer’ ideologies of rule.  It seems quite fitting, then, that the anti-
colonial argument for ending imperial rule engages this familial metaphor as well: 
“We have grown and are now adults (or alternatively, we have always been adults).  
We should no longer be treated as children, then, but as brothers.”55
In the rest of these remarks, there are three dimensions of this renegotiation 
that I would like to comment on further: its temporality, its gendering, and what it 
tells us about resistance.      
The Times and Spaces of the Colonial: The Limits and Possibilities of the 
Argument for Inclusion 
To the hierarchical politics of kinship and its construction of the identity 
distinctions of adult versus child in the GA, anti-colonialists respond either that they 
have now grown into, or that they always have been, adults.  Rather than being 
treated as children, then, they seek to be treated as brothers.  In this (masculine) 
politics of growth and adulthood, the anti-colonialist argument, hence, incorporates a 
certain temporality: “We are adults.  The time for decolonization is now.”  Thus, the 
renegotiation of the hierarchical, colonialist construction of space comes to revolve 
in the examination here around a renegotiation of time.  Why is this the case?  Why 
does time emerge as such an important dimension of these debates on decolonization 
in the GA?  In one sense, that the politics of time emerges in this way in this setting 
55 The initial republican challenge to the king’s authority (in France) was also made in this language of 
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perhaps should not be so surprising, for as discussed in Chapter 1, the colonialist 
denial of space relies on a certain temporality: 
Imperial progress across the space of empire is figured as a journey 
backwards in time to an anachronistic moment of prehistory.  By extension, 
the return journey to Europe is seen as rehearsing the evolutionary logic of 
historical progress, forward and upward to the apogee of the Enlightenment in 
the European metropolis.  Geographical difference across space
[consequently] is figured as a historical difference across time (italics in 
original, McClintock 1995: 40). 
From this perspective, the colonialist narrative imbues (as it constitutes) particular 
spaces with cultural and political meanings.  Europe, America and Africa, as well as 
East and West, and North and South are not just spatial and geographical, but also 
economic, political, moral and philosophical metaphors (King 1997; Lewis and 
Wigen 1997; Delanty 1995),56 all of which emerge in part through a powerful identity 
discourse57 that constructs its others as perennially or transiently ‘behind’ (i.e., 
traditional, pre-modern, under-developed, without history) (Wolf 1982; Fabian 1983; 
Wallerstein 1996; Pratt 2002).  
It is precisely such a temporal identity discourse that is embodied in the image 
of linear progression that is so central in the GA debates, as discussed in Chapter 5.  
Thus, the sorts of identity distinctions made by this image—distinctions having to do 
with possessing lesser or greater amounts of linearized, quantified abstractions such 
as ‘progress,’ ‘modernity,’ ‘development’ and so forth—are all temporal distinctions; 
brotherhood (Hunt 1992).
56 I see all of these as moving metaphors, the signification of which shift according to the social, 
cultural, and political conditions of their emergence (Lewis and Wigen 1997).  
57 Various authors point out the role of such a temporal identity discourse historically in the colonial 
construction of sexual, racial and cultural hierarchy (Winant 2001: 29-30; McClintock 1995; Gilroy 
1993).
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and given the way these abstractions are deployed in the transnational politics of 
inequality, power, and privilege in the GA, moreover, ‘progress,’ ‘modernity,’ and 
‘development’ in this case act as time concepts.  Thus, it is to this temporally based 
denial of the spatial and identity claims of various ‘others,’ that the anti-colonialist 
argument for growth and adulthood responds: “We are adults.  The time for 
decolonization is now.”
But is this argument sufficient?  Does it adequately contend with the space-
time of the colonialist narrative?  Can the children simply grow up and join the adults 
in brotherhood and equality?  Can the non-modern simply develop to the level of 
modernity and join the rest of the modern world?  As time concepts, ‘progress,’ 
‘modernity,’ and ‘development’ “foreground the temporal dimension of existence, 
moving the spatial to the background” (Wallerstein 1996).  In other words, as time 
concepts, they narrativize time from a particular location, the space of a colonizing 
Europe, in the meantime making other spaces with simultaneous but different 
experiences of ‘progress,’ ‘modernity,’ and ‘development’ invisible.  The work of 
sociologist Anthony Giddens offers a particularly illustrative example of such a 
Eurocentric theorization.  In The Consequences of Modernity, Anthony Giddens 
defines modernity as “modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe 
from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or 
less worldwide in their influence” (Giddens 1990: 1).  For him, the modern is 
distinguished from the pre-modern by a particular temporality and spatiality.  That is, 
modernity can be understood as the gradual emergence of a “separation of time from 
space…uniformity in the social organization of time…the ‘emptying of time’ [which 
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is then] the precondition for the ‘emptying of space’…the separation of place from 
space.”  He adds that the ‘discovery’ of ‘remote’ regions of the world by Western 
travelers and explorers was the necessary basis for this emptying of time and space.  
“The progressive charting of the globe that led to the creation of universal maps, in 
which perspective played little part in the representation of geographical position and 
form, established space as ‘independent’ of any particular place or region” (Giddens 
1990: 17-19).  
This work exemplifies a central problem is such Eurocentric but unmarked, 
universalized treatments of concepts such as modernity.  For such an ‘emptying out’ 
of time and space in which ‘perspective played little part’—from the problematic 
location of seventeenth century Europe no less—silences the history of the space-time 
of the colonialist narrative, including its definitions of self (Europe, civilization, and 
so forth) and other (Non-Europe, barbarism, savagery, etc).  Perhaps it is only from 
the perspective of the unmarked ‘center’ that such an ‘emptying out’ is even possible.  
The particularity of this theorization of modernity is especially evident when 
we contrast it to theorizations situated in other locations.  For example, in his essay 
“’Race,’ Time and the Revision of Modernity,” Homi Bhabha interrogates the 
Eurocentric understanding of modernity from the perspective of space and speaks of 
something called ‘contra-modernity.’  Specifically, he asks: what is modernity in 
those colonial conditions where its imposition is itself the denial of historical 
freedom, civic autonomy (1994b)—of conditions the ‘center’ always associates with 
modernity?  In a somewhat similar fashion, in The Black Atlantic, Paul Gilroy (1993) 
seeks to demonstrate the “variations and discontinuities in modern experience 
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and…the decentered and inescapably plural nature of modern subjectivity and 
identity” (Gilroy 1993: 46).  Here akin to Bhabha’s ‘contra-modernity,’ Gilroy writes 
of the ‘Black Atlantic’ as a ‘counterculture of modernity.’  From still another vantage 
point, Tani Barlow uses the term ‘colonial modernity’ as a way to think through the 
fundamentally transnational space-time of modernity:
Because it is a way of posing a historical question about how our mutual 
present came to take its apparent shape, colonial modernity can also suggest 
that historical context is not a matter of positively defined, elemental or 
discrete units—nation-states, stages of development, or civilizations, for 
instance—but rather a complex field of relationships or threads of material 
that connect multiply in space-time and can be surveyed from specific sites 
(italics added, Barlow 1997: 6).  
In this vein, scholars have also examined how modernities take shape in multiple, 
complex ways ‘outside’ of the metropolitan core.  Barlow (1997), for example, argues 
that there have been multiple modernities in East Asia that have been missed because 
the Eurocentric modernity narrative was not prepared to recognize them outside of the 
‘West.’  Similarly, other scholars have discussed a ‘selective’ modernity within 
Indian nationalism (Chatterjee 1993: 121), ‘peripheral modernities’ in Latin America 
(Pratt 2002) and particular  ‘negotiations of modernity’ in Africa (Korang 2004).  
Hence, in opposition to the exclusivist notion of modernity provided by Europe, Mary 
Louise Pratt argues for a concept of modernity that is global and relational, focusing 
on relations of contradiction, complementarity and differentiation in the ‘periphery’ 
with respect to the ‘center’ (Pratt 2002).  
Thus, the temporal identity discourse embedded within the colonialist 
narrative constructs differential and hierarchical distinctions between peoples and 
territories from a particular, unmarked, but universalized space.  Such a Eurocentric 
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temporal discourse serves to deny the alternative spatial and identity claims of various 
‘others,’ constructing them as lacking in progress, development, modernity and so on.  
As, Roland Robertson argues, then, it is only with the fading of the temporal 
unidirectionality of the ‘modernity narrative,’ as he puts it, that the representational 
space within which other narratives may be added can be expanded (Robertson 1997).  
Thus, with “We are adults.  The time for decolonization is now, “ anti-colonialists do 
address this temporal dimension—to an extent.  
But does this politics of adulthood and brotherhood sufficiently disrupt the 
space-time of the colonialist narrative so that other spatialities and temporalities—
other experiences of progress, modernity and development—may be recognized?  My 
argument is that while this politics disrupts the conservative gradualism of colonialist 
kinship politics in the mid-twentieth century, nevertheless, it does not go far enough.  
In the first instance, the argument for adulthood and brotherhood only asks that 
kinship politics be reconfigured so that grown men may be ‘included.’  It does 
nothing to challenge this politics or the space-time of the colonialist narrative more 
fundamentally.  These speakers do not want to challenge the family or even leave the 
family, but only be equal members in brotherhood within the family.  In contrast to 
actually dismantling the space-time of colonial modernity by bringing other 
spatialities and temporalities into the conversation, thus, they ask for the 
“homogeneous empty time” (Anderson 1991: 24) and “space” (Alonso 1994) of the 
nation.  In doing so, they leave the discourse and hierarchies of kinship intact, making 
them available to be used again, on still dependent territories, on newly independent 
countries, and on others.  
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Thus today, the older European colonial powers have declined and the United 
States has taken its place, and it is a truism to say that faith in political decolonization 
and economic development have faded.  And yet, half a century after these 
conversations on progress and kinship, the politics of kinship, broadly conceived as 
the politics of competency and incompetency, responsibility and irresponsibility, 
continue to shape relations between different states.  Thus today, the United States 
positions itself as the competent and the responsible, which is perhaps not 
unconnected to its initial hesitation to accepting aid from other countries with the 
recent disaster of Hurricane Katrina.58  Additionally, the globe continues to be 
divided into ‘more and less dangerous,’ ‘older’ versus ‘younger,’ ‘mature’ versus 
‘immature,’ and ‘stable’ versus ‘unstable’ states.  And still, if we compare pictures of 
the ‘international community’ from 1900 to 2005, we would see that this pictorial 
depiction of global power has only slightly shifted: with the entrance of Japan, it is no 
longer completely white.  Yet, even though the brotherhood has been enlarged, it is 
still completely male.    
The Contradictions of Inclusion: The Productive Power of the Nation and 
Gender
A number of scholars have written about the problematic nature of the post-
war moment of ‘inclusion.’  In the era of American globalization, for example, there 
is a particular form of power that is not about completeness and does not work for 
completeness but rather: A form of capital which recognizes that it can only…rule 
through other local capitals, rule alongside and in partnership with other economic 
58 It is also interesting that the U.S. was more inclined, initially, to accept international aid from the 
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and political elites.  [Thus] it does not attempt to obliterate them; [rather] it operates 
through them (Hall 1997a: 28).  Hall is interested here in the power relations inherent 
in post-war ‘global mass culture.’  Beyond mass culture, Howard Winant 
problematizes inclusion in a similar fashion, but from the perspective of race:  
the racial reforms achieved in the second half of the twentieth century…were 
contradictory: they expanded democracy and lessened racial hierarchy, but 
they also allowed white supremacy to survive, to modernize, to adapt to post-
colonial and post-apartheid conditions (146).  Hence…the world racial system 
underwent a transition from domination to hegemony...segregation and 
colonialism were abandoned…but …the new world racial system could 
maintain much of the stratification and inequality, much of the differential 
access to political power and voice, much of the preexisting cultural logic of 
collective representation and racial hierarchy (italics added,  Winant 2001: 
307).
Continuing in this vein, some authors argue that particularly from the vantage point of 
the United States, the nation-state form was never intended to extend freedom but 
rather, to contain it:
The US in the first instance was at least as interested in reducing the economic 
and political powers of the European empires as it was in advancing the cause 
of the downtrodden, colonized nations…[Moreover,] the US leadership 
planned for the replacement of all bilateral economic negotiation with a large 
and complex apparatus of new global institutions—a World Bank, an 
International Monetary Fund, Global Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, and an 
International Trade Organization (later WTO)—institutions that in reality, 
even while they invented themselves restricted dramatically the possibilities 
of self-determination that the nation-state was said to embody (Kelly and 
Kaplan 2004: 138-39).
Thus, the ‘UN world’ became an ‘engine for limiting political will’: 
This is the predicament of post-coloniality—not so much, as so many theorists 
of the postcolonial have sought to define it, the incompleteness of 
decolonization or the continuing importance of inherited colonial 
relationships, but this, the fact that decolonization as actually experienced was 
UK, Canada and the European Union than from other states that also offered aid.
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entry into a new world order already tooled for purposes at best differing from 
aims of anticolonial movements, and at times clearly obstructive of them (ibid 
2004: 141).  
Hence, Kelly and Kaplan argue that the very meaning of the state shifted from the 
colonial to the ‘post-colonial’ era.  While in the former, what was called the ‘national 
state’ was about competition, conflict and conquest, a “vehicle for expressing and 
extending” national will, what became the ‘nation-state’ in the latter was a form of 
containment (ibid 2004: 137).59
Consequently, rather than framing legal decolonization in the UNGA through 
the terminology of the global advance of democracy, or as a transition from 
oppression to liberation, perhaps it is more accurate to deploy Foucault’s notion of 
power as a positive or productive force (Foucault 1977; Foucault 1988b).  Because 
now, formerly dependent territories take up the notion of freedom as the practice of 
state- and nation-building without really disturbing the ideology of ‘catch up’ 
embedded in the image of linear progression.  This is the case most clearly with the 
pursuit of economic, technological and other forms of development, which some 
argue have simply replaced earlier colonial discourses (Rajagopal 2003: 27-34), and 
still continue to be about colonial hierarchies such as race (Winant 2001: 16).  
Thus, there is a real contradiction between the anti-colonial bid for freedom 
via inclusion into the nation-state form and the performative demands of this form of 
agency in the post-war world.  The notion that oppressed selves must be reclaimed or 
protected sits uneasily with the notion that postcolonial nations must somehow 
develop or change.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, Partha Chatterjee suggests 
59 These authors argue that the term ‘nation-state’ did not really come into use until after World War II 
(see Kelly and Kaplan 2004).
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that these states manage this contradictory position by recourse to a dichotomy of 
external versus internal, which translates into the idea that any change that 
postcolonial nations must undergo will only be an external or superficial form of 
change, while inner, more authentic traditions/cultures will be protected (Chatterjee 
1993).  But of course, postcolonial practice in this arena is fundamentally about 
creating new symbolic and material entities—of feeling, of practice, of being (Alonso 
1994).
Moreover, by pursuing freedom as state- and nation-building, postcolonial 
states further reinforce the problematic modern co-articulation and reification of the 
territorial machinery and space of the state with the ideological spaces of nation-race-
ethnicity-culture.60  Etienne Balibar suggests, for example, that the nation invents and 
relies on a ‘fictive ethnicity:’  
[For every nation] the fundamental problem is…to produce the people.  More 
exactly, it is to make the people produce itself continually as national 
community…[In this sense,] fictive ethnicity is...indispensable to...the ideal 
nation...for it makes possible for the expression of a preexisting unity to be 
seen in the state and continually to measure the state against its 'historic 
mission' in the service of the nation and as a consequence, to idealize politics.  
By constituting the people as a fictively ethnic unity against the background of 
a universalistic representation which attributes to each individual one—and 
only one—ethnic identity and which thus divides up whole of humanity 
between different ethnic groups corresponding to potentially so many nations, 
national ideology …inscribes…a sense of belonging …and the naturalization 
of belonging (Balibar 1996).  
Moreover, Balibar argues that a central way in which this fictive ethnicity is built is 
through “a principle of closure, of exclusion”—the modern idea of race (Balibar 
1996).  Indeed, according to a number of authors, race and nation have been 
209
thoroughly interlinked in modernity (Nicholson 1999), and modern states actually 
rely on the notion of race (Goldberg 2002; Lentin 2004; Marx 1998).  Thus, racism is 
a part of “the historical traditions of civic and liberal humanism that create 
ideological matrices of national aspiration, together with their concepts of ‘a people’ 
and its imagined community” (Bhabha 1994b), perhaps helping to explain, then, the 
“discursive slippage or connotative resonance between ‘race,’ ethnicity, and nation” 
(Gilroy 1993: 15).  In the post-war period, perhaps there has been a slight shift in 
these discourses of the nation-state as the term ‘culture’ has increasingly come to 
replace the term ‘race.’  Nevertheless, either intentionally in the language of 
colonialist reactionaries (Cooper 1996: 17) or unintentionally in the language of 
progressives and anti-racists (Lentin 2005), ‘culture’ continues to do the same work 
as ‘race’—ultimately serving to “justify exclusionary politics and policy…far better 
than traditional white supremacist arguments can” (Winant 2001: 35). 
Beyond such naturalization of difference, this notion of freedom as state- and 
nation-building is further problematic from the perspective of gender and sexuality as 
the concept of community that is articulated to the state—or is even sub-state or trans-
state—whether ‘national,’ ‘cultural,’ ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic61,’ has historically relied and 
continues to rely on gender and (hetero)sexuality (Ganguly-Scrase and Julian 1997; 
Alonso 1992; Alonso 1994; Gilmore 1996; Enloe 1989; Yuval-Davis 1997; Yuval-
Davis 1994; Papanek 1994; Moghadam 1994; McClintock 1995; Kaplan, Alarcon, 
and Moallem 1999; Kandiyoti 1994; Hall 2000; Mosse 1985; Caufiled 2000; Pierson 
60 Of course, in contrast to the totalizing aims of the state, Homi Bhabha reminds us of the inevitably 
hybrid nature of such ideological spaces (Bhabha 1994). 
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and Chaudhuri 1998; Coontz 1987).  Hence, if freedom is defined as the reclaiming of 
lost/oppressed ‘national,’ ‘ethnic,’ ‘racial’ or ‘cultural’ tradition—particularly 
tradition that is ‘superior’ to the ‘materialistic West’ (See Chapter 3; See also 
Chatterjee 1993: 121; Duara 2004: 12)—the production of this tradition relies on the 
co-production of so-called traditional ideas about gender and (hetero)sexuality as 
well.  Thus, the external versus internal dichotomy identified above is a spatialized 
and gendered dichotomy.  In the case of Indian nationalist discourse, for example, this 
dichotomy is applied to the spaces of the home and the world: 
The world is the external, the domain of the material; the home represents 
one’s inner spiritual self; one’s true identity.  The world is the treacherous 
terrain of the pursuit of material interests… practical … male…the home in its 
essence must remain unaffected by the profane activities of the material 
world—and woman is its representation…[Moreover, as a specifically anti-
colonialist discourse, this perspective posits that] the world was where the 
European power had challenged the non-European peoples…[but in the 
spiritual realm where East was superior] the East was undominated, sovereign, 
master of its own fate…[so] the subjugated must learn the modern sciences 
and arts of the material world from the West…[but simultaneously] protect, 
preserve, and strengthen the inner core of the national culture, its spiritual 
essence (Chatterjee 1993: 121).
Thus, we must qualify Hobsbawn and Ranger’s notion of the national invention of 
tradition (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983), then, as the national invention of gendered 
tradition.  In this vein, writing on the nationalist politics of population, Teitlebaum 
and Winter discuss the development of ‘Mother’s Day’ in the United States as one 
such example (1985). 
Moreover as the nation is a time concept, an important element of such 
gendering of the nation also has to do with the gendering of nationalist time.  That is, 
the nation as a time concept consists of a duality in that while on the one hand, the 
61 One could also add ‘religious’ to this list.  See for example, the works of Delaney (Delaney 1995; 
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nation is supposed to represent a primordial essence that reaches ‘back’ into time, on 
the other, it is also supposed to represent an entity moving ‘forward’ into the future.  
Anne McClintock argues that nations manage this temporal duality, thus, with 
gender—with differing temporalities for the masculine and the feminine.  
Specifically, gendered dichotomies manage the dual temporality of the nation by 
associating masculinity with progress and moving forward and femininity with 
maintaining the traditional and the essential (1995: 358-60).  ‘Postcolonial’ nations, 
especially those without large settler societies, have the additional task of bringing 
together local—however invented— traditions with sometimes quite foreign images 
of modernity.  In these nationalisms, the politics of gender are not simply about 
maintaining tradition but also about guarding the authenticity of ‘non-western’ 
nation-ethnicity-race-culture from ‘the west,’ ‘the colonial,’ and ‘the modern.’  Here, 
too, tensions and contradictions seem to be managed with gender.  For example, if it 
is acceptable to pursue modernity in the ‘economic’ arena, tradition may nevertheless 
be policed in the more ‘authentic’ arenas of gender and (hetero)sexuality and 
especially around the bodies of women (Lindsay and Miescher 2003; Moghadam 
1994; Papanek 1994).  Interestingly, such dynamics are also evident in ‘postcolonial’ 
immigrant communities in various countries: surrounded by ‘others’ and so 
threatened, it is up to the women of the immigrant community to maintain/uphold the 
community’s ‘traditions’(Ganguly-Scrase and Julian 1997; Appadurai 1994).  Thus, 
Prasenjit Duara argues that ‘postcolonial’ patriarchy is not a traditional patriarchy but 
an emergent, ‘nationalist patriarchy.’ For now with decolonization, women are “to be 
Delaney 2001), though I am not going to discuss religious community here.  
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mothers of the nation, protecting and cherishing its inner values” (Duara 2004: 10; 
See also Chatterjee 1993).
Of course, the politics of nation, culture, race and ethnicity, tradition and 
modernity, progress and stagnation, development and under-development, implicate 
gender in myriad and complex ways that exceed the purposes of this study.  The 
symbol ‘woman,’ as well as particular women’s bodies, are vehicles for not only 
guarding national tradition but also for projects of modernization and can further be 
deployed creatively by women themselves (Greenhalgh 1994; Lopez 1998; Cano 
1998; de Groot 1998).  Moreover in the GA, little can be said about specific national 
constructions of community, though this is perhaps a less important question because 
much work has already been done in this area.  What can be seen from the rare angle 
of vision provided by the GA debates, however, is a (particular local instantiation) of 
a global conversation.  That is, to the hierarchies of the colonial narrative, the anti-
colonial argument for freedom and for the nation is an argument for adulthood and 
masculinity.  The agency of the nation is envisioned in these conversations, thus, as a 
masculine agency.  And the new metaphor for international community then, little 
surprise, is brotherhood.  
Theorizing Resistance: What Did We Learn? 
This is a study on conversations occurring, broadly, between transnational 
‘colonialist’ and ‘anti-colonialist’ collectivities.  The study’s purpose is to understand 
a particular set of exchanges between different racialized, sexualized subjectivities in 
historical and transnational perspective.   Patterns of appeal and narrative, in the 
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manner in which they are amassed and compared here, offer a window onto such 
conversations.  However, these findings are silent on a number of accounts.  First, 
they say nothing about what might be occurring at other levels of analysis.  For 
example, at the state level, we do not know what particular states might want, 
whether a state would follow the general pattern identified for its group in another 
context, what additional issues distinguish the situation of a given state, and so forth.  
Second, though these conversations are ‘global,’ they are happening in a particular 
‘local’ situation—in the United Nations General Assembly immediately after World 
War II.  In that sense, like any particular ‘global,’ they are a local instantiation of the 
‘global’(Robertson 1997)—hence they are local-global conversations.  Other spaces 
and times of investigation regarding some of these same issues might reveal different 
elements within these exchanges.  Third, these negotiations are occurring among 
elites—among groups in power within particular states via their elite diplomatic 
proxies.  Overwhelmingly, the bulk of these individuals are educated, and they are 
male.  This is true of the elite groups of both powerful and colonialist states on the 
one hand as well as of newly independent and anti-colonialist states on the other.  As 
such, the conversations examined do not necessarily represent the perspectives of 
various ‘others’—women, the unlettered, and contingencies not in power within 
particular states.  The partiality of these negotiations, however, should not detract 
from their significance.  For this partiality is in stark contrast to the alleged 
universalism of the UN negotiations, underscoring the central point of this study that 
the negotiation of international community is a problematic, power-laden undertaking 
that represents itself as a moment in the global advance of democracy.
214
Beyond this partiality, it must be noted that the way resistance and social 
change are institutionalized within the complex, bureaucratic apparatus of the United 
Nations, only certain social locations are able to participate in the language games 
this apparatus presupposes.  Thus, nationalist and anti-colonialist movements must 
learn the language games of time, space, subjectivity, agency, and representation 
embedded within the state-system and the global economy, at the very minimum, to 
negotiate their entry.  The system’s spatial and temporal others, who speak from 
within different language-games, are at a distinct disadvantage.  This consideration 
inevitably brings us to one question: what would the renegotiation of the hierarchies 
of the colonial look like from these othered social locations?  From the perspective of 
the indigenous, women, the ‘subaltern?’  And, where would we go to get a glimpse?  
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Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq (Great Britain)
B The Cameroons, Togo,  (France)
North West Cameroons, Togo (West), Tanganyika  (Great Britain)
Ruanda-Urundi (Belgium)
C South West Africa (Union of South Africa)
Caroline Islands, Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands (Japan)
Nauru, British Empire, Eastern New Guinea (Australia)
Western Samoa (New Zealand)
Source: Grimal, 1978: 14.
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Chapter 3
Chart-1: Prevalence of Appeals in Debates on NSGTs and Trusts, by Political 
















































































1. This is based on a total of 54 meetings examined, with 20 of those being on NSGTs and 34 being on 
Trusts.
2. Percentages are calculated for the total number of appeals across all fifteen years of debate in order 
to control for the different length of time spent on Trusts versus NSGTs versus the Declaration.
Figure 1: The UN Bounding of the Colonial Problem  
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Table-1: Growth in UN Membership, 1945 to Present
Year Number Member States
1945 Original
51
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Belarus, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Yugoslavia1
1946 55 Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden, Thailand




1955 76 Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Jordan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nepal, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka
1956 80 Japan, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia
1957 82 Ghana, Malaysia
1958 822 Guinea
1960 99 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Madagascar, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo
1961 104 Mauritania, Mongolia, Sierra Leone, United Republic of Tanzania
1962 110 Algeria, Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda
1963 112 Kenya, Kuwait
1964 115 Malawi, Malta, Zambia
1965 117 Gambia, Maldives, Singapore
1966 122 Barbados, Botswana, Guyana, Lesotho
1967 123 Democratic Yemen
1968 126 Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Swaziland
1970 127 Fiji
1971 132 Bahrain, Bhutan, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates
1973 135 Bahamas, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic
1974 138 Bangladesh, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau
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1975 144 Cape Verde, Comoros, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Suriname
1976 147 Angola, Samoa, Seychelles
1977 149 Djibouti, Viet Nam
1978 151 Dominica, Solomon Islands
1979 152 Saint Lucia
1980 154 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Zimbabwe
1981 157 Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Vanuatu
1983 158 Saint Kitts and Nevis
1984 159 Brunei Darussalam
1990 1593 Liechtenstein, Namibia
1991 166 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Estonia, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, Republic of Korea
1992 179 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 Croatia, 2 Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, San Marino, Slovenia, 3 Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
1993 184 Andorra, Czech Republic, Eritrea, Monaco, Slovak Republic, The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia3
1994 185 Palau
1999 188 Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga
2000 189 Tuvalu, Serbia and Montenegro1
2002 191 Switzerland, Timor-Leste
Notes: 
1 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an original Member of the United Nations, the 
Charter having been signed on its behalf on 26 June 1945 and ratified 19 October 1945, until its 
dissolution following the establishment and subsequent admission as new members of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General 
Assembly resolution A/RES/46/237 of 22 May 1992.
The Republic of Croatia was admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General Assembly 
resolution A/RES/46/238 of 22 May 1992.
The Republic of Slovenia was admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General Assembly 
resolution A/RES/46/236 of 22 May 1992.
By resolution A/RES/47/225 of 8 April 1993, the General Assembly decided to admit as a Member of 
the United Nations the State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations 
as "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" pending settlement of the difference that had arisen 
over its name.
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General 
Assembly resolution A/RES/55/12 of 1 November 2000.
Following the adoption and the promulgation of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro 
by the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 4 February 2003, the name of the State of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was changed to Serbia and Montenegro. 
2 The total remains the same because from 21 January 1958 Syria and Egypt continued as a single 
member (United Arab Republic). 
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3 The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were admitted to 
membership in the United Nations on 18 September 1973. Through the accession of the German 
Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany, effective from 3 October 1990, the two 
German States have united to form one sovereign State.
Source: http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm




Cocos (Keeling) Islands Change in Status 1984









Independence as Papua New 
Guinea
1975
Belgian Congo Independence as Congo 
Leopoldville, then Zaire 
Now Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
1960




Independence as Rwanda 1962
Denmark Greenland Change in Status 1954
French Equatorial Africa Independence as Chad 1960
Independence as Gabon 1960
(Middle Congo) Independence as Congo 
(Brazzaville)
Now Republic of the Congo
1960
(Ubangi Shari) Independence as Central 
African Republic
1960
French Establishments in 
India
Change in Status 1947
French Establishments in 
Oceania
Change in Status 1947
French Guiana Change in Status 1947
France
French Somaliland Independence as Djibouti 1977
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French West Africa Independence as Dahomey
Now Benin
1960
(French Guinea) Independence as Guinea 1958
(French Sudan) Independence as Mali 1960
Independence as Ivory Coast 1960
Independence as Mauritania 1960
(Niger Colony) Independence as Niger 1960
Independence as Senegal 1960





Change in Status 1947
Independence as Cambodia 1953
Independence as Laos 1949
Indo-China
Independence as Viet Nam 1945
Independence as Madagascar 1960Madagascar and 
Dependencies
Independence as Comoros 1975
Martinique Change in Status 1947
Morocco Independence 1956
New Caledonia 1 and 
Dependencies




Independence as Vanuatu 1980
Reunion Change in Status 1947




Independence as Cameroon 1960
French Togoland
Trust Territory
Independence as Togo 1960
Italy Somaliland
Trust Territory
Independence as Somalia 
(joined with British 
Somaliland)
1960
Netherlands Netherlands Indies Independence as Indonesia 1949
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Netherlands New Guinea Joined with Indonesia as Irian 
Jaya
1963
Netherlands Antilles Change in Status 1951
Change in Status 1951Surinam
Independence as Suriname 1975
Cook Islands Change in Status 1965




Independence as Samoa 1962
Angola, including the 
enclave of Cabinda
Independence 1975
Cape Verde Archipelago Independence as Cape Verde 1975
Goa and Dependencies Change in Status 1961
Portuguese Guinea Independence as 
Guinea Bissau
1974
Macau and Dependencies Change in Status 1972
Mozambique Independence 1975
Sao João Batista de Ajuda Change in Status 1961
Sao Tome and Principe Independence 1975
Portugal
East Timor2 Independence as Timor Leste 2002
General Assembly terminated 
South Africa’s mandate
1966South Africa South West Africa
Independence as Namibia 1990
Fernando Póo and Rí 
Muni
Independence as Equatorial 
Guinea
1968Spain
Ifni Change in Status 1969
Aden Colony and 
Protectorate





Basutoland Independence as Lesotho 1966
Bechuanaland
Protectorate
Independence as Botswana 1966
British Guiana Independence as Guyana 1966
British Honduras Independence as Belize 1981
British Somaliland Independence as Somalia 








Gambia Independence as The Gambia 1965
Independence as Kiribati 1979Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
Colony
Independence as Tuvalu 1978
Gold Coast Colony and 
Protectorate
Independence as Ghana 1957




(Antigua) Independence as Antigua 
and Barbuda
1981
(St. Kitts- Nevis-Anguilla) Independence as St. Kitts and 
Nevis (separated from 
Anguilla)
1983








North Borneo3 Change in status 1963
Northern Rhodesia Independence as Zambia 1964
Nyasaland Independence as Malawi 1964
Sarawak3 Change in status 1963
Seychelles Independence 1976
Sierra Leone Independence 1961
Singapore3 Independence 1965
Solomon Islands Independence 1978
Southern Rhodesia Independence as Zimbabwe 1980
Swaziland Independence 1968
Trinidad and Tobago Independence 1962
Uganda Independence 1962
Windward Islands
(Dominica) Independence as Dominica 1978
(Grenada) Independence as Grenada 1974
(St. Lucia) Independence as St. Lucia 1979
(St. Vincent) Independence as St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines
1979
Zanzibar Independence4 as United 
Republic of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar
Now Republic of Tanzania
1963














Independence4 as United 
Republic of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar after joining
with Zanzibar
Now Republic of Tanzania
1963
United States Alaska Change in Status 1959
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Hawaii Change in Status 1959
Panama Canal Zone Change in Status 1947
Puerto Rico Change in Status 1952
Change in Status as Federated 
Sates of Micronesia
1990
Change in Status as Republic 
of the Marshall Island
1990





Change in Status as Palau 1994
Notes:
1In 1986 the General Assembly determined that New Caledonia was a Non-Self-Governing 
Territory.
2Initially administered by Portugal. Under Indonesian control between 1975 and 1999. East 
Timor attained independence in May 2002 and joined the United Nations in September 2002 
as Timor Leste.
3In 1963, the Federation of Malaya became Malaysia, following the admission to the new 
federation of Singapore, Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak. Singapore became independent 
1965.
4Following the ratification in 1964 of Articles of Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, 
the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was formed and later changed its name to
the United Republic of Tanzania.
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lack of civilization simplistic civilization
primitive backward
Figure-3: Second Associational Cluster of Political Independence, Freedom, 
Autonomy and Sovereignty
ability to make decisions for self
Autonomy
maturity Political Independence growth
Freedom
Sovereignty 
     responsibility, including responsibility for self
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Figure-4: Second Associational Cluster of Political Dependence and Lack of 
Sovereignty
immaturity dependency
wards political dependence children
      lack of sovereignty
          lack of responsibility, including responsibility for self
Figure-5: A “Colonialist” Anti-Colonialist Discourse
                      not advanced, progressed, evolved, developed
not self-governing backwardness lower level of culture
      uneducated
Figure-6: An “Alternative” Anti-Colonialist Discourse
lack of development, lack of independence independence leads to development
backwardness 
colonialism leads to backwardness, lack of development





Advancement, Development Backward, Underdeveloped
Modernity, Progress, Evolution Primitive, Native, Incompetent, Uneducated
Higher civilization
vs 
Lack of civilization/simplistic civilization
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Political Dependence-Lack of 
Sovereignty
Maturity, growth Immaturity, children
Ability to make decisions for self Wards, dependency
Responsibility (for self)
vs
Lack of responsibility (for self)
Table-3: Political Status, Linear Progression, and Kinship
Key Terms/symbols Cluster 1: Status in Linear Progression Cluster 2: Kinship
Advanced Maturity
Developed Growth
Modern Ability to make decisions for 
self















Lack of civilization/simplistic 
civilization
Table-4: Identities, Relationships and Knowledges in the Anti-Colonialist 
Response
Identity Distinctions Relationships Knowledge
N1 ‘Advanced’ administering 
authorities versus ‘backwards’ 
dependent territories





require help in 
modernizing.
N2 ‘Advanced’ administering 
authorities versus ‘backwards’ 
dependent territories
Independence required for 
progress; tutelage not 
required.
Dependent territories are 
backwards because of 
colonialism.




Dependent territories are 





Chart-1: Prevalence of Appeals in Debates on NSGTs, Trusts, and the 











































































Colonialist NSGT Colonialist Trust Colonialist Declaration
Anti-Colonialist NSGT Anti-Colonialist Trust Anti-Colonialist Declaration
Notes:
1This is based on a total of 74 meetings examined, with 20 of those being on NSGTs, 34 being on  
 Trusts, and 20 being on the Declaration.
2 Percentages are calculated for the total number of appeals across all fifteen years of debate in order 
 to control for the different length of time spent on Trusts versus NSGTs versus the Declaration.
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Table-1: Main Organs of the United Nations
Organ Membership Major Functions
Security Council (SC) 11 members, including 5 
permanent members consisting of 
US, UK, France, China, USSR 
and 6 temporary members
Maintain peace and 
security, act on behalf of 
GA in situations requiring 
prompt action, submit 
reports to GA, revoke and 
restore membership 
privileges, deal with all 
trust territories designated 
as 'strategic,' shall have 
assistance from other UN 
members as required, shall 
have assistance from ESC 
as required, may help 
enforce decisions of ICJ.
General Assembly (GA) All members of UN It could consider and 
discuss, principles, initiate 
studies and receive reports, 
make recommendations,2
may refer matters to the 
SC, agree to accept and 
carry out decisions of SC, 
approve the budget, 
oversee the TC with 
respect to 'non-strategic 
trusts,' responsible for the 
ESC, responsible for 
overseeing international 
economic and social 
cooperation as laid out in 
Chapter IX. 
UN members, who assume 
responsibility for the 
administration of NSGTs, 
must help promote the 
interest of these peoples, 
assist them in their 
development (Chapter XI).
Economic and Social Council 
(ESC)
A number of members elected by 
GA
Make undertake studies 
with respect of economic, 
social, cultural, 
educational, health and 
other matters, generally 
under GA 
Trusteeship Council (TC) Include UN members who 
administer trusts plus as many 
non-administering members as 
required so that each constitutes 
1/2 of the Council.
Will operate under 
authority of GA to oversee 
the (non-strategic) trust 
territories.
International Court of Justice 
(ICJ)
Principle judicial organ of 
UN
Secretariat Consists of Secretary-General Will act in capacity of 
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(appointed by GA upon 
recommendation of SC) and staff
chief administrative officer 
in meetings of GA, SC, 
ESC, TC
Notes:
1This was changed in 1963 to 15 members, though the number of permanent members remained 5
2except on an issue the Security Council is considering, as per Article 12
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